Limitation- Section 17 of Limitation Act

Can the benefit of the condonable period, which expired during the Court’s vacation, be granted when the petition is filed immediately after the reopening of the Court, in exercise of the power under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963? – My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. Vs. Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd. – Supreme Court

/ 61 minutes of reading

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in light of the current position of law, the Section 34 application preferred by the appellant is barred by limitation based on the following conclusions:
(i) There is no wholesale exclusion of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act when calculating the limitation period under Section 34(3) of the ACA.
(ii) Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies to Section 34(3) of the ACA only to the extent when the 3-month period expires on a court holiday. It does not aid the applicant when the 30-day condonable period expires on a court holiday.
(iii) In view of the applicability of Section 4 of the Limitation Act to Section 34 proceedings, Section 10 of the GCA does not apply and will not benefit the applicant when the 30- day condonable period expires on a court holiday.

Can the benefit of the condonable period, which expired during the Court’s vacation, be granted when the petition is filed immediately after the reopening of the Court, in exercise of the power under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963? – My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. Vs. Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd. – Supreme Court Read Post »

The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally – Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By L.Rs. and Ors. Vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) – Supreme Court

/ 20 minutes of reading

Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.

The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally – Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By L.Rs. and Ors. Vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) – Supreme Court Read Post »

For non-filing of claim by Management of Claimant/Creditor in a CIRP of the Corporate Debtor, the Resolution Professional of Claimant/Creditor is fully entitled to take appropriate proceedings against the Ex-Management and the benefits of Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for filing belated claim is not available in case where fraud was played in the Claimant/Creditor Company and not in the Corporate Debtor – Gyan Chandra Misra RP for Three C Green Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Three C Universal Developers Pvt. Ltd. – NCLAT New Delhi

/ 17 minutes of reading

In the facts of the present case, the claim of the Appellant was filed after 14 months from the date when Resolution Plan in the CIRP of the Corporate Debtor was approved by the CoC.

Hon’ble NCLAT held that:
(i) For non-filing of claim by the Management of 3C Green, the Resolution Professional of 3C Green is fully entitled to take appropriate proceedings against the Ex-Management on allegation of fraud of siphoning of money in the CIRP of the 3C Green.
(ii) The benefits of Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for filing belated claim is not available in case where fraud was played in the Claimant/Creditor Company and not in the Corporate Debtor.
(iii) The present is a case where fraud is being alleged against the Management of 3C Green itself and in which Appellant is Resolution Professional. It is not a case of the Appellant that any fraud was played by the Corporate Debtor in whose CIRP belated claim has been filed by the Appellant, so that claim could not be filed by the Appellant. No fraud is alleged against the Corporate Debtor. Hence, we fail to see as to how the benefit of Section 17 of the Limitation Act can be claimed by the Appellant in the present case.
(iv) Dismissed the appeal.

For non-filing of claim by Management of Claimant/Creditor in a CIRP of the Corporate Debtor, the Resolution Professional of Claimant/Creditor is fully entitled to take appropriate proceedings against the Ex-Management and the benefits of Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for filing belated claim is not available in case where fraud was played in the Claimant/Creditor Company and not in the Corporate Debtor – Gyan Chandra Misra RP for Three C Green Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Three C Universal Developers Pvt. Ltd. – NCLAT New Delhi Read Post »

The IBC does not exclude the application of Sections 6 or 14 or 18 or any other provision of the Limitation Act, 1963 to proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 in the NCLT/NCLAT | All the provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to proceedings in the NCLT/NCLAT, to the extent feasible – Sesh Nath Singh and Anr. Vs. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-Operative Bank Ltd. and Anr. – Supreme Court

/ 75 minutes of reading

This judgment covers:
A. Interpretation of Section 238A of IBC and applicability of provision of Limitation Act to proceedings under the IBC.
B. Interpretation of the words ‘as far as may be’ used in Section 238A of the IBC.
C. Basis of Condonation of delay in filing of Application/Appeal.
D. Requirement of Formal Application for condonation of delay in filing of Application/Appeal.
E. Various aspect of applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in respect to IBC.
E.1. IBC does not exclude the operation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
E.2. Proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 are civil proceedings.
E.3. Proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 would qualify for exclusion under Section 14 of the Limitation Act?
E.4. Whether the expression ‘Court’ in Section 14(2) of Limitation Act includes any forum under the SARFAESI Act?
E.5 Whether exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, would only be available if the proceedings had ended?
F. Other: Dispute irrelevant for IBC Section 7 proceedings.
G. Conclusion and
H. Disposed of.

The IBC does not exclude the application of Sections 6 or 14 or 18 or any other provision of the Limitation Act, 1963 to proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 in the NCLT/NCLAT | All the provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to proceedings in the NCLT/NCLAT, to the extent feasible – Sesh Nath Singh and Anr. Vs. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-Operative Bank Ltd. and Anr. – Supreme Court Read Post »

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