Consumer Protection Act 2019

Can the benefit of the condonable period, which expired during the Court’s vacation, be granted when the petition is filed immediately after the reopening of the Court, in exercise of the power under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963? – My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. Vs. Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd. – Supreme Court

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in light of the current position of law, the Section 34 application preferred by the appellant is barred by limitation based on the following conclusions:
(i) There is no wholesale exclusion of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act when calculating the limitation period under Section 34(3) of the ACA.
(ii) Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies to Section 34(3) of the ACA only to the extent when the 3-month period expires on a court holiday. It does not aid the applicant when the 30-day condonable period expires on a court holiday.
(iii) In view of the applicability of Section 4 of the Limitation Act to Section 34 proceedings, Section 10 of the GCA does not apply and will not benefit the applicant when the 30- day condonable period expires on a court holiday.

Can the benefit of the condonable period, which expired during the Court’s vacation, be granted when the petition is filed immediately after the reopening of the Court, in exercise of the power under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963? – My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. Vs. Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd. – Supreme Court Read Post »

Circumstances when a sale of property by auction or other means may be set-aside after its confirmation | Henderson Principle | Applicability of Lis Pendens in case of subsequent transfer of the property sold under auction – Celir LLP v. Mr. Sumati Prasad Bafna and Ors. – Supreme Court

In this judgment, Hon’ble Supreme Court deals with the following points:
(i) Concept of Abuse of Process of Court and Collateral challenge to judgments that have attained finality.
(ii) Scope of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.
(iii) Once Borrower has elected to move the High Court for the very same cause of action and underlying prayers, the Borrower was precluded from pursuing its remedies before the DRT.
(iv) The ‘Henderson’ Principle as a corollary of Constructive Res-Judicata.
(v) Four situations where in second proceedings between the same parties doctrine res judicata as a corollary of the principle of abuse of process may be invoked
(vi) Applicability of Lis Pendens in the absence of any registration as required under the State Amendment to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
(vii) Interpretation of the Higher Court decisions.
(viii) Circumstances when a sale of property by auction or other means under the SARFAESI Act may be set-aside after its confirmation.

Circumstances when a sale of property by auction or other means may be set-aside after its confirmation | Henderson Principle | Applicability of Lis Pendens in case of subsequent transfer of the property sold under auction – Celir LLP v. Mr. Sumati Prasad Bafna and Ors. – Supreme Court Read Post »

The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally – Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By L.Rs. and Ors. Vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) – Supreme Court

Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.

The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally – Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By L.Rs. and Ors. Vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) – Supreme Court Read Post »

Legal principles relevant in adjudicating cases where subordinate legislation (Rules/Regulations) are challenged on the ground of being ultra vires the parent Act | Rule 9(3)(b) of CA (Procedure of Investigation of Professional and Other Misconduct and Conduct of Cases) Rules, 2007 falls within the scope of the general delegation of power under Sec. 29A of ICAI Act, 1949 – Naresh Chandra Agrawal Vs. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India and Ors. – Supreme Court

In this, important judgment on challenging Rules/Regulations ultra virus of main Act, Hon’ble Supreme Court has listed 8 points for adjudicating cases where subordinate legislation (Rules/Regulations) are challenged on the ground of being ‘ultra vires’ the parent Act.

Also, Hon’ble Court holds that Rule 9(3)(b) of the Chartered Accountants’ (Procedure of Investigation of Professional and Other Misconduct and Conduct of Cases) Rules, 2007 is not inconsistent with and beyond the rule-making power of the Central Government under Section 29A(1) of ICAI Act, 1949.

In this case, the Court also explains the principle of ‘generality vs enumeration’, Section 21 and 21A of ICAI Act, 1949, Rule 9 etc.

Legal principles relevant in adjudicating cases where subordinate legislation (Rules/Regulations) are challenged on the ground of being ultra vires the parent Act | Rule 9(3)(b) of CA (Procedure of Investigation of Professional and Other Misconduct and Conduct of Cases) Rules, 2007 falls within the scope of the general delegation of power under Sec. 29A of ICAI Act, 1949 – Naresh Chandra Agrawal Vs. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India and Ors. – Supreme Court Read Post »

Condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial – Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) Through Lrs. & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Anr. – Supreme Court

Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:
(i) Condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial.
(ii) Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable.
(iii) Each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts.
(iv) Law is fairly well-settled that “a court of appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts below”.

Condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial – Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) Through Lrs. & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Anr. – Supreme Court Read Post »

The Union of India shall ensure that on or before 15.11.2023, all tribunals are provided with requisite infrastructure for hybrid hearings – Sarvesh Mathur Vs. The Registrar General High Court of Punjab and Haryana – Supreme Court

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The Union of India shall ensure that on or before 15.11.2023, all tribunals are provided with requisite infrastructure for hybrid hearings – Sarvesh Mathur Vs. The Registrar General High Court of Punjab and Haryana – Supreme Court Read Post »

In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal, application or proceeding, the period from 15.03.2020 till 02.10.2021 shall stand excluded – In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation – Supreme Court

I. In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal, application or proceeding, the period from 15.03.2020 till 02.10.2021 shall stand excluded. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 15.03.2021, if any, shall become available with effect from 03.10.2021.

II. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 02.10.2021, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 03.10.2021. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 03.10.2021, is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply.

III. The period from 15.03.2020 till 02.10.2021 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23 (4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings.

In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal, application or proceeding, the period from 15.03.2020 till 02.10.2021 shall stand excluded – In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation – Supreme Court Read Post »

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