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G. Sundaravadivelu Vs. Indian Overseas Bank & Anr. – Supreme Court Read Post »
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Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:
(i) The IBC is a time bound process. There are, of course, certain circumstances in which the time can be increased.
(ii) Section 15 of the IBC and Regulation 6 of the IBBI Regulations mandate a public announcement of the CIRP through newspapers. This would constitute deemed knowledge on the appellant. In any case, their plea of not being aware of newspaper pronouncements is not one which should be available to a commercial party.
(iii) The mere fact that the Adjudicating Authority has yet not approved the plan does not imply that the plan can go back and forth, thereby making the CIRP an endless process.
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Greymatter Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Pro Sportify Pvt. Ltd. – Supreme Court Read Post »
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in this landmark judgment has clarified various issues:
(i) Interpretation of a non-obstante provision
(ii) Interpretation of the expressions ‘relevant date’, debt ‘due’ and debt ‘due and payable’.
(iii) Whether the Customs Act creates a first charge overriding the charge in favour of the secured creditor
(iv) Interpretation of Section 142A of the Customs Act, 1962
(v) The decision in Collector of Customs v. Dytron (India) Ltd. 1998 SCC OnLine Cal 674 does not lay down the correct law
(v) Examines decision in Imperial Chit Funds (P) Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam and interpretation of Section 178 of the Income Tax Act.
The Five Judges Bench of the NCLAT in Union Bank of India Vs. Dinkar T. Venkatasubramanian & Ors. (2023) ibclaw.in 381 NCLAT held that NCLAT is not vested with any power to review the judgment, however, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction this Tribunal can entertain an application for recall of judgment on sufficient grounds. The judgment of this Tribunal in Agarwal Coal Corporation Pvt. Ltd. vs Sun Paper Mill Limited & Anr. (2021) ibclaw.in 493 NCLAT and Rajendra Mulchand Varma & Ors vs K.L.J Resources Ltd & Anr. (2022) ibclaw.in 827 NCLAT observing that this Tribunal cannot recall its judgment does not lay down the correct law.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in this case held that we are in agreement with the view taken by the Five Judges Bench of the NCLAT and thus find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment.
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Intergen Energy Ltd. Vs. Anil Hada (Huf) – Supreme Court Read Post »
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Revital Reality Pvt. Ltd. Vs. India Bulls Housing Finance Ltd. – Supreme Court Read Post »
In this case, Appellant herein entered into two license agreements with R1 and the sister concern of R1. Thereafter, a tripartite agreement was executed by and amongst the Appellant, R1 and Bank of Baroda. The appellant agreed to create first charge on fixed assets, which was to be released only with the consent of R1. On dispute, the Appellant served a notice on R1 under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 invoking the provision for arbitration contained in the licence agreement. The Commercial Court at Ahmedabad, in the order dated 13.12.2017, rejected the application of the Appellant under Section 8 of the Act of 1996. It was held that there was no arbitration clause in the tripartite agreement and no reference had been made to the original or supplementary licence agreement to give effect or consider the arbitration clause as a part and parcel of the tripartite agreement. In appeal, the decision of the Commercial Court was upheld by the High Court.
On the matter in Apex Court, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that (i) Except the principal agreement dated 07.04.2005, none of the other agreements contained any arbitration clause, even if they related to the same property and also involved the Appellant and the R1.
(ii) In the frame of the suit and various other reliefs claimed, involving subsequent purchasers too and the allegations of fraud, the dispute cannot be said to be arbitrable at all. The present one cannot be said to be a case involving any “doubt” about non-existence of arbitration agreement in relation to the dispute in question.
(iii) Even if by reference to remote pedigree, the original licence agreement is said to be the genesis of the contractual relations of the appellant and the R1, that does not ipso facto lead to the availability of the arbitration agreement in relation to the dispute in question, which emanates from the tripartite agreement and which cannot be determined without reference to the said tripartite agreement and without involving all the parties thereto.
(iv) The other elements of dispute pertaining to the subsequent purchasers too cannot be resolved in any forum without reference to the tripartite agreement and its amended clause, which did not provide for arbitration.
(v) The other memo by R3 to 5 had been of no effect whatsoever. Consent of the said respondents, the subsequent purchasers, for reference to arbitration could not have infused an arbitration clause in the tripartite agreement and their memo could not have propelled the matter to arbitration, particularly looking to the core of the dispute and its obvious non-arbitrability for the reason that it related to the tripartite agreement.
