The Adjudicating Authority observed that the fundamental difference between the facts of Sesh Nath Singh (2021) ibclaw.in 49 SC and the present case is this: in Sesh Nath Singh (supra), the financial creditor was a cooperative bank. The Hon’ble Calcutta High Court, before whom the SARFAESI proceedings were challenged, was prima facie of the view that a cooperative bank could not invoke the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. Therefore, the proceedings were stayed pending a final decision on the writ petition. Therefore, both the appellate courts felt that a case was made out for exclusion of time under section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In case the writ proceedings confirmed the prima facie view of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court that a cooperative bank could not initiate SARFAESI proceedings, then it would have resulted in the proceedings before DRT being quashed. That would have left the creditor therein with only one remedy: to approach the civil court. In these circumstances, the Hon’ble Supreme Court thought it fit to hold that section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would have applicability.
As noticed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sesh Nath Singh (supra) in para 77 thereof, section 14 provides that an applicant who has prosecuted another civil proceeding with due diligence before a forum which is unable to entertain the same on account of jurisdiction or any other cause of like nature, is entitled to exclusion of time spent in prosecuting such proceeding in computing the period of time. However, such is not the case here. The financial creditor is perfectly entitled to maintain the proceedings initiated by it under the RDDB Act before the learned DRT-I, Kolkata, for recovery of its dues. Neither is the DRT a wrong forum. Therefore, in this conspectus, it is not a fit case for exclusion of time under section 14.