(2025) ibclaw.in 63 HC IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI Jaiprakash Associates Ltd.v.NHPC Ltd. ARB.P. 1061/2023Decided on 14-Jan-25 Mr. […]
The Hon’ble Patna High Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on the facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression ‘sufficient cause’ cannot be liberally interpreted, if based on the facts of the case it is evident that there has been negligence, inaction or lack of bonafides on the part of the petitioner. The term ‘sufficient cause’ means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bonafide on the part of the petitioner in view of the facts and circumstances of the case.
The Hon’ble Delhi High Court held that a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act is for setting aside the Award. It cannot be said that a challenge to an Award filed without the Award itself would be a valid filing. Without the Award, the challenge would become meaningless because unless the Award is perused by the Court, it cannot adjudicate upon the appropriateness and correctness of the Award. An application under Section 34 of the Act filed without an Award and admittedly without a vakalatmana can only be a stack of papers filed only to save the limitation.
The Hon’ble Chhattisgarh High Court observed that in the present case, an award was passed on 30.07.2021. The petitioner filed a reply to the application moved under Section 36 of the Arbitration Act, before the learned Executing Court in December, 2022 and thereafter, moved an application under Section 31(5) of the Act, 1996 on 04.11.2023. The petitioner could have obtained a certified copy of the award from the arbitral records available with the learned Executing Court but instead moved an application under Section 35(1) of the Act, 1996. Non-supply of the signed arbitral award may be a ground for setting aside an award, but on this count alone, the execution proceedings cannot be quashed. The award can be challenged by the judgment/award debtor only in accordance with the provisions of Section 34(2) of the Act, 1996, and not otherwise.
The Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court held that:
(i) The termination of the arbitral proceedings can be on account of the non-cooperative attitude of the parties, including the non-deposit of the arbitral fee. In such circumstances, there is no occasion for filing of a fresh petition for appointment of an Arbitrator, rather the remedy for the party concerned is either to file an application for recall of the order or to challenge the legality of the order under Section 14(2).
(ii) On the basis of the same legal notice, petitioners have approached the Court once again for appointment of an Arbitrator under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act. Once an Arbitrator already stood appointed pursuant to the legal notice, petitioners are debarred from approaching this Court all over again and the present petition is not maintainable.
The Hon’ble Calcutta High Court held that there are different situations which may arise even after the passing of an order under section 36 of the Arbitration Act. The parties or any one of them may need to approach Court in view of subsequent events or changed circumstances. The security may also require to be renewed, revalued or re-examined. Thus, once a Court exercises its jurisdiction under section 36 of the Act and directs security in a particular mode and manner, it always retains inherent jurisdiction in respect of such security. In such circumstances, any order passed at this stage of the proceeding is an interim order and by nature subject to alteration, variation or modification. As such, a Court always retains the power and jurisdiction to pass necessary orders.
The Hon’ble Madras High Court held that on the first ground that no personal hearing was granted, though in the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 almost 31 grounds were raised, this was not one of the grounds. Moreover, the Appellant, to a specific query posed by us, was candid that this ground was not raised before the learned Single Judge. Therefore, in our view, this cannot be raised now at the stage of appeal under Section 37 of the said Act, appellant having accepted the position.
The Hon’ble Calcutta High Court held that the Arbitral Tribunal proceeded on the premise that it did not, since the respondent had not filed any such independent application under Section 33 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and restricted its correction to the prayer made by the claimant in its application under the said provision. However, such view of the Arbitral Tribunal is patently illegal, being in contravention of Section 33(3) of the 1996 Act. The said provision empowers the Arbitral Tribunal to correct any error of the type referred to in Clause (a) of sub-section (1) on its own initiative within 30 days from the date of arbitral award.
(2025) ibclaw.in 09 HC IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd.v.Stewardss and Lloyds India Ltd. and
A plain reading of Section 34 reveals that the scope of interference by the Court with the arbitral award under Section 34 is very limited, and the Court is not supposed to travel beyond the aforesaid scope to determine whether the award is good or bad. Even an award that may not be reasonable or is non-speaking to some extent cannot ordinarily be interfered with by the Courts. It is also well settled that even if two views are possible, there is no scope for the Court to reappraise the evidence and take a different view from that taken by the arbitrator.
