Mr. Justice Rajesh S. Patil

Suspension period of an Insolvency Professional is a matter within the realm of the IBBI Disciplinary Committee – Vijendra Kumar Jain Vs. The Insolvency & Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) and Anr. – Bombay High Court

Hon’ble Bombay High Court held that:

(i) The action of suspending the registration of the petitioner as RP on the basis of judgment of NCLAT, which was not challenged by the IP, is justified.
(ii) The period for which such suspension should operate is a matter within the realm of the Disciplinary Committee.
(iii) The Disciplinary Committee in the light of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Section 220 of the Code is empowered to take into consideration all relevant aspects including the conduct of RP.

Suspension period of an Insolvency Professional is a matter within the realm of the IBBI Disciplinary Committee – Vijendra Kumar Jain Vs. The Insolvency & Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) and Anr. – Bombay High Court Read Post »

Whether IBBI Disciplinary Committee constituted under Section 220 of the IBC can consist of a Single Whole-Time Member – Rohit J. Vora Vs. Insolvency & Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) – Bombay High Court

Division Bench of Hon’ble Bombay High Court held that:

(i) The proviso to Section 220(1) of IBC merely requires that the members of the Disciplinary Committee should be whole-time members of the IBBI. The said proviso does not seek to provide the number of members who should constitute the Disciplinary Committee.
(ii) While Section 220(1) of the Code deals with constitution of a Disciplinary Committee with the requirement that its members ought to be whole-time members of the IBBI, the constitution of the Disciplinary Committee as regards the number of its members is provided by Clause 2(1)(c) of the Regulations of 2017.
(iii) Regulation 2(1)(c) of the IBBI (Inspection and Investigation Regulations) Regulations, 2017 cannot be said that this clause travels beyond what has been provided by Section 220(1).
(iv) It would be permissible to constitute a Disciplinary Committee consisting of either a single whole-time member or more than one whole-time member of the IBBI.

Whether IBBI Disciplinary Committee constituted under Section 220 of the IBC can consist of a Single Whole-Time Member – Rohit J. Vora Vs. Insolvency & Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) – Bombay High Court Read Post »

Suspension of authorisation for assignment (AFA) pending consideration of show cause notices issued under Section 219 of IBC is not contrary to law | Clause 23A of Model Bye-Laws and Governing Board of IPAs Regulations, 2016 cannot be held to be ultra vires – Kairav Anil Trivedi Vs. Insolvency & Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) and Ors. – Bombay High Court

The Hon’ble Bombay High Court (Division Bench) did not find that Clause 23A of the Schedule of IBBI (Model Bye-Laws and Governing Board of Insolvency Professional Agencies) Regulations, 2016 travel beyond what has been empowered to be done under the Code.

The Bench also considered the office noting placed on record which indicates that DGM (IBBI) was directed to undertake investigation and held that it cannot be said that the Investigating Authority in the absence of any order in writing proceeded to conduct an investigation in terms of Section 218(1) of the Code.

The Court referring the decision in CA V. Venkata Sivakumar Vs. IBBI and Ors. (2024) ibclaw.in 59 HC did not find that the suspension of AFA pending consideration of the show cause notices is in any manner contrary to law or unwarranted in the facts of the present case.

Suspension of authorisation for assignment (AFA) pending consideration of show cause notices issued under Section 219 of IBC is not contrary to law | Clause 23A of Model Bye-Laws and Governing Board of IPAs Regulations, 2016 cannot be held to be ultra vires – Kairav Anil Trivedi Vs. Insolvency & Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) and Ors. – Bombay High Court Read Post »

As per Section 34 of SARFAESI Act, 2002 there is a clear bar to the filing of a civil suit in respect of any action which the DRT or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered under the SARFAESI Act to determine as also no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action being taken under the SARFAESI Act or the RDB Act 1993 – Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. Vs. The State of Maharashtra – Bombay High Court

Hon’ble High Court of Bombay held that:
(i) These provisions are a code by itself when it comes to an action being taken under the SARFAESI Act is concerned. As per Section 34 there is a clear bar to the filing of a civil suit in respect of any action which the DRT or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered under the SARFAESI Act to determine as also no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action being taken interalia under the SARFAESI Act or the RDB Act 1993.
(ii) The Respondents in absence of any stay, much less an order which could be passed in the proceedings which the third party could initiate only under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act before the DRT. We are of the clear view that the Respondents were totally illegal in their approach in addressing the impugned communication dated 17 November 2022 as also stalling the recovery proceedings as initiated by the Petitioner.

As per Section 34 of SARFAESI Act, 2002 there is a clear bar to the filing of a civil suit in respect of any action which the DRT or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered under the SARFAESI Act to determine as also no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action being taken under the SARFAESI Act or the RDB Act 1993 – Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. Vs. The State of Maharashtra – Bombay High Court Read Post »

Rule 5 of the Debts Recovery Tribunals (Refund of Court Fee) Rules, 2013 cannot be construed to mean that a consent needs to be obtained from the Borrower and/or a joint application be presented for refund of Court fees on settlement – Yes Bank Ltd. Vs. Union of India – Bombay High Court

The Hon’ble Division Bench of Bombay High Court held that once the DRT itself on application of mind has permitted the applicant in an Original Application refund of Court fees, and when the entitlement for refund of Court fees itself has been fixed by a judicial order, it would not be permissible for the Registrar of the DRT to nonetheless insist that a joint application ought to be presented for refund of Court fees. However, this would not mean that where in case if the Registrar has any doubt on materials that the applicant in the Original Application does not himself/itself become entitled for refund of Court fees and/or if the judicial order does not grant a clear refund of Court fees to the plaintiff alone, in such cases, certainly requirement of joint application can be insisted, as in such cases the complexion of the refund application itself would be completely different.

Rule 5 of the Debts Recovery Tribunals (Refund of Court Fee) Rules, 2013 cannot be construed to mean that a consent needs to be obtained from the Borrower and/or a joint application be presented for refund of Court fees on settlement – Yes Bank Ltd. Vs. Union of India – Bombay High Court Read Post »

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