Mr. Justice Sanjay Karol

Can application under Section 9 of the IBC be rejected due to pendency of civil suit in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881? – Palaparty Abhishek Vs. Binjusaria Ispat Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. – Supreme Court

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Can application under Section 9 of the IBC be rejected due to pendency of civil suit in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881? – Palaparty Abhishek Vs. Binjusaria Ispat Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. – Supreme Court Read Post »

Whether a Director who has resigned can be held liable under Section 138/141 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Rajesh Viren Shah Vs. Redington (India) Ltd. – Supreme Court

Hon’ble Supreme Court holds that the position of law as to the liability that can be fastened upon a Director for non-realisation of a cheque is no longer res integra. Section 141 of the N.I. Act states that every person who at the time of the offence was responsible for the affairs/conduct of the business of the company, shall be held liable and proceeded against under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, with exception thereto being that such an act, if done without his knowledge or after him having taken all necessary precautions, would not be held liable. However, if it is proved that any act of a company is proved to have been done with the connivance or consent or may be attributable to (i) a director; (ii) a manager; (iii) a secretary; or (iv) any other officer – they shall be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be proceeded against accordingly.

Whether a Director who has resigned can be held liable under Section 138/141 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Rajesh Viren Shah Vs. Redington (India) Ltd. – Supreme Court Read Post »

Any attempt to “modify an award” under Section 34 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 would amount to “crossing the Lakshman Rekha” | Arbitral proceedings are per se not comparable to judicial proceedings before the Court – S.V. Samudram Vs. State of Karnataka and Anr. – Supreme Court

Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:
(i) The position as to whether an arbitral award can be modified in the proceedings initiated under Sections 34/37 of the A&C Act is no longer res integra.
(ii) The Court categorically observed that any attempt to “modify an award” under Section 34 would amount to “crossing the Lakshman Rekha”.
(iii) It is a settled principle of law that arbitral proceedings are per se not comparable to judicial proceedings before the Court
(iv) It is also a settled principle of law that an award passed by a technical expert is not meant to be scrutinised in the same manner as is the one prepared by a legally trained mind
(v) Observation of the court, advisory in nature, for the contractor to have commenced the work for one part of the contract is unwarranted and uncalled for, in fact perverse.
(vi) For it is no business of the Court to consider the burden on the exchequer.
(vii) Accounting for the legal position, the court could have at best set aside the award and could not modify the same.
(viii) The Court under Section 37 had only three options:-
(a) Confirming the award of the Arbitrator;
(b) Setting aside the award as modified under Section 34; and
(c) Rejecting the application(s) under Section 34 and 37.

Any attempt to “modify an award” under Section 34 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 would amount to “crossing the Lakshman Rekha” | Arbitral proceedings are per se not comparable to judicial proceedings before the Court – S.V. Samudram Vs. State of Karnataka and Anr. – Supreme Court Read Post »

Only by saying that a person was in charge of the company at the time when the offence was committed is not sufficient to attract Section 141(1) of Negotiable Instruments (NI) Act, 1881 – Ashok Shewakramani & Ors. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. – Supreme Court

Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:
(i) Section 141 is an exception to the normal rule that there cannot be any vicarious liability when it comes to a penal provision.
(ii) Every person who is sought to be roped in by virtue of sub-section 1 of Section 141 NI Act must be a person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company. Merely because somebody is managing the affairs of the company, per se, he does not become in charge of the conduct of the business of the company or the person responsible for the company for the conduct of the business of the company.
(iii) Only by saying that a person was in charge of the company at the time when the offence was committed is not sufficient to attract sub-section 1 of Section 141 of the NI Act.
(iv) On a plain reading of Section 141, it is apparent that the words “was in charge of” and “was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company” cannot be read disjunctively and the same ought be read conjunctively in view of use of the word “and” in between.

Only by saying that a person was in charge of the company at the time when the offence was committed is not sufficient to attract Section 141(1) of Negotiable Instruments (NI) Act, 1881 – Ashok Shewakramani & Ors. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. – Supreme Court Read Post »

No Constitutional Court can issue a writ of mandamus to a legislature to enact a law on a particular subject in a particular manner – Union of India & Ors. Vs. K. Pushpavanam & Ors. – Supreme Court

In this case, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:
(i) A writ court cannot direct the Government to consider introducing a particular bill before the House of Legislature within a time frame.
(ii) There is no right vested in the applicant to claim that the Law Commission set up by the Central Government should be given constitutional or statutory status.
(iii) Whether a nodal officer, who is well qualified in law, in each department, to note down the Courts’ recommendations to bring to the knowledge of the Policy¬-Makers of each department by way of periodical reports should be appointed or not, is a matter to be decided by the Central Government.
(iv) The law regarding power of the writ court to issue a mandate to the legislature to legislate is well settled. No Constitutional Court can issue a writ of mandamus to a legislature to enact a law on a particular subject in a particular manner. The Court may, at the highest, record its opinion or recommendation on the necessity of either amending the existing law or coming out with a new law.

No Constitutional Court can issue a writ of mandamus to a legislature to enact a law on a particular subject in a particular manner – Union of India & Ors. Vs. K. Pushpavanam & Ors. – Supreme Court Read Post »

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