29

The discretionary power conferred under Section 34(4) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is to be exercised where there is inadequate reasoning or to fill up the gaps in the reasoning, in support of the findings which are already recorded in the award – Union of India Vs. B.B. Senapati – Orissa High Court

Hon’ble Orissa High Court held that:
(i) When application is filed under Section 34(4) of the Act, the same is to be considered keeping in mind the grounds raised in the application under Section 34(1) of the Act by the party, who has questioned the award of the Arbitral Tribunal and the grounds raised in the application filed under Section 34(4) of the Act and the reply thereto.
(ii) Merely because an application is filed under Section 34(4) of the Act by a party, it is not always obligatory on the part of the Court to remit the matter to Arbitral Tribunal. The discretionary power conferred under Section 34(4) of the Act, is to be exercised where there is inadequate reasoning or to fill up the gaps in the reasoning, in support of the findings which are already recorded in the award.
(iii) A harmonious reading of Section 31, 34(1), 34(2A) and 34(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, make it clear that in appropriate cases, on the request made by a party, Court can give an opportunity to the arbitrator to resume the arbitral proceedings for giving reasons or to fill up the gaps in the reasoning in support of a finding, which is already rendered in the award. But at the same time, when it prima facie appears that there is a patent illegality in the award itself, by not recording a finding on a contentious issue, in such cases, Court may not accede to the request of a party for giving an opportunity to the Arbitral Tribunal to resume the arbitral proceedings.

The discretionary power conferred under Section 34(4) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is to be exercised where there is inadequate reasoning or to fill up the gaps in the reasoning, in support of the findings which are already recorded in the award – Union of India Vs. B.B. Senapati – Orissa High Court Read Post »

The exclusion of assets from the definition of the expression “assets” through explanation under Section 18 of IBC does not extend to Section 25 of IBC – Victory Iron Works Ltd. Vs. Jitendra Lohia & Anr. – Supreme Court

Hon’ble Supreme Court held that from Sections 18 and 25 that the word “asset” and not the word “property” is what is used in these provisions, though the word “property” is defined in Section 3(27). But the said word “asset” used in Sections 18 and 25 is not defined in the IBC. While the definition of the word in the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act,1993 appears to be exhaustive, the definition in IBC is only inclusive. The word “asset” is not defined, either in IBC or in any of the seven enactments referred to in Section 3(37) of the Code. Since the expression “asset” in common parlance denotes “property of any kind”, the bundle of rights that the Corporate Debtor has over the property in question would constitute “asset” within the meaning of Section 18(f) and Section 25(2)(a) of IBC.
As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the Resolution Professional, the Explanation under Section 18 begins with a caveat namely “for the purposes of this Section”. Therefore, the exclusion of assets owned by a third-party, but in the possession of the Corporate Debtor held under contractual arrangements, from the definition of the expression “assets”, is limited to Section 18. In other words, the Explanation under Section 18 does not extend to Section 25.

The exclusion of assets from the definition of the expression “assets” through explanation under Section 18 of IBC does not extend to Section 25 of IBC – Victory Iron Works Ltd. Vs. Jitendra Lohia & Anr. – Supreme Court Read Post »

Scroll to Top