In this judgment, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:
(i) Extension under Section 29A beyond six months, even by consent of the parties, is not permitted.
(ii) The court has the power to extend the period for making an award at any time before or after the mandated period.
(iii) The word “terminate” in Section 29A(4) makes the arbitral tribunal functus officio, but not in absolute terms.
(iv) The termination of the arbitral mandate is conditional upon the non-filing of an extension application and cannot be treated as termination stricto sensu. Termination under Section 29A(4) is not set in stone or absolutistic in character.
(v) The power of the court to extend the time is to be exercised only in cases where there is sufficient cause for such extension.
(vi) The arbitral tribunal may not pronounce the award till an application under Section 29A(5) of the A & C Act is sub-judice before the court.
(vii) In a given case, where an award is pronounced during the pendency of an application for extension of period of the arbitral tribunal, the court must still decide the application under sub-section (5), and may even, where an award has been pronounced, invoke, when required and justified, sub-sections (6) to (8), or the first and third proviso to Section 29A(4) of the A & C Act.
(viii) Conclusion: An application for extension of the time period for passing an arbitral award under Section 29A(4) read with Section 29A(5) is maintainable even after the expiry of the twelve-month or the extended six-month period, as the case may be.