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CIRP application filed u/s 9 of IBC in respect of claims arising under the Settlement Agreement does not come within the definition of ‘Operational Debt’ – Mr. Maulik Kirtibhai Shah Vs. United Telecoms Ltd. – NCLAT Chennai

NCLAT held that the Petition filed in respect of claims arising under the aforementioned Settlement Agreement [even if disputed herein] does not come within the definition of Operational Debt]. Time and again, the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of Judgments held that the IBC is not a recovery mechanism. Even if the Settlement Agreement is taken into consideration, this Tribunal is of the earnest view that the claims arising under the MOU lost the character of Operational Debt and became a debt simpliciter. In respect of in the definition of Operational Debt cannot be interpreted widely so as to include any agreement between the parties which does not specifically pertain to the supply of goods or services. A wide interpretation would only defeat the scope and objective of the code. Keeping in view, the spirit of the Code, this Tribunal is of the considered view that at best, the claims are contractual claims for which appropriate Civil Proceedings may lie.

CIRP application filed u/s 9 of IBC in respect of claims arising under the Settlement Agreement does not come within the definition of ‘Operational Debt’ – Mr. Maulik Kirtibhai Shah Vs. United Telecoms Ltd. – NCLAT Chennai Read Post »

Whether the period of limitation u/s 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 r/w Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act, is to be counted from the date of dismissal of the SLP or the date when the appellant came to know about the dismissal of the SLP – M/s Noumla Brothers Vs. M/s Ruchi World Wide Ltd. – Madhya Pradesh High Court

Hon’ble High Court held that as per sub-section (1) of Section 34, the arbitral award is liable to be set aside only by way of an application in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) of Section 34. As per sub-section (3), an application for setting aside may not be made after three months (not 90 days) have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award. As per Proviso, if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months, it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. As per Proviso to sub-section (3), for granting an extension of time for thirty days from three months, an application is liable to be filed. Thus, in the present case, the appellant was required to file two applications, first u/s. 14 of the Limitation Act for exclusion of time spent in the proceedings bona fide in the Court without jurisdiction; and another application under the Proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 for further extension of one month.

Whether the period of limitation u/s 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 r/w Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act, is to be counted from the date of dismissal of the SLP or the date when the appellant came to know about the dismissal of the SLP – M/s Noumla Brothers Vs. M/s Ruchi World Wide Ltd. – Madhya Pradesh High Court Read Post »

Mr. Sanjay Kumar Mishra RP of Transstroy Tirupati Thiruthani Chennai Tollsways Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s. International Asset Reconstruction Company Pvt. Ltd. – NCLT Hyderabad Bench

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Mr. Sanjay Kumar Mishra RP of Transstroy Tirupati Thiruthani Chennai Tollsways Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s. International Asset Reconstruction Company Pvt. Ltd. – NCLT Hyderabad Bench Read Post »

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