Justice S. Ravindra Bhat

Not all dues owed under statute are treated as ‘government dues’ under Section 53 of IBC, Rainbow Papers judgment did not notice the waterfall mechanism – Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. Vs. Raman Ispat Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. – Supreme Court

Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:
(i) On occurrence of any eventuality specified under Section 33, the liquidation process has to begin, as a matter of course – there is no choice in the matter.
(ii) The expression “government dues” is not defined in the IBC – it finds place only in the preamble. The repeated reference of lowering of priority of debts to the government, on account of statutory tax, or other dues payable to the Central Government or State Government, or amounts payable into the Consolidated Fund on account of either government, in the various reports which preceded the enactment of the IBC, as well as its Preamble, means that these dues are distinct and have to be treated as separate from those owed to secured creditors.
(iii) The specific mention of other class of creditors whose dues are statutory, such as dues payable to workmen or employees, “the provident fund, the pension fund, the gratuity fund” under Section 36(4), which excludes these enumerated amounts from the liquidation, especially clarifies that not all dues owed under statute are treated as ‘government’ dues. In other words, dues payable to statutory corporations which do not fall within the description “amounts due to the central or state government” such as for instance amounts payable to corporations created by statutes which have distinct juristic entity but whose dues do not constitute government dues payable or those payable into the respective Consolidated Funds stand on a different footing.
(iv) On the other hand, dues payable or requiring to be credited to the Treasury, such as tax, tariffs, etc. which broadly fall within the ambit of Article 265 of the Constitution are ‘government dues’ and therefore covered by Section 53(1)(f) of the IBC.
(v) Rainbow Papers judgment did not notice the ‘waterfall mechanism’ under Section 53 – the provision had not been adverted to or extracted in the judgment. The dues payable to the government are placed much below those of secured creditors and even unsecured and operational creditors. This design was either not brought to the notice of the court in Rainbow Papers (supra) or was missed altogether. In any event, the judgment has not taken note of the provisions of the IBC which treat the dues payable to secured creditors at a higher footing than dues payable to Central or State Government.

Not all dues owed under statute are treated as ‘government dues’ under Section 53 of IBC, Rainbow Papers judgment did not notice the waterfall mechanism – Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. Vs. Raman Ispat Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. – Supreme Court Read Post »

Mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the high court and render a writ petition not maintainable – M/s Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. Vs. The Excise and Taxation Officer-Cum-Assessing Authority & Ors. – Supreme Court

Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard may be made to Article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the petitioner before the high court, in a given case, has not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that the high courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not.

Mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the high court and render a writ petition not maintainable – M/s Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. Vs. The Excise and Taxation Officer-Cum-Assessing Authority & Ors. – Supreme Court Read Post »

Award rendered in the a settlement of disputes or differences through a two-tier arbitration procedure being a “foreign award” is liable to be enforced under the provisions of Section 48 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – M/s. Centrotrade Minerals and Metals Inc. Vs. Hindustan Copper Ltd. – Supreme Court

The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that as has been held in paragraph 76 of Vijay Karia (supra), the context of Section 48 is recognition and enforcement of foreign awards under the New York Convention of 1958. Given the context of the New York Convention, and the fact that the expression “otherwise” is susceptible to  two  meanings,  it  is  clear  that  the  narrower  meaning  has  been preferred, which is in consonance with the pro-enforcement bias spoken  about by a large number of judgments referred to in Vijay Karia (supra). Kochuni’s case (supra) dealing with an entirely different Act with a different object cannot, therefore, possibly apply to construe this word in the setting in which it occurs.

Award rendered in the a settlement of disputes or differences through a two-tier arbitration procedure being a “foreign award” is liable to be enforced under the provisions of Section 48 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – M/s. Centrotrade Minerals and Metals Inc. Vs. Hindustan Copper Ltd. – Supreme Court Read Post »

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