

UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law

Part three: Treatment of
enterprise groups in insolvency



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UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW

UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law

Part three: Treatment of
enterprise groups in insolvency



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Part three

Treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency

Introduction to part three

1. Part three focuses on the treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency. Where an approach different to that taken in part two might be required with respect to a particular issue as it affects an enterprise group or where the treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency raises issues additional to those discussed in part two, they are addressed in this part. Where the treatment of an issue in the context of an enterprise group is the same as discussed above, it is not repeated in this part. The substance of part two is therefore applicable to enterprise groups unless indicated otherwise in this part.

2. Chapter I addresses general features of enterprise groups. Chapter II deals with the insolvency of group members in a domestic context and proposes a number of recommendations to supplement the recommendations of part two, insofar as additional issues arise by virtue of the group context. Chapter III addresses the cross-border insolvency of enterprise groups, building upon the *Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law* (UNCITRAL Model Law),¹ which is relevant to cross-border insolvency proceedings with respect to an individual group member, but does not address issues pertinent to the insolvency of different group members in different States, and upon the *Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law* (UNCITRAL Practice Guide).²

Purpose of part three

3. The purpose of this part is to permit, in both domestic and cross-border contexts, treatment of the insolvency proceedings of one or more enterprise

¹*Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.05.V.10), annex III, part one. Available from www.uncitral.org under “UNCITRAL Texts and Status”.

²United Nations publication, Sales No. E.10.V.6. Available from www.uncitral.org under “UNCITRAL Texts and Status”.

group members within the context of the enterprise group to address the issues particular to insolvency proceedings involving those groups and to achieve a better, more effective result for the enterprise group as a whole and its creditors and, in particular:

- (a) To promote the key objectives of recommendation 1; and
- (b) To more effectively address, in the context of recommendation 5, instances of cross-border insolvency proceedings involving enterprise group members.

Glossary

4. The following additional terms relate specifically to enterprise groups and should be read in conjunction with the terms and explanations included in the main glossary above.

(a) “Enterprise group”: two or more enterprises that are interconnected by control or significant ownership;

(b) “Enterprise”: any entity, regardless of its legal form, that is engaged in economic activities and may be governed by the insolvency law;³

(c) “Control”: the capacity to determine, directly or indirectly, the operating and financial policies of an enterprise;

(d) “Procedural coordination”: coordination of the administration of two or more insolvency proceedings in respect of enterprise group members. Each of those members, including its assets and liabilities, remains separate and distinct;⁴

(e) “Substantive consolidation”: the treatment of the assets and liabilities of two or more enterprise group members as if they were part of a single insolvency estate.⁵

5. To simplify terminology, part three uses the term “parent” to refer to the entity that controls members of an enterprise group and the term

³Consistent with the approach adopted with respect to individual debtors, the focus of this part is upon the conduct of economic activities by entities that would conform to the types of entities described as an “enterprise”. It is not intended to include consumers or other entities of a specialized nature (e.g. banks and insurance companies) that would not be governed by insolvency law pursuant to recommendations 8 and 9 (see *UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.05.V.10), part two, chap. I, footnote 6 to recommendation 9). The special considerations arising from the insolvency of such debtors are not specifically addressed in the *UNCITRAL Legislative Guide* (see part two, chap. I, paras. 1-11).

⁴The concept of procedural coordination is explained in detail see chap. II, paras. 22-25.

⁵For the effects of substantive consolidation and the treatment of security interests, see recommendations 224 and 225 below and chap. II, paras. 129-133.

“controlled group member” to refer to those members controlled by the parent, irrespective of their legal structure. The term “group member” refers generally to both the parent and controlled group members, unless otherwise specified.

I. General features of enterprise groups

A. Introduction

1. Most jurisdictions recognize the legal concept of “corporation”, an entity that has a legal personality separate from that of the individuals it comprises, whether as owners, managers or employees. As a legal or juristic person, a corporation is capable of enjoying and being subject to certain legal rights, duties and liabilities, such as the capacity to sue and be sued, to hold and transfer property, to sign contracts and to pay taxes. The corporation also enjoys the characteristic of perpetuity, in the sense that its existence continues, independent of its members at any given time and over time, and shareholders can transfer their shares without affecting the entity’s corporate existence. Corporations may also have limited liability, whereby investors will be liable only for the amount they have intentionally put at risk in the enterprise, providing certainty and encouraging investment; without that limitation, investors would put their entire assets at risk for every business venture they entered into. A corporation depends on a legal process to obtain its legal personality and, once formed, will be subject to the regulatory regime applying to entities so formed. The law generally will determine not only the requirements for formation, but also the consequences of formation, such as the powers and capacities of the corporation, the rights and duties of its members and the extent to which members may be liable for its debts. The corporate form can thus be seen as promoting certainty in the ordering of business affairs, as those dealing with a corporation know that they can rely upon its legal personality and the rights, duties and obligations that attach to it.

2. The business of corporations is increasingly conducted, both domestically and internationally, through “enterprise groups”. The term “enterprise group” covers different forms of economic organization based upon the single legal entity and, for a working definition, may be loosely described as two or more legal entities (group members) that are linked together by some form of control (whether direct or indirect) or ownership (see paras. 26-30 below). The size and complexity of enterprise groups may not always be readily apparent, as the public image of many is that of a unitary organization operating under a single corporate identity.

3. Enterprise groups have been in existence for some time, emerging in some countries, according to commentators, at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century through a process of internal expansion, which involved corporations taking control of their own financial, technical or commercial capacities. These single-entity enterprises then expanded externally to take legal or economic control of other corporations. Initially these other corporations may have been in the same market, but eventually the expansion encompassed corporations working in related fields, and later in fields that were different or unrelated, whether by reference to a product or geographical location or both. One of the factors supporting this expansion, at least in some jurisdictions, was the legitimatization of ownership of the shares of one corporation by another corporation, a phenomenon originally prohibited in both common law and civil law systems.

4. Throughout this expansion, corporations retained, and continue to retain, their separate legal personality, even though individual corporations are now probably the typical form of organization only for small private businesses. Enterprise groups are ubiquitous in both emerging and developed markets, with a common characteristic of operations across a large number of sometimes unrelated industries, often with family ownership in combination with varying degrees of participation by outside investors. The largest economic entities in the world include not only States, but also a number of multinational enterprise groups. Major multinational groups may be responsible for significant percentages of gross national product worldwide and have annual growth rates and turnovers that exceed those of many States.

5. Despite the reality of the enterprise group, much of the legislation relating to corporations, and particularly to their treatment in insolvency, deals with the single corporate entity. Despite the absence of legislation, judges and insolvency representatives in many countries, faced with issues that may better be addressed by reference to a single enterprise rather than a single corporate entity,⁶ have developed solutions to achieve results that more accurately reflect the economic reality of modern business.

B. Nature of enterprise groups

6. Enterprise group structures may be simple or highly complex, involving numbers of wholly or partly owned subsidiaries, operating subsidiaries, sub-subsidiaries, sub-holding companies, service companies, dormant companies, cross-directorships, equity ownership and so forth. They may also involve

⁶The distinction is discussed further in paras. 31-39 below.

other types of entity, such as special purpose entities (SPE),⁷ joint ventures,⁸ offshore trusts,⁹ income trusts¹⁰ and partnerships.

7. Enterprise groups may have a hierarchical or vertical structure, with succeeding layers of parent and controlled group members, which may be subsidiaries or other types of affiliated or related entities, operating at different points in a production or distribution process. Vertical integration generally takes place within a single industry and combines, for example, some or all of the sequential operations between the sourcing of raw materials and sale of the final product. It can be pursued as a strategy by acquiring suppliers, wholesalers and retailers to increase control and reliability. It can also be achieved when a corporation gains strong control over suppliers or distributors, usually by exercising purchasing power. One example of vertical integration that is often cited is the oil industry, where the large oil groups conduct exploration and crude recovery, transport and refining, and retail distribution and sale of fuel.

8. Enterprise groups may also have a horizontal structure, with many sibling group members, often with a high degree of cross-ownership, operating at the same level in a particular process, such as in book publishing, where

⁷A special purpose entity (SPE), also known as a “special purpose vehicle” or “bankruptcy-remote entity”) is created to fulfil narrow or temporary objectives, such as the acquisition and financing of specific assets, primarily to isolate financial risk or enhance tax efficiency. An SPE is typically a corporation owned almost entirely by the parent; certain jurisdictions require that another investor own at least 3 per cent. Its asset and liability structure and legal status generally make its obligations secure even if the parent becomes insolvent. The corporation establishing the SPE can accomplish its purpose without having to carry any of the associated assets or liabilities on its own balance sheet; thus, they are “off-balance sheet”. SPEs may also be used for competitive reasons to ensure that intellectual property, such as for the development of new technology, is owned by a separate entity that is not affected by pre-existing licence agreements.

⁸A joint venture is often a contractual arrangement or partnership between two or more parties to pursue a joint business purpose. Such an arrangement may sometimes result in the formation of one or more legal entities that may involve both parties contributing equity and sharing in the revenues, expenses and control of the enterprise. The venture could be for one specific project only or a continuing business relationship. Joint ventures are widely used in an international context, as some countries require foreign corporations to form joint ventures with a domestic partner in order to enter a market. This requirement often results in technology and managerial control being transferred to the domestic partner. Forming a joint venture may assist in spreading costs and risks; improving access to financial resources; providing economies of scale and advantages of size; and facilitating access to new technologies and customers or to innovative managerial practices. It may also serve competitive and strategic goals such as influencing the structural evolution of an industry; pre-empting competition; creating stronger competitive units; facilitating the transfer of technology and skills, and diversification.

⁹An offshore trust is a conventional trust that is formed under the laws of an offshore jurisdiction. Offshore trusts are similar in nature and effect to onshore trusts, involving a transfer of assets to a trustee to manage for the benefit of a person or class of persons. Offshore trusts may be formed for tax purposes or asset protection. In practice the effectiveness of such trusts may be limited if the insolvency law of the home jurisdiction of the person transferring the assets operates to set aside transfers to the trusts and transactions entered into to defraud creditors.

¹⁰An income trust is an investment trust holding income-producing assets. The term may also refer to a legal entity, capital structure or ownership vehicle for certain assets or businesses. Its shares or trust units are traded on securities exchanges and income is passed on to the investors or unit holders, through monthly or quarterly distributions.

one publisher might acquire others in order to increase its range of editors and authors or to otherwise enhance its competitiveness, or the media industry, where one group may own multiple media outlets running the same or very similar content. Horizontal integration is generally associated with control of a single stage of production or a single industry, enabling the group to take advantage of economies of scale, but horizontally integrated groups may also conduct businesses in a related field or in a diverse range of unrelated fields. It has been suggested that horizontal groups are more common in some parts of the world, such as Europe, while vertical groups are more common in others, such as the United States of America and Japan. Additionally, vertical integration might be more common in manufacturing, while horizontal integration is more common in marketing.

9. The research literature on enterprise groups clearly shows that they can be based on different types of alliances, such as bank relationships, interlocking board directorates, owner alliances, information-sharing, joint ventures and cartels, and that enterprise group structures vary across corporate governance systems. In some States, they may be organized either vertically or horizontally and develop across industries, where they may include a parent or a trading company, and a diverse group of members engaged in manufacturing and sometimes a bank. In some cases, the parent may be an unincorporated entity, such as a foundation or other form of non-profit organization. In contrast, in other States such groups are typically controlled by a single family or a small number of families and are uniformly vertically organized, or they may have strong ties to the State, but not to particular families. Degrees of diversification also vary considerably, with some groups involving significant intra-group trading and others not.¹¹

10. The degree of financial and decision-making autonomy in enterprise groups can vary considerably. In some groups, members may be active trading entities, with primary responsibility for their own business goals, activities and finances. In others, strategic and budgetary decisions may be centralized, with group members operating as divisions of a larger business and exercising little independent discretion within the cohesive economic unit. A parent may exercise close control by allocating equity and loan capital to group members through a central group finance operation, deciding their operational and financial policies, setting performance targets, selecting directors and other key personnel, and continuously monitoring their activities. The power of the group may be centralized in the ultimate parent or

¹¹Some research suggests that groups in Chile, for example, are more diverse than groups in the Republic of Korea, while groups in the Philippines are more vertically integrated than groups in India and far more involved in financial services than groups in Thailand. See T. Khanna and Y. Yafeh, "Business groups in emerging markets: paragons or parasites?", *Journal of Economic Literature*, vol. 45, No. 2 (June 2007), pp. 331-372.

in a group member further down the group chain, with the parent owning the key group shares, but not having any direct productive or managerial role. The largest groups might have their own banks and perform the principal functions of a capital market. Group financing might involve intra-group lending between the parent and other group members, involving loans both from and to the parent and the granting of cross-guarantees.¹² Intra-group lending might be working capital or unpaid short-term debt, such as unpaid dividends or credit in respect of intra-group trading; they may or may not involve the payment of interest.

11. In some States, family ties play an important connecting factor in enterprise groups. It may be the case, for example, that the more important family members and close associates of family members will sit on the board of the parent of a group, with members of that board spread around the boards of group members so that there is a web of interlinked common directorships, enabling the family to maintain control over the group. For example, the chart of a large group in India shows a complex web of shared directorships between the board of the parent and 45 other group members.¹³

12. In some countries, enterprise groups have enjoyed close ties to governments and government policies, such as those affecting access to credit and foreign currency and competition, which have significantly influenced the development of groups. Equally, there are examples where government policies have targeted the operations of enterprise groups, removing certain types of preferential treatment, such as access to capital.

13. The structure of many enterprise groups shows the dimension and potential complexity of the arrangements. They may involve many layers of different companies controlled to a greater or lesser extent by the level or

¹² In many countries a significant method of enterprise group capital raising is cross-guarantee financing, where each group member guarantees the performance of the others. Implementing cross-guarantee claims in liquidation has proved difficult in some jurisdictions and they have sometimes been set aside. In one jurisdiction, cross-guarantees may operate to reduce the regulatory burden on companies by bestowing accounting and auditing relief on companies that are party to the arrangement. The deed of cross-guarantee makes the group of companies that are party to that deed akin to a single legal entity in many respects and operates as a form of voluntary contribution or pooling in the event that one or more of the companies party to the deed go into liquidation while the cross-guarantee is still operative. One advantage of this arrangement is that creditors and potential creditors can focus on the consolidated position for those entities, rather than on the individual financial statements of the wholly owned subsidiaries that are party to the deed.

¹³Khanna and Yafeh, "Business groups in emerging markets" (see footnote 11 above).

levels above,¹⁴ in some cases involving hundreds if not thousands of different companies.

14. A study based upon the 1979 accounts and reports of a number of large British-based multinationals, for example, had to be abandoned with respect to two of the largest groups, one with 1,200 and the other with 800 subsidiaries, because of the impossibility of completing the task. Researchers noted that few people inside the group could have had a clear understanding of the precise legal relationships between all group members and that none of the groups studied appeared to have its own complete chart.¹⁵ Similarly, the group charts of several Hong Kong property groups, such as the Carrian group, which failed over 20 years ago, ran to several pages, and a reader would have needed a good magnifying glass to identify the subsidiaries. The group chart of the Federal Mogul group, an automotive component supplier, when blown up to the point where you can read the names of all the subsidiaries, covers a wall of a small office. The group chart of Collins & Aikman, another automotive group, is printed in a book, with sub-sub-groups having the complexity of structure of many domestic enterprise groups.

15. The degree of integration of a group might be determined by reference to a number of factors, which might include the economic organization of the group (e.g., whether the administrative structure is arranged centrally or maintains the independence of the various members, whether group members depend on the enterprise group for financing or loan guarantees, whether personnel matters are handled centrally, the extent to which the parent makes key decisions on policy, operations and budget and the extent to which the businesses of the group are integrated vertically or horizontally); how the group manages its marketing (e.g., the importance of intra-group sales and purchases, the use of common trademarks, logos and advertising programmes and the provision of guarantees for the products); and the public image of the group (e.g., the extent to which the group presents itself as a single enterprise and the extent to which the activities of the constituent members are described as operations of the group in external reports, such as those for shareholders, regulators and investors).

¹⁴A 1997 survey in Australia of the top 500 listed companies showed that 89 per cent of those companies controlled other companies; the greater the market capitalization of a listed company, the more companies it was likely to control (this ranged from an average of 72 controlled companies for those companies with the largest market capitalization to an average of 9 for the smallest); 90 per cent of controlled companies were wholly owned; the number of vertical subsidiary levels in an enterprise group ranged from 1 to 11, with an overall average of 3 to 4. In other countries the figures are much larger (Australia, Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, *Corporate Groups Final Report* (Sydney, 2000), para. 1.2).

¹⁵Tom Hadden, "Inside corporate groups", *International Journal of the Sociology of Law*, vol. 12, 1984, p. 273.

16. The legal structure of a group as a number of separate legal entities does not necessarily determine how the business of the group is managed. While each group member is a separate entity, management may be arranged in divisions along product lines and group members may have one or many product lines, with the result that they fall across different divisions. In some cases, management may treat wholly owned group members as if they were branches of the parent.

C. Reasons for conducting business through enterprise groups

17. Diverse factors shape the formation, operation and evolution of enterprise groups, ranging from legal and economic factors to societal, cultural, institutional and other norms. State leadership, inheritance customs, kinship structures (including intergenerational considerations), ethnicity and national ideology, as well as the level of development of the legal (e.g., effectiveness of contract enforcement) and institutional framework supporting commercial activity may influence enterprise groups in different environments. Some studies suggest that group structures can make up for underdeveloped institutions, with consequent benefits for transaction costs.

18. The advantages of conducting business through an enterprise group structure may include reduction of commercial risk and maximization of financial returns, by enabling the group to diversify its activities into various types of businesses, each operated by a separate group member. Other companies may be acquired to expand and increase market power, at the same time preserving the acquired company and continuing to operate it as a separate entity to utilize its corporate name, goodwill and public image. Expansion may occur to acquire new, technical or management skills. Once formed, groups may continue to exist and proliferate because of the administrative costs associated with rationalizing and liquidating redundant members.

19. A group structure may enable a group to attract capital to only part of its business without forfeiting overall control, by incorporating that part of the business as a separate group member and allowing outside investors to acquire a minority shareholding in it. A group structure may enable a group to lower the risk of legal liability by confining high liability risks, such as environmental and consumer liability, to particular group members, thus isolating the remaining group assets from the potential liability. Better security for debt or project financing may be facilitated by moving specific assets into a separate member incorporated for that purpose, thus ensuring

that the lender has first priority over the whole or most of the new member's property. A separate group member may also be formed to undertake a particular project and obtain additional finance by means of charges over its own assets and undertaking or may be required for the purpose of holding a government licence or concession. A group structure can simplify the partial sale of a business, as it may be easier, and sometimes more tax-effective, to transfer the shares of a group member to the purchaser, rather than sell discrete assets. A group may also be formed incidentally when a company acquires another company, which in turn might be a parent for various members of another group.

20. Use of a group structure may make it easier to meet regulatory requirements because each group member is able to do so separately. In the case of multinational groups, the domestic law of particular countries in which the group wishes to conduct business may require local businesses to be conducted through separate entities (sometimes subject to minimum local equity requirements) or impose other requirements or limitations, relating, for example, to employment and labour regulation. Arrangements not involving equity have been used for foreign expansion because of, for example, local obstacles to equity participation, the level of regulation imposed upon foreign investment operations and the relative cost advantages of those types of arrangement. Another relevant factor for multinational groups may be geographical imperatives, such as the need to acquire raw materials or to market products through a group member established in a particular location. A related consideration of increasing importance, which perhaps relates more to where parts of the group structure are to be located than to the question of whether or not to organize a business through a group structure, is the importance of local law on issues such as the cost and simplicity of incorporation in the first instance, obligations of incorporated entities and treatment of an enterprise group in insolvency. Differences in law across jurisdictions can significantly complicate these issues.

21. Other key drivers for complicated group structures include fiscal considerations and their influence on the flow of money within groups. The incidence of tax is often cited as the reason for the formation and subsequent growth of enterprise groups, and many legal systems have traditionally given weight to the economic unity of related entities. While separate taxation of individual entities might be the underlying principle, it may be qualified to fulfil basic purposes such as protecting the revenue interests of governments and alleviating the tax burden that would otherwise result from the separate taxation of each group member.¹⁶ Measures that take into account the

¹⁶Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *International Investment and Multinational Enterprises: Responsibility of Parent Companies and Their Subsidiaries* (Paris, 1979).

connections between parent and controlled group members include tax exemptions for intra-group dividends; group relief; and measures aimed at combating tax evasion. Tax exemptions may be available, for example, on the dividends paid by a group member to its resident shareholders and for intra-group dividends where group members are linked by substantial ownership. Tax credits may be allowed for the foreign tax paid on the underlying profits of the controlled group member and for the foreign tax that is charged directly on a dividend. Group relief might be available where related group members can be treated as a single fiscal unit and file consolidated accounts. The losses of one group member may be offset against the income of another or profits and losses may be pooled amongst group members.

22. As a result of the importance of fiscal considerations, inter-group pricing policies and national taxation rates and policies often determine the distribution of assets and liabilities within enterprise groups. Differential corporate tax rates across States, as well as certain exceptions (such as reduced tax rates for profits from manufacturing activities or financial services income) applicable in some States may make them more attractive locations than others that have higher tax rates and fewer or no exceptions. Nevertheless, tax authorities may have the right to revisit transfer-pricing structures aimed at locating profits in low-taxation domiciles.

23. Choices of corporate form, such as between establishing a branch or a subsidiary, might also be affected by fiscal regulation where, for example, repatriation of profits from a foreign group member may be effected tax-free by loan repayments to a parent or may be tax-free provided the parent owns a specified percentage (from 5 to 20 per cent) of the foreign member's share capital; interest on funds borrowed to finance the acquisition of a group member can be offset against their profits, and, as already noted, the profits and losses of different group members can be offset against each other in a consolidated tax return. Business activities have also been divided between two or more group members to exploit tax allowances, limits imposed on the amounts of tax allowances or progressive rates of taxation. Other reasons might include: taking advantage of differences in accounting methods, taxable years, depreciation methods, inventory valuation methods and foreign tax credits; segregating activities that, if combined in a single taxable entity, might be disadvantageous in fiscal terms; and taking advantage of favourable treatment for certain activities (e.g., anticipated or potential sales, mergers, liquidations or intrafamily gifts or bequests) that is available for some operations, but not for others.

24. Accounting requirements also have a role to play in determining the structure of enterprise groups. In some jurisdictions, certain devices, such as "agent only" group members, might be created to manage certain aspects

of the business and enable the parent to avoid submitting detailed trading accounts for that member, which is just an agent of the parent that owns all of the relevant assets.

25. Many of these benefits of conducting business through an enterprise group may be illusory. Protection against devastating losses may fall away as a result of group financing agreements; intra-group trading; cross-guarantees; and letters of comfort¹⁷ given to group auditors; and the inclination of major creditors, particularly bankers, to ensure that they have the indemnity of the top member in any group. To avoid doubt, group structures are not required from the accounting point of view—accountants are just as happy with consolidating branches as groups of subsidiaries. It seems probable that the banking, commercial and legal sectors often fail to appreciate the accounting aspects of enterprise groups.

D. Defining the “enterprise group” —ownership and control

26. Although the existence of enterprise groups and the importance of relationships between the group members are increasingly acknowledged, both in legislation and court decisions, there is no coherent body of rules that directly governs those relationships in a comprehensive manner. In jurisdictions where there is legislation that recognizes enterprise groups, it may not specifically deal with the regulation of such groups, by way of commercial or corporate legislation, but rather be contained in legislation on taxation, corporate accounting, competition and mergers or other issues. Legislation addressing the treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency is rare. Furthermore, an analysis of legislation that does address aspects of enterprise groups reveals a diversity of approaches to the various issues associated with groups, not only between jurisdictions, but also on a comparison of the different legislation within a single jurisdiction. Thus different tests may apply in the determination of what constitutes an enterprise group for different purposes, although there may be common elements, and where those tests employ a particular concept, such as “control”, definitions may be broader or narrower, depending upon the purpose of the legislation, as noted above.

¹⁷A letter of comfort is generally provided by a parent to persuade another entity to enter into a transaction with a group member. It may include various types of undertaking, none of which would amount to a guarantee, which may include an undertaking to maintain its shareholding or other financial commitment to that group member; using its influence to see that that group member meets its obligation under a primary contract; or confirming that it is aware of a contract with that group member, but without any express indication that it will assume any responsibility for the primary obligation.

27. While much legislation avoids specifically defining the term “enterprise group”, several concepts are common to determining the relationships between entities that will be sufficient to constitute them as an enterprise group for certain specific purposes, such as extending liability, accounting purposes, taxation and so on. These concepts are found both in legislation and in numerous court decisions concerning enterprise groups in various countries and generally include aspects of ownership and ability to control or influence, both direct and indirect, although in some examples only direct ownership or ability to control or influence is considered. The choice between the two concepts often reflects a balance between the desirability of certainty, which can be achieved by setting a prescribed level of ownership, and flexibility, which might better be achieved by referring to the ability to control or influence and acknowledging the diverse economic realities of enterprise groups.

28. Some examples consider ownership by reference to a formal relationship between the group members. This may be determined by reference to a formal standard, such as the holding, whether direct or indirect, of a specified percentage of capital or votes. Examples of those percentages vary from as little as 5 per cent to more than 80 per cent. Those laws specifying lower percentages generally consider additional factors such as the ones discussed below as indicators of control or influence. In some examples, the percentages may establish a rebuttable presumption as to ownership, while higher percentages may establish a conclusive presumption.

29. Other examples of what constitutes an enterprise group adopt a more functional approach and focus on aspects of control, or controlling or decisive influence (referred to as “control”), where “control” is often a defined term. The key elements of control include actual control or capacity to control, either directly or indirectly, financial and operating policy and decision-making. Where the definition includes capacity to control, it generally envisages a passive potential for control, rather than focusing upon control that is actively exercised. Control may be obtained by ownership of assets, or through rights or contracts that give the controlling party the capacity to control. What is important is not so much the strict legal form of the relationship, between the entities, such as parent and controlled group member, but rather the substance of that relationship.

30. Factors that might indicate the existence of control of one entity by another could include: the ability to dominate the composition of the board of directors or governing body of the second entity; the ability to appoint or remove all or a majority of the directors or governing members of the second entity; the ability to control the majority of the votes cast at a meeting of the board or governing body of the second entity; and the ability to

cast or regulate the casting of, a majority of the votes that are likely to be cast at a general meeting of the second entity, irrespective of whether that capacity arises through shares or options. Information that may be relevant to consideration of these factors might include: the group member's incorporation documents; details about the group member's shareholding; information relating to substantive strategic decisions of the group member; internal and external management agreements; details of bank accounts and their administration and authorized signatories; and information relating to employees.

E. Regulation of enterprise groups

31. Regulation of enterprise groups is generally based on one of two approaches or in some cases on a combination of the two: the separate entity approach (which is the traditional approach and by far the most prevalent) and the single enterprise approach.

32. The separate entity approach relies on several basic principles, foremost of which is the separate legal personality of each member of the group. It is also based upon the limited liability of shareholders of each group member and the duties of directors of each separate group member to that member.

33. The separate legal personality of a corporation generally means that it has its own rights and duties, irrespective of who controls it or owns it (i.e., whether it is wholly or partly owned by another company) or its participation in the activities of the enterprise group. The debts it incurs are its debts, and the assets of the group generally cannot be pooled¹⁸ to pay those debts. Contracts entered into with external persons do not automatically involve the parent or other group members. A parent cannot take into account the undistributed profits of other group members in determining its own profits. Limited liability of a corporation means that, unlike in a partnership or sole proprietorship, enterprise group members generally have no liability for the group's debts and obligations, with the result that potential losses cannot exceed the amount contributed to the group member by purchasing shares.

34. The single enterprise approach, in comparison, relies upon the economic integration of enterprise group members, treating the group as a single economic unit that operates to further the interests of the group as a whole, or of the dominant group member, rather than of individual members. Borrowing may be conducted on a group basis, with group treasury

¹⁸See chap. II, paras. 105-137 below, for a discussion of substantive consolidation.

arrangements being used to offset the credit and debit balances of each group member; group members may be permitted to operate at a loss, or be undercapitalized, as part of the overall group financial structure and strategy; assets and liabilities may be moved between group members in various ways; and intra-group loans, guarantees or other financial arrangements may be entered into on essentially preferential terms.

35. While many countries follow the separate entity approach, there are some countries that recognize exceptions to strict application of that approach and others that have developed, either by legislation or the courts, a single enterprise approach that applies to certain situations.

36. Some of the circumstances in which strict application of the separate entity approach has been overridden may include: consolidation of enterprise group accounts for a parent and any controlled group member; related person transactions (where a group member is otherwise prohibited from giving any financial benefit, including intra-group loans, guarantees, indemnities, releases of debt or asset transfers, to a related group member unless that transaction is approved by shareholders or is otherwise exempt); cross-shareholding (where group members are generally prohibited from acquiring, or taking a security over, the shares of any parent or issuing or transferring their shares to any controlled group member); and insolvent trading (where a parent that ought to suspect the insolvency of a controlled group member can be made liable for the debts of that group member incurred when it was insolvent).

37. A few countries have established various categories of enterprise groups that can operate as a single enterprise, in exchange for enhanced protection of creditors and minority shareholders. In one country,¹⁹ enterprise group structures involving public companies are divided into three categories: (a) integrated groups; (b) contract groups; and (c) de facto groups, to which a set of harmonized single enterprise principles dealing with corporate governance and liability applies:

(a) Integrated groups are based upon a vote, by a specified proportion of shareholders of the parent, which in turn owns a specified proportion of the shares of the controlled group member, to approve the complete integration of that group member. The parent will have unlimited power to direct the controlled group member, in return for the parent being jointly and severally liable for the debts and obligations of the controlled group member;

¹⁹Germany.

(b) Contract groups can be formed by a specified proportion of shareholders of each of two companies entering into a contract that grants one company (the parent) the right to direct the other company, provided the directions are consistent with the interests of the parent or the group as a whole. In return for giving the parent the right of control, minority shareholders and creditors are given enhanced protection; and

(c) De facto groups are those where one company exercises, either directly or indirectly, a dominant influence over another company. Although not created by any formal arrangement, there must nevertheless be systematic involvement by the parent in the affairs of the controlled company.

38. In one country²⁰ where single enterprise principles have been introduced into corporate legislation, directors of wholly or partly owned group members may act in the interests of the parent rather than their own group member; there are provisions for streamlined group mergers; and legislation also permits contribution and substantive consolidation or pooling orders.

39. In another country,²¹ commercial regulatory laws affecting enterprise groups increasingly use single enterprise principles to ensure that the policy underlying specific commercial legislation cannot be undermined or avoided by the use of enterprise groups. The courts have assisted in this development, selectively introducing the single enterprise concept to achieve the underlying policies of the legislation. The concept has been applied to insolvency law to avoid specified intra-group transactions, to support intra-group guarantees and, in limited cases, to achieve substantive consolidation. The courts also have the power to alter the priority of claims in the liquidation of a group member, either by treating some intra-group loans to that member as equity rather than debt, or by subordinating intra-group loans to that member to the claims of its external creditors.

²⁰New Zealand.

²¹United States of America.

II. Addressing the insolvency of enterprise groups: domestic issues

A. Introduction

1. Enterprise groups may be structured in ways that minimize the threat of insolvency to one or more group members, by entering into cross-guarantees, indemnities and similar types of arrangements. Where problems do arise, a parent may seek to avoid the insolvency of other group members in order to preserve its reputation and maintain its credit in commercial and financial spheres by providing additional finance and agreeing to subordinate intra-group claims to external liabilities.

2. However, if the complexity of an enterprise group's structure is disturbed by the onset of financial difficulty affecting one, some or even all of the group members that leads to insolvency, problems arise simply because the group is constituted by members that are each recognized as having a separate legal personality and existence. Since, as noted above, the great majority of domestic insolvency and corporate laws do not address the insolvency of enterprise groups, even though group issues might be addressed outside the insolvency area in relation to accounting treatment, regulatory issues and taxation, the absence of legislative authority to the contrary or judicial discretion to intervene in insolvency means that each entity has to be separately considered and, if necessary, separately administered in insolvency. In certain situations, such as where the business activity of group members is closely integrated, that approach may not always achieve the best result for the individual debtor or for the business of the group as a whole, unless the parallel insolvency proceedings concerning all group members can be closely coordinated.

3. Much of what already exists in domestic law regarding the insolvency of enterprise groups concentrates on the circumstances in which it might be appropriate to consolidate insolvency estates. What is lacking is guidance on how the insolvency of enterprise groups should be addressed more comprehensively and, in particular, whether and in what circumstances enterprise groups should be treated differently from a single corporate entity.

4. A second key issue with respect to the treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency is the degree to which the group is economically and organizationally integrated and how that level of integration might affect treatment of the group in insolvency, and in particular the extent to which a highly integrated group should be treated differently from a group where individual members retain a high degree of independence. In some cases, where, for example, the structure of a group is diverse, involving unrelated businesses and assets, the insolvency of one or more group members may not affect other members or the group as a whole and the insolvent members can be administered separately. In other cases, however, the insolvency of one group member may cause financial distress in other members or in the group as a whole, because of the group's integrated structure, with a high degree of interdependence and linked assets and debts between its different parts. In those circumstances, it might often be the case that the insolvency of one or more group members would lead inevitably to the insolvency of all members (the "domino effect"), and there may be some advantage in judging the imminence of the insolvency by reference to the group situation as a whole or coordinating that consideration with respect to multiple members.

B. Application and commencement

5. General considerations with respect to application for and commencement of insolvency proceedings are discussed in part two, chapters I and II. Since those chapters apply equally to individual enterprise group members, they should be considered in conjunction with the additional issues specific to enterprise groups discussed below.

1. Joint application for commencement

(a) Background

6. As a general rule, insolvency laws respect the separate legal status of each enterprise group member, and a separate application for commencement of insolvency proceedings is required to be made with respect to each of those members. Moreover, each of those members must be covered by the insolvency law (see recommendation 10) and satisfy the standard for commencement of insolvency proceedings (see recommendations 15 and 16). Some laws make provision for limited exceptions that allow a single application to be extended to other group members where, for example, all interested parties consent to the inclusion of more than one group member; the insolvency of one group member has the potential to affect other group

members; the parties to the application are closely economically integrated, such as by intermingling of assets or a specified degree of control or ownership; or consideration of the group as a single entity has special legal relevance, especially in the context of reorganization plans.

7. The recommendations above concerning application for and commencement of insolvency proceedings apply to debtors that are enterprise group members in the same manner as they apply to debtors that are individual commercial enterprises. Recommendations 15 and 16 establish the standards for debtor and creditor applications for commencement of insolvency proceedings and form the basis upon which an application could be made for each group member that satisfied those standards.²² In the enterprise group context, the insolvency of a parent may affect the financial stability of a controlled group member or the insolvency of a number of such members might adversely affect the solvency of others, so that insolvency is imminent across the group. That situation is covered by the terms of recommendation 15 if, at the time of application by the insolvent group members, it could be said of the other group members that they are or will be generally unable to pay their debts as they mature.

(b) Purpose of a joint application

8. Permitting group members that satisfy the commencement standard to make a joint application for commencement of insolvency proceedings has the potential to improve efficiency and reduce costs by facilitating the coordinated consideration of those applications by the court, without affecting the separate identity of each of those group members or removing the need for each to individually satisfy the applicable commencement standard. It would also alert the court to the existence of a group, particularly if the application was accompanied by information substantiating the existence of the group and the relationship between the relevant group members and, where proceedings subsequently commenced on the basis of that joint application, would have the advantage of establishing a common commencement date for each insolvent group member. This common date could simplify compliance with deadlines and the calculation of the suspect period for avoidance purposes.

9. Such a joint application might include, where permitted under the law and feasible in the circumstances, a single application covering all group members that satisfy the commencement standard or parallel applications made at the same time in respect of each of those members. The latter

²²In the case of an application by a debtor, recommendation 15 includes imminent insolvency.

approach may be appropriate where the group members are not located in the same domestic jurisdiction and different courts have competence (as discussed in paras. 17-20 below) or where other circumstances of the case, such as the need to coordinate a significant number of proceedings, suggest that a single application would not be practical. In both cases, it is desirable that the insolvency law facilitate the court undertaking a coordinated consideration of whether the commencement standards with respect to the individual group members are satisfied, taking into account the group context where relevant.

(c) Joint application and procedural coordination distinguished

10. The making of a joint application for commencement of insolvency proceedings should be distinguished from an application for procedural coordination. The purpose of permitting a joint application is to facilitate coordination of commencement considerations and potentially reduce costs. Commencement of multiple proceedings on the basis of a joint application should also facilitate coordination of those proceedings; the commencement date, and any other dates calculated by reference to that date, such as those relating to the suspect period, would be the same for each member. Permitting a joint application is not intended to predetermine, if the proceedings commence, how they would be administered and, in particular, whether they would be subject to procedural coordination. It is desirable, therefore, that an insolvency law not establish a joint application as a prerequisite for procedural coordination. Nevertheless, a joint application for commencement might include an application for procedural coordination, as noted below, and might facilitate the court's taking a decision on procedural coordination.

(d) Including a solvent group member in a joint application

11. A question that is often discussed in the group context is whether a solvent group member can be included in an application for commencement of insolvency proceedings with respect to insolvent group members and, if so, in what circumstances. Where a group member appears to be solvent, but further investigation shows insolvency to be imminent, inclusion of that member in the application would be covered by recommendation 15, as noted above.

12. Where the question is not one of imminent insolvency and the group member is clearly solvent, different approaches may be taken. Where a group is closely integrated, an insolvency law may permit an application for commencement to include group members that do not satisfy the commencement standard, on the basis that it is desirable, in the interests of the group as a

whole, that those members be included in the proceedings. Factors relevant to determining whether the necessary degree of integration exists might include: the relationship between the group members that is variously described, but involves, for example, a significant degree of interdependence or control; intermingling of assets; unity of identity, reliance on management and financial support or other similar factors that need not necessarily arise from the legal relationship between the group members (such as parent and controlled group member). A further situation in which including a solvent group member in a joint application might be appropriate is where the existence of the “group” is fictitious. This might occur where, for example, the activities of the group are conducted as if they related to a single entity and the existence of the group is a mere front for the activities of that single entity. It may also occur where members are so interlinked that there is really only one asset base and the legal separation between group members is not maintained, with management and creditors treating the different members as if they were one and the same.

13. The inclusion of a solvent group member may facilitate the development of an insolvency solution for the whole group, avoiding the piecemeal commencement of proceedings over time, if and when additional group members become affected by the insolvency proceedings initiated against the originally insolvent members. It could also facilitate the preparation of a comprehensive reorganization plan, covering the assets of both solvent and insolvent group members.

14. One of the problems with including a solvent group member, however, is that the insolvency law will generally cover only those entities properly regarded as satisfying the standard for commencement of insolvency proceedings. A solvent group member may, however, voluntarily be covered by a reorganization plan, where a commercial decision is taken by the board of directors or the management of that member (in accordance with applicable law) that it should participate in the plan (see para. 152 below).

15. A joint application for commencement might also be permitted under some insolvency laws where all interested group members consent to the inclusion of one or more other members, whether they are insolvent or not, or where all parties in interest, including creditors, so consent. It would generally be the case, however, that obtaining the consent of all creditors in such circumstances would prove to be very difficult and potentially time-consuming. An insolvency law might also consider whether a group member not involved at the time of commencement of insolvency proceedings with respect to other group members might later be joined in those proceedings if it is subsequently adversely affected by those proceedings or it is determined that its joinder would be in the interests of the group as a whole.

(e) *Persons permitted to make a joint application*

16. Consistent with the approach of recommendation 14, an insolvency law may permit a joint application to be made by two or more enterprise group members that satisfy the commencement standard of the insolvency law (see part two, chap. I, paras. 32-53). An application might also be made by a creditor with respect to any of the group members of which it is a creditor. Permitting a creditor to make an application with respect to group members of which it is not a creditor would be inconsistent with the commencement standard of recommendation 14.

(f) *Competent courts*

17. A joint application for commencement with respect to two or more enterprise group members may raise issues of jurisdiction, even in the domestic context, if those group members are located in different places and different courts potentially have jurisdiction over them and therefore competence to consider the application. This may occur, for example, in respect of a group operating nationally in States where jurisdiction for insolvency matters lies with courts in different places or applications for commencement may be made in different courts. Some laws may allow a joint application for commencement to be handled by a single court that will have jurisdiction over the individual group members included in the application.

18. Although that approach is desirable, it will ultimately be a question of whether domestic law permits joint applications involving different debtors (albeit members of the same group) in different jurisdictions or courts to be treated in such a way. In some States, proceedings in different courts may be transferred to, or consolidated in, a single court. Various criteria might be relevant, in such circumstances, to determining which court would be the most appropriate to handle such an application. It might, for example, be the court with competence to administer insolvency proceedings with respect to the parent of a group, where the parent is included in the application. Other criteria, such as the amount of indebtedness of the various group members or the location of the centre of control of the group might also be chosen to establish the prevailing competence of one court in the domestic setting. Creditors of different group members might also be located in different places, raising issues of representation and the location in which creditor committees would meet or be constituted.

19. Although the issue of which court is competent to consider a joint application for commencement where the subject group members are located in different domestic jurisdictions might be addressed by law other than the

insolvency law, it is desirable that the approach of recommendation 13 be followed. This would require the insolvency law to clearly indicate, or include a reference to, the law that establishes the court with jurisdiction over such an application. The adoption of that approach should make it clear to all relevant parties where and how such an application can be pursued. This will be of particular importance where more than one court might have jurisdiction over different group members.

20. Where a joint application is permitted under the insolvency law, there is the potential for cost savings where, for example, the same court is considering the commencement criteria with respect to a number of members of the same enterprise group at the same time. The fees payable and other associated procedural issues associated with an application for, and commencement of, insolvency proceedings may therefore merit reconsideration in the context of joint applications (see part two, chap. I, paras. 76-78).

(g) Notice of application

21. The recommendations above with respect to notification of an application for commencement of insolvency proceedings would apply to a joint application (see part two, chap. I, paras. 64-67). A joint application by a creditor should be notified to the group members that are the subject of the application in accordance with recommendation 19 (a). Where group members make a joint application, notice to creditors and other parties in interest would not be required until proceedings commenced on the basis of that application, in accordance with recommendation 22.

Recommendations 199-201

Purpose of legislative provisions

The purpose of provisions on joint application²³ for commencement of insolvency proceedings with respect to two or more enterprise group members is:

(a) To facilitate coordinated consideration of an application for commencement of insolvency proceedings with respect to those enterprise group members;

(b) To enable the court to obtain information concerning the enterprise group that would facilitate the determination of whether commencement of insolvency proceedings with respect to those group members should be ordered;

²³A joint application for commencement does not affect the legal identity of each group member included in the application: each member remains separate and distinct.

Recommendations 199-201 (continued)

(c) To promote efficiency and reduce costs; and

(d) To provide a mechanism²⁴ for the court to assess whether procedural coordination of those insolvency proceedings would be appropriate.

Contents of legislative provisions*Joint application for commencement of insolvency proceedings (paras. 8-9)*

199. The insolvency law may specify that a joint application for commencement of insolvency proceedings may be made with respect to two or more enterprise group members, each of which satisfies the applicable commencement standard.²⁵

Persons permitted to apply (para. 16)

200. Where the insolvency law provides for joint applications in accordance with recommendation 199, the insolvency law should specify that a joint application may be made by:

(a) Two or more enterprise group members, each of which satisfies the applicable commencement standard in recommendation 15; or

(b) A creditor, provided that:

(i) It is a creditor of each group member to be included in the application; and

(ii) Each of those group members satisfies the commencement standard in recommendation 16.

Competent courts (paras. 17-20)

201. For the purposes of recommendation 13, the words “commencement and conduct of insolvency proceedings, including matters arising in the course of those proceedings” include a joint application for commencement of insolvency proceedings with respect to two or more enterprise group members.²⁶

²⁴A joint application is not a prerequisite for procedural coordination, but may facilitate the court’s consideration of whether an order for procedural coordination should be made

²⁵See recommendation 15, which addresses debtor applications and recommendation 16, which addresses creditor applications for commencement (*UNCITRAL Legislative Guide*, part two, chap. I)

²⁶Recommendation 13 provides: “The insolvency law should clearly indicate (or include a reference to the relevant law that establishes) the court that has jurisdiction over the commencement and conduct of insolvency proceedings, including matters arising in the course of those proceedings.” (*UNCITRAL Legislative Guide*, part two, chap. I) The criteria that might be relevant to determining the competent court is discussed in para. 18 above.

2. Procedural coordination

(a) Purpose of procedural coordination

22. Procedural coordination is intended to promote procedural convenience and cost-efficiency; it may not only facilitate the obtaining of comprehensive information on the business operations of the group members subject to the insolvency proceedings, but also assist in the valuation of assets, in the identification of creditors and other parties in interest and in avoiding duplication of effort. Procedural coordination refers to what in practice may be varying degrees of coordination with respect to the conduct and administration of multiple insolvency proceedings commenced with respect to two or more enterprise group members involving one or possibly more than one court. Although administered in a coordinated manner, the assets and liabilities of each group member involved in the procedural coordination remain separate and distinct, thus preserving the integrity and identity of individual group members and the substantive rights of claimants. Accordingly, the effect of procedural coordination is limited to administrative aspects of the proceedings and does not touch upon substantive issues. The scope of an order for procedural coordination would generally be determined by the court in each case.

23. Multiple proceedings may be streamlined in various ways through an order for procedural coordination, facilitating sharing of information to obtain a more comprehensive evaluation of the situation of the various debtors; combining of hearings and meetings; preparation of a single list of creditors and other parties in interest for the provision of notice and coordination of the provision of notice; establishment of joint deadlines; agreement on a joint claims procedure and coordinated realization and sale of assets; coordination of avoidance proceedings; and the holding of joint creditor meetings or coordination among creditor committees. Streamlining may also be facilitated by the appointment of a single or the same insolvency representative to administer the insolvency proceedings or by ensuring coordination between insolvency representatives where two or more are appointed (see paras. 139-144 below). It may also involve cooperation between two or more courts or, when permitted by domestic law, administration of the multiple proceedings concerning group members in a single court.

24. Where two or more courts are involved, cooperation between them might include, for example, coordinating the holding of hearings and sharing and disclosure of information. As noted below with respect to cross-border cooperation (see chap. III, paras. 38-40), coordinated hearings may significantly promote the efficiency of parallel insolvency proceedings involving

members of an enterprise group by bringing relevant stakeholders together at the same time to discuss and resolve outstanding issues or potential conflicts, thus avoiding protracted negotiations and resulting delays. Such hearings would generally involve two or more courts holding hearings at the same time with provision for simultaneous communication so that parties can at least hear and preferably see the proceedings in each court. Such hearings may be more convenient to organize in a domestic setting, as they would not generally involve the challenges posed by different languages, time zones, laws, procedures and judicial traditions that may arise in the cross-border context. However, as in the international context, the conduct of such hearings might require the use of common procedures and agreement, for example, as to how filing of documents and submission of information is to be handled between different courts.

25. Various factors might be relevant to considering whether procedural coordination is appropriate in a particular case. These may relate, for example, to information substantiating the existence of the group and identifying the linkages between group members, including the position in the group of each member covered by the application, particularly where one of them is the parent. Although a requirement to provide such detail might be onerous in cases where creditors are permitted to apply for procedural coordination, the essence of the application is that the debtors are members of the same group and that procedural coordination will benefit the conduct and administration of insolvency proceedings. Accordingly, the court would need to be satisfied as to that relationship when determining whether proceedings should commence and procedural coordination should be ordered.

(b) Creditor participation

26. Part two (chap. III, paras. 99-114) discusses the participation of creditors in insolvency proceedings and, in particular, the formation of creditor committees. The considerations discussed would also apply in the context of insolvency proceedings concerning enterprise group members. With respect to such proceedings, the interests of creditors of the different group members have the potential to diverge, and it is unlikely that those interests could be represented in a single creditor committee. It may also be the case, however, that where procedural coordination involving many group members is ordered, establishing a separate committee for the creditors of each member might prove to be extremely costly and inefficient for administration of the proceedings. For that reason, the courts in some States have the discretion not to establish, in appropriate circumstances, a separate creditor committee for each group member subject to insolvency proceedings. Those circumstances may include where the interests of creditors of the different group members are

not diverse and can be accommodated and appropriately protected in a single committee or where the creditors are common to the group members concerned. The desirability of forming a single committee may also depend upon the extent to which creditors can participate in the insolvency proceedings under the applicable insolvency law (see part two, chap. III, paras. 75-87) and whether that participation can be facilitated by a creditor committee (see part two, chap. III, paras. 99-114). Where it is not appropriate to establish a single committee, it will be desirable to facilitate coordination between the various committees established in the different proceedings.

(c) Timing of application

27. The benefits to be derived from procedural coordination may be apparent at the time an application for commencement is made or may arise after proceedings have commenced. It is therefore desirable that an insolvency law adopt a flexible approach to the timing of an application for procedural coordination. An application might be made at the same time as an application for commencement of proceedings or at any subsequent time. However, since the goal of procedural coordination is to coordinate the administration of multiple proceedings, the feasibility of making an application at a late stage of the proceedings would be limited, in practice, by the usefulness of so doing. In other words, there may be little advantage in seeking to coordinate proceedings that are almost completed. Similarly, the time at which additional group members became insolvent would determine whether they could be added to an existing order for procedural coordination.

28. An insolvency law might adopt the approach of stipulating a time limit for applying for procedural coordination to provide a degree of certainty. However, as is generally the case with any consideration of the need for a time limit, the advantages of establishing such a limit must be weighed against the potential disadvantages of inflexibility and the need to ensure that the time limit is properly observed (see part two, chap. I, para. 60).

(d) Persons permitted to apply

29. It is desirable that procedural coordination be as widely available as possible and that the court be given the discretion to consider whether coordination of the various proceedings would benefit their administration. The court may consider whether to order procedural coordination on its own initiative, particularly to address situations where it is determined that procedurally coordinating the proceedings would be in the best interests of the enterprise group and facilitate administration, but no application for

procedural coordination is forthcoming from a party authorized to do so. The court might also order procedural coordination in response to an application from authorized parties, such as any group member subject to insolvency proceedings, the insolvency representative of a member, who would generally possess the information most relevant for making such an application, or a creditor.

30. In the case of creditors, the eligibility limitation that applies with respect to a joint application for commencement of insolvency proceedings (recommendation 200 (b) (i)) need not necessarily apply. Where the application for procedural coordination is made at the time of the application for commencement, the issue of commencement should be treated separately from that of procedural coordination, since the criteria required to satisfy each issue will generally be different. Once proceedings have commenced, there is no reason to limit the eligibility to make an application for procedural coordination to those creditors who are creditors of the group members to be coordinated, especially since procedural coordination is intended to benefit the conduct and administration of the proceedings. Creditors of other group members might also apply; the decision to order procedural coordination should not be conditioned upon the status of the creditor applying.

(e) Competent courts

31. Procedural coordination may also raise issues of jurisdiction with respect to joint applications for commencement (see paras. 17-18 above), where different domestic courts have competence over the various group members subject to insolvency proceedings. In jurisdictions where those issues arise, they would generally be determined by reference to domestic procedural law. In some States, proceedings in different courts may be consolidated or transferred to a single court, for example, the court with competence to administer insolvency proceedings with respect to the parent of a group. A range of other criteria, such as priority of filing, amount of indebtedness or location of the centre of control, might also be chosen to establish the prevailing competence of one court in the domestic setting. A key element of consolidating or transferring proceedings to a single court would be establishing communication between the courts involved prior to that transfer. Creditors of different group members might also be located in different places, raising issues of representation and the location in which creditor committees would meet or be constituted. Where the proceedings cannot be consolidated or transferred to a single court, coordination between the competent courts will be required to ensure the goal of the procedural coordination is met.

32. Although these issues might be addressed by a law other than the insolvency law, it is desirable (see para. 19 above) that the approach of recommendation 13 be followed. That would require the insolvency law to clearly indicate or include a reference to the relevant law that establishes the court with jurisdiction over an application for procedural coordination.

(f) Notice with respect to procedural coordination

33. An application for procedural coordination could be subject to the same requirements for giving of notice as an application for commencement of proceedings (see recommendations 19 and 22-24 and part two, chap. I, paras. 64-68). When made at the same time as the application for commencement of proceedings, only an application for procedural coordination by creditors would require notice to be given to the relevant debtors, consistent with recommendation 19.

34. An application made at that time by group members would not require creditors to be notified, consistent with recommendations 23 and 24, but relevant information, such as the content or implications of the order, could be included with the notice of commencement of proceedings.

35. When an application for procedural coordination is made subsequent to commencement of proceedings, it may be appropriate to provide notice to creditors, despite the fact that procedural coordination does not affect their substantive rights. The provision of notice may be particularly important where the law makes provision, as noted above, for cases commenced in different jurisdictions to be transferred to, or administered by, a single court and that transfer may affect procedural aspects of the proceedings of interest to creditors, such as the location of meetings of a creditor committee or the place for submission of claims.

36. Provision of notice to all creditors may be satisfied with collective notification, such as by notice in a particular legal publication, when domestic legislation so permits and when appropriate, for instance, in the case of a large number of creditors (see part two, chap. I, paras. 69-70). In addition to the information required by the recommendations above addressing provision of notice on commencement of proceedings (recommendation 25 and part two, chap. I, para. 71), notice of an order for procedural coordination might include the terms of the order and information relevant to, for example, coordination of hearings and meetings, and arrangements to be made with respect to post-commencement finance.

(g) *Modifying or terminating an order for procedural coordination*

37. Given that the purpose of procedural coordination is to promote administrative convenience and cost-efficiency, an insolvency law may include provisions relating to modification or termination of an order for procedural coordination to accommodate changed circumstances. That approach might be appropriate when, for example, a coordinated reorganization is not successful and the individual members should be liquidated separately. Termination of an order, although rarely required, should be possible as the initial order is not intended to affect substantive rights. As a safeguard, the insolvency law could provide that termination or modification would be possible, provided it was without prejudice to vested rights and interests arising from the initial order.

Recommendations 202-210

Purpose of legislative provisions

The purpose of provisions on procedural coordination of insolvency proceedings with respect to two or more enterprise group members is:

- (a) To facilitate coordination of the administration of those insolvency proceedings, while respecting the separate legal identity of each group member; and
- (b) To promote cost-efficiency and a better return to creditors.

Contents of legislative provisions

Procedural coordination of two or more insolvency proceedings (paras. 22-25)

202. The insolvency law should specify that the administration of insolvency proceedings with respect to two or more enterprise group members may be coordinated for procedural purposes.

203. The insolvency law should specify that, at the request of a person permitted to make an application under recommendation 206 or on its own initiative, the court²⁷ may order procedural coordination.

204. Procedural coordination may involve, for example, the appointment of a single or the same insolvency representative; the establishment of a single

²⁷Coordination might involve different courts competent with respect to different group members or a single court that is competent with respect to a number of different insolvency proceedings concerning members of the same group. Accordingly, an order for procedural coordination may require action by one or more than one court.

creditor committee; cooperation between the courts, including coordination of hearings; cooperation between insolvency representatives, including information-sharing and coordination of negotiations; joint provision of notice; coordination between creditor committees; coordination of procedures for submission and verification of claims; and coordination of avoidance proceedings. The scope and extent of the procedural coordination should be specified by the court.

Application for procedural coordination

—Timing of application (paras. 27-28)

205. The insolvency law should specify that an application for procedural coordination may be made at the same time as an application for commencement of insolvency proceedings or at any subsequent time.²⁸

—Persons permitted to apply (paras. 29-30)

206. The insolvency law should specify that an application for procedural coordination may be made by:

(a) An enterprise group member that is subject to an application for commencement of insolvency proceedings or subject to insolvency proceedings;

(b) The insolvency representative of an enterprise group member;
or

(c) A creditor²⁹ of an enterprise group member that is subject to an application for commencement of insolvency proceedings or subject to insolvency proceedings.

Coordinating consideration of an application (para. 31)

207. The insolvency law should specify that the court³⁰ may take appropriate steps to coordinate with any other competent court consideration of an application for procedural coordination of insolvency proceedings concerning two or more enterprise group members. Those steps might involve, for example, coordinated proceedings; coordinated hearings; sharing and disclosure of information.

²⁸The possibility of ordering procedural coordination at an advanced stage of the insolvency proceedings is discussed in para. 27 above.

²⁹To be eligible to make an application for procedural coordination, a creditor does not have to be a creditor of all the group members in respect of which it is seeking procedural coordination.

³⁰See the footnote to recommendation 203.

Recommendations 202-210 (continued)*Modification or termination of an order for procedural coordination (para. 37)*

208. The insolvency law should specify that an order for procedural coordination may be modified or terminated, provided that any actions or decisions already taken pursuant to the order should not be affected by the modification or termination. Where more than one court is involved in ordering procedural coordination, those courts may take appropriate steps to coordinate modification or termination of the procedural coordination.

Competent courts (paras. 31-32)

209. For the purposes of recommendation 13, the words “commencement and conduct of insolvency proceedings, including matters arising in the course of those proceedings” include applications and orders for procedural coordination of insolvency proceedings with respect to two or more enterprise group members.³¹

Notice with respect to procedural coordination (paras. 33-36)

210. The insolvency law should establish requirements for giving notice with respect to applications and orders for procedural coordination and modification or termination of procedural coordination, including the scope and extent of the order; the parties to whom notice should be given; the party responsible for giving notice; and the content of the notice.

C. Treatment of assets on commencement of insolvency proceedings

38. The manner in which the commencement of insolvency proceedings affects the debtor and its assets is discussed in detail above in part two, chapter II. In general, those effects would apply equally to commencement of insolvency proceedings with respect to two or more enterprise group members. Some of the effects that might differ in the group context are discussed below, with respect to protection and preservation of the insolvency estate; post-application finance; use and disposal of assets; post-commencement finance; avoidance; subordination; and remedies, including substantive consolidation orders.

³¹The criteria that might be relevant to determining the competent court are discussed in para. 18 above.

1. Protection and preservation of the insolvency estate

(a) Application of the stay to a solvent group member

39. As noted in part two, chapter II, paragraph 26, many insolvency laws include a mechanism to protect the value of the insolvency estate that not only prevents creditors from commencing actions to enforce their rights through legal remedies during some or all of the period of insolvency proceedings, but also suspends actions already under way against the debtor. The recommendations relating to the application of that mechanism, referred to as a “stay”, would apply generally in the case of insolvency proceedings concerning two or more enterprise group members (see recommendations 39-51).

40. One issue that might arise in the context of the insolvency of enterprise groups, but not in the case of individual debtors, is the extension of the stay to an enterprise group member that is not subject to the insolvency proceedings (where the insolvency law permits a group member that is not insolvent to be included in the proceedings, this issue will not arise). The issue may be of particular relevance to enterprise groups because of the interrelatedness of the business of the group. For example, when finance is arranged on a group basis by way of cross-guarantees or cross-collateralization, the finance provided to one member might affect the liabilities of another, or actions affecting the assets of group members not subject to insolvency proceedings may also affect the assets and liabilities or the ability to continue the ordinary course of business of group members with respect to which applications for commencement have been made or insolvency proceedings have commenced.

41. Extension of the stay to include the solvent member might be sought in a number of situations, for example, to protect an intra-group guarantee that relies upon the assets of the solvent group member providing the guarantee; to restrain a lender from seeking to enforce an agreement against a solvent group member, where that enforcement might affect the liability of another member subject to an application for insolvency proceedings; and to restrain the enforcement of a security interest against assets of a solvent member that are central to the business of the group, including the business of group members subject to an application for insolvency proceedings. Extension of the stay in these cases has the potential to affect the business of the solvent member and the interests of its creditors, depending upon the nature of the solvent member and its function within the group structure. The day-to-day activities of a trading group member, for example, may be more adversely affected than those of a group member established to hold certain assets or obligations.

42. In some States, ordering insolvency-related relief with respect to a solvent group member (not included in insolvency proceedings) might not be possible, as it would conflict, for example, with the protection of property rights or raises issues of constitutional rights. Nevertheless, it might be possible to achieve the same effect if a court could order measures of protection in conjunction with the commencement of insolvency proceedings with respect to other enterprise group members in certain cases, such as where there is an intra-group guarantee. The measures may be available at the court's discretion, subject to such conditions as the court determines appropriate.

43. These measures might be covered by recommendation 48, which provides for the court to grant relief in addition to any relief that might be applicable automatically on commencement of insolvency proceedings (as addressed in recommendation 46). As the footnote to recommendation 48 points out, that additional relief would depend upon the types of measures available in a particular jurisdiction and the measures that might be appropriate in a particular insolvency proceeding.

44. Measures might also be available on a provisional basis. Recommendation 39 addresses provisional measures, specifying the types of relief that might be available “at the request of the debtor, creditors or third parties, where relief is needed to protect and preserve the value of the assets of the debtor or the interests of creditors, between the time an application to commence insolvency proceedings is made and commencement of the proceedings”.

45. Protection for the interests of the creditors, both secured and unsecured, of the solvent group member, might also be found in the relevant recommendations in part two, chapter II. Recommendations 50 and 51, for example, specifically address the issue of protection of secured creditors and grounds for relief from the stay applicable on commencement and might be extended to secured creditors of the solvent group member. Other grounds for relief from the stay might relate to the financial situation of the solvent member and the continuing effect of the stay on its day-to-day operations and, potentially, its solvency.

46. Where a secured creditor is a member of the same enterprise group as the debtor or debtors, a different approach to the question of protection might be required, especially where the insolvency law permits substantive consolidation or subordination of related person claims (see below, paras. 84-88).

(b) *Post-application finance*

47. The discussion on post-commencement finance in part two, chapter II, recognizes that the continued operation of the debtor's business after the commencement of insolvency proceedings is critical to reorganization and, to a lesser extent, liquidation, where the business is to be sold as a going concern. To maintain its business activities, the debtor must have access to funds to enable it to continue to pay for crucial supplies of goods and services, including labour costs, insurance, rent, maintenance of contracts and other operating expenses, as well as costs associated with maintaining the value of assets.

48. The same need for finance may also occur in the period between the time an application for commencement of insolvency proceedings is made and commencement of those proceedings (referred to as postapplication finance). When an enterprise group member becomes insolvent and makes an application for commencement of insolvency proceedings, that application often triggers an event of default under existing loan agreements, entitling the lender to discontinue advancing funds under those agreements. Where an insolvency law does not provide for automatic commencement of insolvency proceedings upon application, it can often take a period of several months between the making of an application and the commencement of the proceedings, during which time the courts must make an independent evaluation as to whether the debtors subject to the application meet the statutory criteria to commence proceedings. However, if the group member is to continue as a going concern while this determination is being made, it must be able to continue to conduct its business, pay its employees, pay its suppliers and generally continue its day-to-day activities. The availability or lack of financing during this interim period can determine or significantly influence whether reorganization will ultimately be a viable option or whether liquidation will be required. Where the business of the insolvent group member is closely related to that of other group members, its ability to keep operating may affect the solvency of those other members and ultimately, depending upon its position in the group hierarchy, the solvency of the group as a whole.

49. As noted in part two, chapter II, paragraph 96, in the absence of enabling or clarifying treatment in the insolvency law, the provision of finance in this period before commencement of the insolvency proceedings may raise difficult questions relating to the application of avoidance powers and the liability of both the lender and the debtor. Some insolvency laws provide, for example, that where a lender advances funds to an insolvent debtor in the period before commencement of proceedings, the lender may

be responsible for any increase in the liabilities of other creditors or the advance may be subject to avoidance in any ensuing insolvency proceedings as a preferential transaction.

50. The existence of a provision under the insolvency law enabling finance to be obtained for the period of time between the making of an application and the commencement of the proceedings would provide the necessary authorization and give any existing or new lender the assurance and incentive necessary to provide additional financing to cover that period.

51. As noted in paragraph 44 above, recommendation 39 permits the court to order provisional measures to preserve the assets of the debtor prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings. Since those measures could include authorizing post-application finance, the provision of that finance should therefore be regarded as being within the purview of recommendation 39.

2. Use and disposal of assets

52. It is noted in part two, chapter II, paragraph 74, that, although as a general principle it is desirable that an insolvency law not interfere unduly with the ownership rights of third parties or the interests of secured creditors, the conduct of insolvency proceedings will often require assets of the insolvency estate, and assets in the possession of the debtor being used in the debtor's business, to continue to be used or disposed of (including by way of encumbrance) in order to enable the goal of the particular proceedings to be realized.

53. Where insolvency proceedings concern two or more enterprise group members, issues may arise with regard to the use of assets belonging to a group member not subject to insolvency proceedings to support ongoing operations of those members subject to such proceedings, pending resolution of the proceedings. Where those assets are in the possession of one of the group members subject to insolvency proceedings, recommendation 54, which addresses the use of assets owned by a third party that are in the possession of the debtor, may be sufficient.

54. Where those assets are not in the possession of any of the group members subject to insolvency proceedings, recommendation 54 generally will not apply. There may be circumstances, however, where the solvent group member in possession of those assets is included in the insolvency proceedings or the provisions of a group reorganization plan should cover the assets (see para. 152 below for a discussion of the inclusion of a solvent group member in a reorganization plan). Where the solvent group member is not

included in the proceedings, the question will be whether those assets can be used to support group members subject to insolvency proceedings and if so, the conditions to which that use would be subject. The use of those assets might raise questions of avoidance, particularly where the supporting member subsequently became insolvent, and also raises concerns for creditors of that member.

3. *Post-commencement finance*

(a) *The need for post-commencement finance*

55. The discussion on post-commencement finance in part two, chapter II (see in particular paras. 94-95), recognizes that the continued operation of the debtor's business after the commencement of insolvency proceedings is critical to reorganization and, to a lesser extent, liquidation where the business is to be sold as a going concern. To maintain its business activities, the debtor must have access to funds to enable it to continue to pay for crucial supplies of goods and services, including labour costs, insurance, rent, maintenance of contracts and other operating expenses, as well as costs associated with maintaining the value of assets. It is also noted, however, that many jurisdictions restrict the provision of new money in insolvency or do not specifically address the issue of new finance or the priority for its repayment in insolvency. Of those laws that do address post-commencement finance, very few, if any, specifically address the issue in the context of enterprise groups.

56. Post-commencement finance may be even more important in the group context than it is in the context of individual insolvency proceedings. If there are no ongoing funds there is very little prospect of reorganizing an insolvent enterprise group or selling all or parts of it as a going concern. The economic impact of that failure is likely to be much greater, especially in large groups, than it would be in the case of an individual debtor. The reasons for promoting the availability of post-commencement finance in the group context are therefore similar to the case of the individual debtor, although a number of issues different to those relating to the individual debtor are likely to arise. These issues may include: balancing the interests of individual enterprise group members with what is required for the reorganization of the group as a whole; provision of post-commencement finance by solvent group members, especially in cases where issues of control might arise (such as where that solvent member is controlled by the insolvent parent of the group); treatment of transactions between group members that are essentially related persons (see main glossary, para. 12 (jj)); provision

of finance by group members subject to insolvency proceedings; and the desirability of maintaining, in insolvency proceedings, the financing structure that the group had before the onset of insolvency, especially where that structure involved pledging all of the assets of the group for finance that was channelled through a centralized group entity with treasury functions.

57. The use of post-commencement finance in the group context will involve consideration of the desirability and impact of that financing not only for the group member receiving the benefit of the finance but also the group member providing the finance or facilitating its provision by way of a security interest or guarantee. Where that consideration involves more than one insolvency representative, coordination and agreement between them will be crucial. Where only one insolvency representative is appointed to administer several group members, potential conflicts of interest connected with post-commencement finance will need to be considered and addressed.

(b) Sources of post-commencement finance in a group context

58. As noted in part two, chapter II, paragraph 99, post-commencement finance is likely to come from a limited number of sources. In the enterprise group context, that might include sources both external and internal to the group, where internal sources might include both solvent group members and group members already subject to insolvency proceedings. While some of the incentives for providing post-commencement finance might be the same for internal and external lenders, internal lenders may have the added inducement of their own survival where they are to be part of a reorganization.

(i) Provision of post-commencement finance by a solvent group member

59. As noted above, one of the questions with respect to post-commencement finance in the enterprise group context is whether the assets of a solvent group member can be used, for example, as the basis for granting a security interest or providing a guarantee, to obtain financing for an insolvent member from an external source or to fund the insolvent member directly, and, if so, the implications for the recommendations concerning priority and security. A solvent group member might have an interest in the financial stability of the parent, other group members or the group as a whole in order to ensure its own financial stability and the continuation of its business, particularly where it is closely integrated with or reliant upon insolvent members for ongoing business activity. This may commonly occur, for example, in a vertically integrated manufacturing group. Different types of solvent entities, such as special-purpose entities with few liabilities and valuable assets, might be

involved in different ways in the insolvency of other group members, such as by granting a guarantee or security interest to secure new finance for insolvent group members.

60. However, the use of the assets of a solvent group member in that way, especially where that solvent member is likely to become, or subsequently becomes, insolvent, raises a number of questions. While the solvent entity might provide that finance on its own authority under relevant company law and not under the insolvency law, the consequences of that provision of finance may ultimately be regulated by the insolvency law. Questions may arise, for example, as to: whether a solvent group member would be entitled to the priority provided by recommendation 64 if it provided funding to an insolvent group member; whether the claim arising from that transaction would be subject to special treatment because it occurred between related persons pursuant to recommendation 184; or whether such a transaction might be considered a preferential transaction under recommendation 87 and thus subject to avoidance in any subsequent insolvency of the member providing the finance. Under some laws, providing such finance may be prohibited as constituting a transfer of the assets of a solvent entity to an insolvent entity to the detriment of the creditors and shareholders of the solvent entity.

61. Some of the difficulties associated with the provision of finance by a solvent group member might be solved if addressed in the context of a reorganization plan, in which the solvent group member, as well as external finance providers, could participate on a contractual basis. While there might be situations in which that approach would be appropriate, the requirement for post-commencement finance at an early stage of the insolvency proceedings suggests that it is likely to be of limited application. In reorganization proceedings, for example, such finance would generally be required before a reorganization plan could be negotiated and approved. Where the business was to be sold as a going concern there would be no reorganization plan, but finance might nevertheless be required to maintain the business prior to a sale.

(ii) Provision of post-commencement finance by an insolvent group member

62. Provision of post-commencement finance by one group member subject to insolvency proceedings to another such member is not addressed directly elsewhere in the *Guide*. Some of the general prohibitions under existing laws associated with insolvent entities' borrowing and lending funds may need to be further considered to facilitate the provision of post-commencement finance in that situation. The policy rationale for those

prohibitions is likely to be clearly evident when both the lender and the borrower are not only insolvent and subject to insolvency proceedings, but also members of the same enterprise group. The group context may also raise concerns with respect to the duties and obligations of the insolvency representatives, when the insolvency representative of one insolvent group member seeks to facilitate the provision of post-commencement finance to another insolvent group member and the insolvency representative of the second group member to obtain or receive that post-commencement finance. In those cases, it is desirable that the insolvency law address both the providing and receiving sides of the post-commencement finance.

63. While it may generally be expected that a group member subject to insolvency proceedings would not have the ability to provide post-commencement finance to another such member or to provide support for its provision, there may be circumstances, albeit potentially limited, where it would be both possible, and desirable, particularly when the interests of the enterprise group are considered as a whole. To the extent that the provision of such finance has an impact on the rights of existing creditors, both secured and unsecured, of both group members, it is desirable that it be balanced against the prospect that preservation of going concern value by the continued operation of the business will ultimately provide benefit to those creditors. A balance might also be desirable between sacrificing one group member for the benefit of other members and achieving a better overall result for all members. Although potentially difficult to achieve, the goal might be the fair apportionment of any harm that arises from such post-commencement finance in the short term with a view to the long-term gain, rather than the sacrifice of one member (and its creditors) for the benefit of others involved in the post-commencement finance.

(c) Addressing the provision and receipt of post-commencement finance in the group context

64. Recommendations 63-68 are aimed at promoting the availability of finance for continued operation or survival of the debtor's business and ensuring appropriate protection for the providers of post-commencement finance, as well as for other parties whose rights may be affected by the provision of that finance. In the enterprise group context, these recommendations would apply to the provision of post-commencement finance to group members subject to insolvency proceedings by lenders external to the group and by solvent members of the group.

65. Recommendation 63 establishes the basis for obtaining post-commencement finance (where the insolvency representative determines it to be necessary for

the continued operation or survival of the business of the debtor or the preservation or enhancement of the value of the estate) and its authorization (by the court or by creditors). Those requirements remain relevant in the context of enterprise groups, and, for the avoidance of doubt, recommendation 63 should be interpreted as including a group member subject to insolvency proceedings that obtains post-commencement finance from either an external lender or a solvent member of the same group. What recommendation 63 does not address is a group member subject to insolvency proceedings providing post-commencement finance directly to another group member also subject to insolvency proceedings or facilitating its provision by way of security interest or guarantee or the receipt of such finance by the insolvent group member.

66. To parallel the requirements of recommendation 63 and address the group member providing the finance, it might be desirable to require the insolvency representative of that providing group member to determine that the provision of post-commencement finance is necessary for the continued operation or survival of the business of that group member or the preservation or enhancement of the value of its estate. An additional requirement might be that any harm to creditors of the providing group member must be offset by the benefit to be derived from the provision of the post-commencement finance.

67. Consistent with recommendation 63, the insolvency law might also require the court to authorize, or creditors of the providing group member to consent, to the post-commencement finance. Given that new finance may be required on a fairly urgent basis to ensure the continuity of the business, it is desirable that the number of authorizations required be kept to a minimum. The advantages and disadvantages of the different considerations with respect to authorization that would also apply in the group context are discussed in part two, chapter II, paragraphs 105-106). It may be added that since the issues to be determined are likely to be more complex in that context, involving as they do a larger number of parties and complex interrelationships, it is most likely to be the insolvency representatives of the relevant group members who will be in the best position to assess the impact of the proposed financing arrangement, in much the same way as they are with respect to determining the need for new finance under recommendation 63. If the involvement of the courts or creditors is considered desirable, however, it should be borne in mind that issues of delay may be encountered where there are a large number of creditors to be consulted or where the court does not have the ability to make speedy decisions.

(d) Conflict of interest

68. The provision of finance in the group context raises issues concerning possible prejudice and conflict of interest that are not relevant in the case

of a single debtor. A conflict of interest might arise, for example, in balancing the interests of the group as a whole against the potentially different interests of the lender and the receiver of post-commencement finance. A particular concern might arise where a single or the same insolvency representative is appointed to administer the insolvency proceedings of a number of group members. The insolvency representative of the member providing the finance might also be the insolvency representative of the receiving member and will be required to assess the interests of each member individually, as well as the interests of the group. That situation might be addressed in several ways in the insolvency law, such as by requiring court or creditor approval of the post-commencement finance as suggested by recommendation 63 or by appointing one or more additional insolvency representatives to ensure the interests of the creditors of the different group members are protected (see para. 144 below). The appointment might be for the time required to address that specific conflict or on more general terms, for the duration of the proceedings.

69. There is also the question of whether an insolvent group member might, as part of the financing arrangements of the enterprise group as a whole, be requested to guarantee finance provided to a solvent group member as part of the ongoing financial arrangements of the group. Since the provision of that guarantee is likely to constitute a disposal of the assets of the insolvent group member, it would probably be covered by the recommendations addressing that issue (see recommendations 52-62).

(e) Priority for post-commencement finance

70. Recommendation 64 specifies the need to establish the priority to be accorded to post-commencement finance and the level of that priority, i.e. ahead of ordinary unsecured creditors, including those with administrative priority, and would apply in the group context where post-commencement finance is provided to a group member by an external lender. In that situation, according priority continues to provide an important incentive for the provision of such financing. However, the inducement required for the provision of post-commencement finance to a group member subject to insolvency proceedings by another group member is perhaps slightly different.

71. The particular interest of a group member providing finance may relate more to the insolvency outcome for the group as a whole (including that member) than to commercial considerations of profit or short-term gains, especially where there is a high degree of integration or reliance between the businesses of the group members. In those circumstances, it might be necessary to consider whether the level of priority accorded by recommendation 64 would be appropriate. One view might be that that level of priority provides

appropriate incentive for the provision of finance and affords appropriate protection to the creditors of the provider, irrespective of whether the provider is external or internal to the group. Another view might be that because the transaction involves related persons in a group context, it is desirable to accord lower priority to protect the interests of creditors more generally and achieve a balance between the interests of the finance provider's creditors and those of the group member receiving the finance. Whichever approach is adopted, it is desirable that the insolvency law accord priority to such lending and that it specify the appropriate level.

(f) Security for post-commencement finance

72. Recommendations 65-67 address issues relating to the granting of security for post-commencement finance and generally would be applicable in the enterprise group context. A group member subject to insolvency proceedings may grant a security interest of the type referred to in recommendation 65 to secure post-commencement finance it has obtained for its own use. That situation is clearly covered by recommendations 65-67. A group member subject to insolvency proceedings may also grant a security interest of the type referred to in recommendation 65 to secure repayment of post-commencement finance provided to another group member subject to insolvency proceedings. In the latter situation, the group member is granting the security over its unencumbered assets, but is not directly receiving the benefit of the post-commencement finance and is potentially diminishing the pool of assets available to its creditors. It may, however, derive an indirect benefit when the provision of the finance facilitates a better solution for the insolvency of the group as a whole and, as noted above, any short-term detriment is offset by the long-term gain for creditors, including its own creditors. The member receiving the finance is deriving a direct benefit, but increasing its indebtedness to the potential detriment of its creditors, although they should also benefit in the longer term.

73. Where it is considered desirable to accord a security interest granted to secure new finance priority ahead of an existing security interest over the same asset, as contemplated by recommendation 66, the safeguards applicable under that recommendation and recommendation 67 would apply in the group context.

(g) Guarantee or other assurance of repayment for post-commencement finance

74. The provision of a guarantee by one group member for payment of new finance to another is not a situation that arises in the case of

an individual debtor and is therefore not addressed elsewhere in the *Guide*. However, since the considerations that arise are similar to those discussed above with respect to the granting and obtaining of a security interest, it may be appropriate to adopt the same approach with respect to the determinations to be made by the insolvency representatives of both the providing and obtaining group members and the possible authorization by the court or consent of creditors.

Recommendations 211-216

Purpose of legislative provisions

The purpose of provisions on post-commencement finance in the context of enterprise groups is:

- (a) To facilitate finance to be obtained by enterprise group members subject to insolvency proceedings for the continued operation or survival of their business or the preservation or enhancement of the value of their assets;
- (b) To facilitate the provision of finance by enterprise group members, including group members subject to insolvency proceedings;
- (c) To ensure appropriate protection for the providers and receivers of post-commencement finance and for those parties whose rights may be affected by the provision of that finance; and
- (d) To advance the objective of fair apportionment of the benefit and detriment associated with the provision of post-commencement finance among all group members involved.

Contents of legislative provisions

Post-commencement finance provided by a group member subject to insolvency proceedings to another group member subject to insolvency proceedings (paras. 62-67 and 74)

211. The insolvency law should permit an enterprise group member subject to insolvency proceedings to:

- (a) Advance post-commencement finance to other enterprise group members subject to insolvency proceedings;
- (b) Grant a security interest over its assets for post-commencement finance provided to another enterprise group member subject to insolvency proceedings; and
- (c) Provide a guarantee or other assurance of repayment for post-commencement finance provided to another enterprise group member subject to insolvency proceedings.

212. The insolvency law should specify that post-commencement finance may be provided in accordance with recommendation 211, where the insolvency representative of the group member advancing finance, granting a security interest or providing a guarantee or other assurance:

(a) Determines it to be necessary for the continued operation or survival of the business of that enterprise group member or for the preservation or enhancement of the value of its estate; and

(b) Determines that any harm to creditors of that group member will be offset by the benefit to be derived from advancing finance, granting a security interest or providing a guarantee or other assurance.

213. The insolvency law may require the court to authorize or creditors to consent to the advance of finance, grant of a security interest or provision of a guarantee or other assurance in accordance with recommendations 211 and 212.

Post-commencement finance obtained by a group member subject to insolvency proceedings from another group member subject to insolvency proceedings (paras. 64-67)

214. The insolvency law should specify that in accordance with recommendation 63, post-commencement finance may be obtained from an enterprise group member subject to insolvency proceedings by another group member subject to insolvency proceedings where the insolvency representative of the obtaining group member determines it to be necessary for the continued operation or survival of the business of that group member or for the preservation or enhancement of the value of its estate. The insolvency law may require the court to authorize or creditors to consent to the obtaining of that post-commencement finance.

Priority for post-commencement finance (paras. 70-71)

215. The insolvency law should specify the priority that applies to post-commencement finance provided by one enterprise group member subject to insolvency proceedings to another group member subject to insolvency proceedings.

Security for post-commencement finance (paras. 72-73)

216. The insolvency law should specify that recommendations 65, 66 and 67 apply to the granting of a security interest in accordance with recommendation 211 (b).

4. Avoidance proceedings

(a) Nature of enterprise group transactions

75. Recommendations 87-99, relating to avoidance, would generally apply to avoidance of transactions in the context of an enterprise group, although additional considerations may apply to transactions between group members because of the group structure and the different relationships that group members may have to each other. A significant expenditure of time and money may be required to disentangle the layers of intra-group transactions in order to determine which, if any, are subject to avoidance. As noted in part two, chapter II, paragraph 155, the costs associated with avoidance proceedings must be weighed against the likelihood of recovering assets and the overall benefit to the estate in the circumstances of each case. Some transactions that might appear to be preferential or undervalued as between the immediate parties might be considered differently when viewed in the broader context of an enterprise group, where the benefits and detriments of transactions might be more widely assigned. Those transactions, such as contracts entered into for purposes of transfer pricing,³² may involve terms and conditions that are different from those included in similar contracts entered into by unrelated commercial parties on usual commercial terms. Similarly, some legitimate transactions occurring within an enterprise group may not be commercially viable outside the group context if the benefits and detriments are analysed on normal commercial grounds.

76. Intra-group transactions may represent a range of different activities, including: trading between group members; channelling of profits upwards from one group member to a parent; loans from one member to another to support continued trading by the borrowing member; asset transfers and guarantees between group members; payments by one group member to a creditor of a related group member; or a guarantee or mortgage given by one group member to support a loan by an external lender to another group member. A group may have the practice of putting all available money and assets in the group to the best commercial use in the interests of the group as a whole, as opposed to the interests or benefit of the group member to which they belong. This might include sweeping cash from some group members into the financing group member. Although this might not always be in the best interests of the individual group members, some laws permit

³²Transfer pricing refers to the pricing of goods and services within a multidivisional organization. Goods from the production division may be sold to the marketing division, or goods from a parent may be sold to a foreign group member. The choice of the transfer prices affects the division of the total profit among the parts of the group. It can be advantageous to choose them so that, in terms of book-keeping, most of the profit is made in a country with low taxes.

directors of wholly owned group members, for example, to act in that manner, provided it is in the best interests of the parent.

(b) Avoidance criteria in the enterprise group context

77. An issue that may need to be considered in the group context is the goal of avoidance provisions. It could be to protect intra-group transactions in the interests of the group as a whole, on the basis that they are normal “ordinary course” business transactions, or it could be to subject them to particular scrutiny and a greater likelihood of avoidance because of the relationship between transacting parties as group members and the provisions of the insolvency law applicable to related person transactions. “Related person” is defined to include enterprise group members such as a parent, subsidiary, partner or affiliate of the insolvent group member with respect to which insolvency proceedings have commenced or a person, including a legal person, that is or has been in control of the debtor (main glossary, para. 12 (*jj*)).

78. In some cases, a stricter regime may be justified on the basis that related persons are more likely to be favoured and, because they tend to have the earliest knowledge of when a particular group member is in fact in financial difficulty, they also have a greater opportunity to take advantage of that situation. Assets may, for example, be transferred from the distressed group member to other group members to enable those assets to continue to be used in the group context and avoid their being subject to any insolvency proceedings. Moreover, group members may have common shareholders and directors that control transactions between group members or have the ability to determine operational and financial policy decisions. Such situations have the potential to render intra-group transactions more vulnerable to avoidance than where the same types of transaction occur between unrelated parties. The mere existence of the enterprise group, however, may not always provide sufficient justification to treat all intra-group transactions as transactions between related persons that should be subject to avoidance, as noted in part two, chapter V, paragraph 48.

79. Therefore, while some of the transactions occurring in the group context may be clearly identified as falling within the categories of transactions subject to avoidance under recommendation 87, other transactions may not fall so clearly within the scope of that recommendation and may need to be carefully examined to determine where the associated benefits and detriments actually lie. These transactions may raise issues concerning the extent to which the group was operated as a single enterprise or the assets and liabilities or activities of group members were closely intermingled, thus

potentially affecting the nature of the transactions between members and between members and external creditors. There may be transactions that are intra-group transactions because they cannot be conducted in other ways or because they result from the manner in which the group is structured. In some situations, for example, finance may be available only on an intra-group basis, and there would be no justification for treating such a transaction more strictly than if it involved an external lender. Similarly, a group may involve centralized cash flow and transfers of cash, as noted above, that would not occur where there was no group. In the situation of intra-group guarantees described above with respect to post-commencement finance, the provider of a guarantee may not derive direct benefit from the finance provided, but rather indirect benefit because it might be dependent upon the borrowing entity in the context of the activities of the group (e.g. as a supplier of component parts in a manufacturing business or a provider of intellectual property) or for some other group-related reason. In considering such intra-group transactions, it will be desirable for the court to be able to take the group context into account and consider factors such as those mentioned above.

80. There may also be transactions occurring in a group context that are not covered by the terms of avoidance provisions. Some insolvency laws, for example, provide for avoidance of preferential payments to a debtor's own creditors, but not to the creditors of another group member, unless the payment is made, for example, pursuant to a guarantee. For these reasons, it is desirable that an insolvency law consider these issues in the group context and include group-related factors as matters to be taken into account in determining whether a particular transaction between group members would be subject to avoidance under recommendation 87.

81. Recommendation 97 addresses the elements to be proved to avoid a particular transaction and defences to avoidance. It may be appropriate to consider how those elements would apply in the group context and whether a different approach is required. One approach to the burden of proof in the case of transactions with related persons, for example, might be to provide that the requisite intent or bad faith is deemed or presumed to exist where certain types of transactions are undertaken within the suspect period and the counterparty to the transaction will have the burden of proving otherwise. Some laws, for example, have established a rebuttable presumption that certain transactions among group members and the shareholders of that group would be detrimental to creditors and therefore subject to avoidance. A different approach would be to acknowledge that, as noted above, transactions occurring within a group, although not always commercially viable if occurring outside the group context, are generally legitimate, especially when occurring within the limits of relevant applicable law and within the ordinary

course of business of the group members concerned. Such a transaction might nevertheless be subjected to special scrutiny in much the same way as is recommended for claims by related persons in recommendation 184, an approach followed by some laws that also permit the rights of related group members under intra-group debt arrangements to be deferred or subordinated to the rights of external creditors of the insolvent members.

82. Recommendation 93 makes limited provision for a creditor to commence an avoidance proceeding with the approval of the insolvency representative or leave of the court. In the group context, it may be desirable to maintain the same approach, even though it may prove difficult in practice. The level of integration of the group may have the potential to significantly affect the ability of creditors to identify the group member with which they dealt and thus provide the requisite information for commencing avoidance proceedings.

Recommendations 217-218

Purpose of legislative provisions

The purpose of avoidance provisions among enterprise group members is to provide, in addition to the considerations set forth in recommendations 87-99, that the insolvency law may:

- (a) Permit the court to take into account that the transaction took place in the context of an enterprise group; and
- (b) Establish the circumstances that may be considered by the court.

Contents of legislative provisions

Avoidable transactions (paras. 79-80)

217. The insolvency law should specify that, in considering whether a transaction of the kind referred to in recommendation 87 (a), (b) or (c) that took place between enterprise group members or between an enterprise group member and other related persons should be avoided, the court may have regard to the circumstances in which the transaction took place. Those circumstances may include: the relationship between the parties to the transaction; the degree of integration between enterprise group members that are parties to the transaction; the purpose of the transaction; whether the transaction contributed to the operations of the group as a whole; and whether the transaction granted advantages to enterprise group members or other related persons that would not normally be granted between unrelated parties.

Recommendations 217-218 (continued)*Elements of avoidance and defences (para. 81)*

218. The insolvency law should specify the manner in which the elements referred to in recommendation 97 would apply to avoidance of transactions in the enterprise group context.³³

5. Subordination

83. It is noted in part two, chapter V, paragraph 56, that subordination refers to a rearranging of creditor priorities in insolvency and does not relate to the validity or legality of the claim. Notwithstanding the validity of a claim, it might nevertheless be subordinated because of a voluntary agreement between creditors, where one creditor agrees to subordinate its claim to that of the other creditor or by a court order, as the result, for example, of improper conduct by a creditor or related party of the debtor, in which case the claim might be subordinated to the claims of all other creditors. Two types of claim that typically may be subordinated in insolvency are those of persons related to the debtor and of owners and equity holders of the debtor, both of which are relevant in the enterprise group context.

(a) Related person claims

84. In the group context, subordination of related person claims might mean, for example, that the rights of group members under intra-group arrangements could be deferred to the rights of external creditors of those group members subject to insolvency proceedings.

85. As explained, the term “related person” would include enterprise group members. However, the mere fact of a special relationship with the debtor, including, in the group context, membership of the same enterprise group, may not be sufficient in all cases to justify special treatment of a creditor’s claim, especially since to do so can in turn disadvantage the creditors of that creditor. In some cases, those claims will be entirely transparent and should be treated in the same manner as similar claims made by creditors who are not related persons; in other cases, they may give rise to suspicion and will deserve special attention. An insolvency law may need to include a mechanism to identify those types of conduct or situation in which claims will deserve additional attention. Similar considerations apply, as noted

³³That is, the elements to be proved in order to avoid a transaction, the burden of proof, specific defences to avoidance and the application of special presumptions; see generally *UNCITRAL Legislative Guide* (see footnote 3 above), part two, chap. II, paras. 148-203.

above, with respect to avoidance of transactions occurring between enterprise group members.

86. A number of situations in which special treatment of a related person's claim might be justified (e.g., where the debtor is severely undercapitalized and where there is evidence of self-dealing) are identified in part two, chapter V, paragraph 48, and would generally be relevant in the group context. Additional considerations might include, as between the parent and a controlled group member: the parent's participation in the management of the group member; whether the parent has sought to manipulate intra-group transactions to its own advantage at the expense of external creditors; or whether the parent has otherwise behaved unfairly, to the detriment of creditors and shareholders of the controlled group member. Examples of unfair behaviour might include the imposition of excessive management or consulting fees or dividend policies designed to strip the controlled group member of its funds. Under some laws, the existence of those circumstances might result in the parent having its claims subordinated to those of unrelated unsecured creditors or even minority shareholders of the controlled group member.

87. Some laws include other approaches to intra-group transactions, such as permitting debts owed by a group member that borrowed funds under an intra-group lending arrangement to be involuntarily subordinated to the rights of external creditors of that borrowing member; permitting the court to review intra-group financial arrangements to determine whether particular funds given to a group member should be treated as an equity contribution rather than as a loan, where the law subordinates equity contributions to creditor claims (on treatment of equity, see below); and allowing voluntary subordination of intra-group claims to those of external creditors.

88. The practical result of subordination in an enterprise group context might be to reduce or effectively extinguish any repayment to those group members whose claims have been subordinated if the claims of secured and unsecured external creditors are large in relation to the funds available for distribution. In some cases this might threaten the viability of the subordinated group member and be detrimental not only to its own creditors, but also its shareholders and, in the case of reorganization, to the group as a whole. The adoption of a policy of subordinating such claims may also have the effect of discouraging intra-group lending.

(b) Treatment of equity

89. Many insolvency laws distinguish between the claims of owners and equity holders that may arise from loans extended to the debtor or their

ownership interest in the debtor (see part two, chap. V, para. 76). With respect to claims arising from equity interests, many insolvency laws adopt the general rule that the owners and equity holders of the business are not entitled to a distribution of the proceeds of assets until all other claims that are senior in priority have been fully repaid (including claims of interest accruing after commencement). As such, these parties will rarely receive any distribution in respect of their interest in the debtor. Where a distribution is made, it would generally be made in accordance with the ranking of shares specified in company law and the corporate charter. Debt claims, such as those relating to loans, however, are not always subordinated.

90. Few insolvency laws specifically address subordination of equity claims in the enterprise group context. One law that does allow the courts to review intra-group financial arrangements to determine whether particular funds given to a group member subject to insolvency proceedings should be treated as an equity contribution, rather than as an intra-group loan, enabling it to be postponed behind creditors' claims. Those funds are likely to be treated as equity where the original debt-to-equity ratio was high before the funds were contributed and the funds would reduce the ratio; if the paid-up share capital was inadequate; if it is unlikely that an external creditor would have made a loan in the same circumstances; and if the terms on which the advance was made were not reasonable or there was no reasonable expectation of repayment.

91. Subordination is discussed above in the context of treatment of claims and priorities, but the *Guide* does not recommend the subordination of any particular types of claims under the insolvency law, simply noting that subordinated claims would rank after claims of ordinary unsecured creditors (recommendation 189).³⁴

D. Remedies

92. Because of the nature of enterprise groups and the manner in which they operate, there may be a complex web of financial transactions between group members, and creditors may have dealt with different members or even with the group as a single economic entity rather than with members individually. Disentangling the ownership of assets and liabilities and identifying the creditors of each group member may involve a complex and

³⁴See also the *UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.09.V.12), chap. V.

costly legal inquiry. However, because adherence to the separate-entity approach means that each group member is liable only to its own creditors, it may become necessary, when insolvency proceedings have commenced with respect to two or more group members, to disentangle the ownership of assets and liabilities.

93. When this disentangling can be effected, adherence to the separate-entity principle operates to limit creditor recovery to the assets of the specific group member of which they are creditors. Where it cannot be effected or other specified reasons exist to treat the group as a single enterprise, some laws include remedies that allow the single-entity approach to be set aside. Historically, these remedies have been developed to overcome the perceived inefficiency and unfairness of the traditional separate-entity approach in specific group cases. In addition to setting aside intra-group transactions or subordinating intra-group lending, the remedies may include: the extension of liability for external debts to solvent group members, as well as to office holders and shareholders; contribution orders; and pooling or substantive consolidation orders. Some of these remedies require findings of fault to be made, while others rely upon the establishment of certain facts with respect to the operations of the enterprise group. In some cases, particularly where misfeasance of management is involved, other remedies might more appropriately be employed, such as removing the offending directors and limiting management participation in reorganization.

94. Because of the potential inequity that may result when one group member is forced to share assets and liabilities with other group members that may be less solvent, remedies setting aside the single-entity approach are not universally available, generally not comprehensive and apply only in restricted circumstances. Those remedies involving extension of liability may involve “piercing” or “lifting the corporate veil”, which may result in shareholders, who are generally shielded from liability for the enterprise’s activities, being held liable for certain activities. The remedies discussed below do not involve lifting the corporate veil, although in some circumstances the effect may appear to be similar.

1. Extension of liability

95. Extending the liability for external debts and, in some cases, the actions of the group members subject to insolvency proceedings to solvent group members and relevant office holders is a remedy available under some laws to individual creditors on a case-by-case basis and depends upon the circumstances of that creditor’s relationship with the debtor.

96. Many laws recognize circumstances in which exceptions to the limited liability of corporate entities are available and one group member and relevant office holders could be found liable for the debts and actions of another group member. Some laws adopt a prescriptive approach and the circumstances are strictly limited; other laws adopt a more expansive approach, giving the courts broad discretion in evaluating the circumstances of a particular case on the basis of specific guidelines. In both cases, however, the basis for extending liability beyond the insolvent group member is the relationship between that group member and related group members in terms of both ownership and control. A further relevant factor may be the conduct of the related group member with respect to the creditors of the member subject to insolvency proceedings.

97. While there are different formulations of the circumstances in which liability might be extended, examples generally fall into the following categories, although it should be noted that not all laws reflect all of these categories and to some extent they may overlap:

(a) Exploitation or abuse by one group member (perhaps the parent) of its control over another group member, including operating that group member continually at a loss in the interests of the parent;

(b) Fraudulent conduct by the dominant shareholder, which might include fraudulently siphoning off a group member's assets or increasing its liabilities, or conducting the affairs of the group member with intent to defraud creditors;

(c) Operation of a group member as the parent's agent, trustee or partner;

(d) Conduct of the affairs of the group or of a group member in such a way that some classes of creditors might be prejudiced (for example, incurring liabilities to employees of one group member);

(e) Artificial fragmentation of a single enterprise into several different entities for the purpose of insulating the single enterprise from potential liabilities; failure to follow the formalities of treating group members as separate legal entities, including disregarding the limited liability of group members or confusing personal and corporate assets; or use of the enterprise group structure as a mere sham or facade, such as where the corporate form is used as a device to circumvent statutory or contractual obligations;

(f) Inadequate capitalization of a group member, so that it does not have an adequate capital basis for carrying out its operations. This may apply at the time of establishment, or be the result of depletion of the capital by way of refunds to shareholders or by shareholders drawing more than distributable profits;

(g) Misrepresentation of the real nature of the enterprise group, leading creditors to believe that they are dealing with a single enterprise rather than with a member of a group;

(h) Misfeasance, where any person, including a group member, can be required to compensate for any loss or damage to another group member arising from fraud, breach of duty or other misfeasance, such as actions causing significant injury or environmental damage;

(i) Wrongful trading, where directors, including shadow directors of a group member have a duty to monitor, for example, whether that group member can properly continue carrying on business in the light of its financial condition and are required to apply for insolvency within a specified period once it has become insolvent. Permitting or directing a group member to incur debts when it is or is likely to become insolvent would fall into this category; and

(j) Failure to observe regulatory requirements, such as keeping regular accounting records of a controlled group member.

98. Generally, the mere incidence of control or domination of a group member by another group member, or other form of close economic integration within an enterprise group, is not regarded as sufficient reason to justify disregarding the separate legal personality of each group member and piercing the corporate veil.

99. In a number of the examples where liability might be extended to the parent, that liability may include the personal liability of the members of the board of directors of the parent (who may be formally appointed, de facto or shadow directors). While directors of an individual group member may generally owe certain duties to that group member, they may be faced with balancing those duties against the overall commercial and financial interests of the group. Achieving the general interests of the group, for example, may require the interests of individual members to be sacrificed in certain circumstances. Some of the factors that might be relevant to determining whether directors of a parent will be personally liable for the debts or actions of a controlled group member subject to insolvency proceedings include: whether there was active involvement in the management of the controlled group member; whether there was grievous negligence or fraud in the management of the controlled group member; whether the management of the parent could be in breach of duties of care and diligence or there was abuse of managerial power; or whether there was a direct relationship between the manner in which the controlled group member was managed and its insolvency. In some jurisdictions, directors may also be found criminally liable. One of the principal difficulties with extending liability in

such cases is proving the behaviour in question to show that the parent was acting as a de facto or shadow director of the other group member.

100. There are also laws that provide for a parent to accept liability for debts of controlled group members by contract, especially where the creditors involved are banks, or by entering into voluntary cross-guarantees. Under other laws, which provide for various forms of integration of enterprise groups, the principal group member can be jointly and severally liable to the creditors of the integrated group members, for liabilities arising both before and after the formalization of the integration.

2. *Contribution orders*

101. A contribution order is an order by which a court can require a solvent group member to contribute specific funds to cover all or some of the debts of other group members subject to insolvency proceedings, particularly where the solvent group member has acted inappropriately towards the insolvent group member. Such inappropriate behaviour might include, for example, transferring the assets of a failing group member to another group member for an inadequate price or one group member taking the benefit of tax advantages accruing to a failing group member and leaving the creditors of the failing member a reduced payout in a subsequent insolvency. Allowing that inappropriate behaviour to occur without a remedy could result in detriment to the creditors of the insolvent group member and a windfall to the shareholders of the solvent member.

102. Although contribution orders are not widely available under insolvency laws, a few jurisdictions have adopted or are considering adopting such measures, generally only in liquidation proceedings. A number of the issues that contribution orders are designed to address, however, may not require specific provisions to be included in the insolvency law, as remedies may already exist under other laws, such as those addressing liability and wrongful trading.

103. The most common difficulty in deciding whether to make a contribution order is balancing the interests of the shareholders and unsecured creditors of the solvent group member with the unsecured creditors of the group member in liquidation, particularly where the contribution order might affect the solvency of the former. Creditors of the solvent group member could argue that they had relied on the separate assets of that member when trading with it and should not be denied full payment of their claim because of the relationship of that solvent group member with, and behaviour towards, other group members. The difficulty of reconciling these different interests

has meant that the power to make a contribution order is not commonly exercised. Courts have also taken the view that a full contribution order may be inappropriate if the effect is to threaten the solvency of the group member not already subject to insolvency proceedings, although it might be possible to order a partial contribution that is limited to certain assets, such as the balance remaining after meeting bona fide obligations.

104. Under laws that permit contribution orders, the court must take into account certain specified circumstances in considering whether to make an order. These concern the relationship between the solvent group member and the member subject to insolvency proceedings and include: the extent to which the solvent group member took part in the management of the insolvent group member; the conduct of the solvent group member towards the creditors of the insolvent member, although creditor reliance on the existence of a relationship between the group members is not sufficient grounds for making an order; the extent to which the circumstances giving rise to the insolvency proceedings are attributable to the actions of the solvent group member; the conduct of a solvent group member after commencement of insolvency proceedings with respect to the insolvent group member, particularly if that conduct indirectly or directly affects the creditors of that group member, such as through failure to perform a contract involving the insolvent group member; and such other matters as the court thinks fit.³⁵ Such an order might also be possible, for example, in cases where the controlled group member had incurred significant liability for personal injury or the parent had permitted the controlled group member to continue trading while insolvent.

3. *Substantive consolidation*

(a) *Introduction*

105. As noted in paragraph 22 above, when procedural coordination is ordered, the assets and liabilities of the debtors remain separate and distinct, with the substantive rights of claimants unaffected. Substantive consolidation, on the other hand, permits the court, in insolvency proceedings involving two or more enterprise group members, to disregard the separate identity of each group member in appropriate circumstances and consolidate their assets and liabilities, treating them as though held and incurred by a single entity. The assets are thus treated as if they were part of a single estate for the general benefit of all creditors of the consolidated group members. Only

³⁵New Zealand Companies Act 1993, sect. 271 (1) (a) and 272 (1).

a few jurisdictions provide statutory authority for substantive consolidation orders, and in those where the remedy is available, it is subject to strict evidentiary rules and is not widely used. A principal concern is that consolidation overturns the principle of the separate legal identity of each group member, which is often used to structure an enterprise group to respond to various business considerations, serving different purposes and having important implications with respect to, for example, taxation law, corporate law and corporate governance rules. If the courts routinely agreed to substantive consolidation, many of the benefits to be derived from the flexibility of enterprise structure could be undermined.

106. Notwithstanding the absence of direct statutory authority or a prescribed standard for the circumstances in which substantive consolidation orders can be made, the courts of some jurisdictions have played a direct role in developing these orders and delimiting the appropriate circumstances. While this practice may reflect increased judicial recognition of the widespread use of interrelated corporate structures for taxation and business purposes, the circumstances that would support a substantive consolidation order are, nevertheless, very limited. They include situations where there is a high degree of integration of the operations and affairs of group members, through control or ownership, that would make it very difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle the assets and liabilities of the different group members in order to identify, for example, ownership of assets and the creditors of each group member, without significant expenditures of time and resources that would ultimately hurt all creditors.

107. Substantive consolidation is typically discussed in the context of liquidation, and the legislation that authorizes it does so only in that context. There are, however, legislative proposals that would permit substantive consolidation in the context of various types of reorganization. In jurisdictions without specific legislation, substantive consolidation orders may be available in both liquidation and reorganization, where such an order would, for example, assist the reorganization of the group. While typically requiring a court order, substantive consolidation may also be possible on the basis of consensus of the relevant interested parties. Some commentators suggest that substantive consolidation by consensus frequently occurs in cases involving enterprise groups, and often in situations where the courts would generally uphold creditor objections to substantive consolidation if a formal application were to be made. Substantive consolidation may also be possible by way of a reorganization plan. Some laws permit a plan to include proposals for a debtor to be substantively consolidated with other group members, whether insolvent or solvent, that are to be included in the plan. Such a plan could be implemented if approved by the requisite vote of creditors.

108. Substantive consolidation might be appropriate where there is no real separation between the group members and the group structure is being maintained solely for dishonest or fraudulent purposes. A further ground that is used in some jurisdictions is where substantive consolidation leads to greater return of value for creditors, either because of the structural relationship between the group members and their conduct of business and financial relationships or because of the value of assets common to the whole group, such as intellectual property in both a process conducted across numerous group members and the product of that process.

109. The principal concerns with the availability of such orders, in addition to those associated with the fundamental issue of overturning the separate-entity principle, include the potential unfairness caused to one creditor group when forced to share *pari passu* with creditors of a less solvent group member and whether the savings or benefits to the collective class of creditors outweigh incidental detriment to individual creditors. Some creditors might have relied on the separate assets or separate legal entity of a particular group member when trading with it, and should therefore not be denied a full payout because of their trading partner's relationship with another group member of which they were unaware. Other creditors might have relied upon the assets of the whole group, and it would be unfair if they were limited to recovery against the assets of a single group member.

110. Because it involves pooling the assets of different group members, consolidation may not lead to increased recovery for each creditor, but rather operate to level the recoveries across all creditors, increasing the amount distributed to some at the expense of others. Additionally, the availability of consolidation may enable stronger, larger creditors to take advantage of assets that should not be available to them; encourage creditors who disagree with such an order to seek its review, thus prolonging the insolvency proceedings; and damage the certainty and enforceability of security interests (where intra-group claims disappear as a result of consolidation, creditors that have security interests in those claims would lose their rights).

111. Substantive consolidation would generally involve the group members subject to insolvency proceedings, but in some cases and as permitted by some insolvency laws, might extend to an apparently solvent group member. This might occur when the affairs of that member were so closely intermingled with those of other group members that it would be impractical to exclude it from the consolidation, where it would be beneficial to include it in the consolidation if further investigation showed it to be actually insolvent because of the intermingling of assets or where the legal entity is a sham or involves a fraudulent scheme. When the solvent group member is to be included, the creditors of that group member may have particular concerns,

and a limited approach might be taken so that the substantive consolidation order extends only to the net equity of the solvent group member in order to protect the rights of those creditors, although this approach would be difficult in cases of intermingling or fraud.

(b) Circumstances supporting substantive consolidation

112. A number of elements have been identified as relevant to determining whether or not substantive consolidation is warranted, both in the legislation that authorizes substantive consolidation orders and in those cases where the courts have played a role in their development. In each case, it is a question of balancing the various elements to reach a just and equitable decision; no single element is necessarily conclusive, and all of the elements do not need to be present in any given case. Those elements have included: the presence of consolidated financial statements for the group; the use of a single bank account for all group members; the unity of interests and ownership between the group members; the degree of difficulty in segregating individual assets and liabilities; the sharing of overhead, management, accounting and other related expenses among different group members; the existence of intra-group loans and cross-guarantees on loans; the extent to which assets were transferred or funds moved from one member to another as a matter of convenience without observing proper formalities; the adequacy of capital; the commingling of assets or business operations; the appointment of common directors or officers and the holding of combined board meetings; a common business location; fraudulent dealings with creditors; the practice of encouraging creditors to treat the group as a single entity, creating confusion among creditors as to which of the group members they were dealing with and otherwise blurring the legal boundaries of the group members; and whether substantive consolidation would facilitate a reorganization or is in the interests of creditors.

113. While these many factors remain relevant, some courts have begun to focus on a limited number, and in particular on whether the affairs of the group members are so intermingled that separating assets and liabilities can be achieved only at extraordinary cost and expenditure of time or group members are engaged in fraudulent schemes or activity that has no legitimate business purpose. With respect to the first ground, the degree of intermingling required is hard to quantify and has been variously described by different courts as involving a degree of intermingling that was hopeless or a practical impossibility to disentangle; that would require such time and expense to disentangle the interrelationships between the group members and the ownership of assets that it would be disproportionate to the result; that was so substantial that it would threaten the realization of any net assets

for the creditors; or that involved an allocation of assets and liabilities between the relevant members that was essentially arbitrary and without economic reality. In reaching a decision that the degree of intermingling in a particular case justified substantive consolidation, the courts have looked at various factors, including the manner in which the group members operated and related to each other, including with respect to management and financial matters; the sufficiency of record keeping of the individual group members; the observance of proper corporate formalities; the manner in which funds and assets were transferred between the various members; and other similar factors concerning group operations.

114. The type of fraud contemplated is not fraud occurring in the daily operations of a company, but rather the total absence of a legitimate business purpose, which may relate either to the reasons for which the company was formed or, once formed, the activities it undertakes (see para. 97 (e) above). Examples of such fraud may include transfers by a debtor of substantially all of its assets to a newly formed entity or to self-owned separate entities for the purpose of preserving and conserving those assets for its own benefit and to hinder, delay and defraud its creditors, simulation³⁶ or Ponzi³⁷ and other such fraudulent schemes.

(c) *Application for substantive consolidation*

(i) *Persons permitted to apply*

115. An insolvency law should address the question of who may apply for substantive consolidation and at what time. With respect to the parties permitted to apply, it would seem appropriate to follow the approach of recommendation 14, concerning the parties permitted to apply for commencement of insolvency proceedings. In the group context, that would include a group member and a creditor of any such group member. In addition, it would be appropriate to permit applications by the insolvency representative of any group member, since in many instances, it will be the insolvency representative or representatives appointed to administer group members that will have the most complete information on group members and will therefore be in the best position to assess the appropriateness or desirability of substantive consolidation.

³⁶Simulation may involve contracts that either do not express the true intent of the parties and have no effect between the parties or produce different effects between the parties than those expressed in the contracts, i.e. sham contracts.

³⁷A fraudulent investment operation that pays returns to separate investors from their own money or money paid by subsequent investors, rather than from any actual profit earned.

116. Although in some States it might be possible for the court to act on its own initiative to order substantive consolidation, the serious impact of such an order requires that a fair and equitable process be followed and that parties in interest have the opportunity to be heard and to object to such an order, in accordance with recommendations 137-138. For that reason, it seems appropriate to draw a distinction between substantive consolidation and procedural coordination and adopt the approach that courts do not act on their own initiative with respect to substantive consolidation.

(ii) Timing of an application

117. Since the factors supporting substantive consolidation might not always be apparent or certain at the time insolvency proceedings commence, it is desirable that an insolvency law adopt a flexible approach to the issue of timing, allowing an application to be made at the same time as an application for commencement of proceedings or at any subsequent time. It should be noted, however, that the possibility of applying for substantive consolidation subsequent to commencement might be limited, in practice, by the state reached in administration of the proceedings, particularly, for example, with respect to the implementation of a reorganization plan. Certain key matters may already have been resolved, such as sale or disposal of assets or submission and admission of claims, or certain decisions taken and acted upon with respect to individual group members, creating practical difficulties with consolidating partly administered proceedings. In this situation, it is desirable that the order take account of the status of administration, consolidating the separate proceedings already in progress and preserving existing rights. Claims already admitted against a group member, for example, might therefore be treated as claims admitted against the consolidated estate.

118. The same approach might apply to adding group members to an existing substantive consolidation. As the administration of various enterprise group members proceeds, it may become apparent that additional group members should be included because the grounds for the initial order are also satisfied with respect to those members. If the substantive consolidation order was made with the consent of the creditors, or if creditors were given the opportunity to object to a proposed order, the addition of another group member at a later stage of the proceedings has the potential to vary the pool of assets from that originally agreed or notified to creditors. In that situation, it is desirable that creditors have a further opportunity to consent or object to the addition to the consolidation. Where substantive consolidation is ordered subsequent to a partial distribution to creditors, the introduction of a hotchpot rule might be desirable. This would help to ensure that a creditor who has received a partial distribution in respect of its claim against the single group member may not receive payment for the same claim in the

consolidated proceedings, so long as the payment of the other creditors of the same class is proportionately less than the partial distribution the creditor has already received.

(d) Competing interests in substantive consolidation

119. In addition to the competing interests of the creditors of the different group members, the interests of other stakeholders may warrant consideration in the context of substantive consolidation, including those of creditors vis-à-vis shareholders; of the shareholders of the different group members, in particular those who are shareholders of some of the members but not of others; and of secured and priority creditors of different consolidated group members.

(i) Owners and equity holders

120. Many insolvency laws adopt the general rule that the rights of creditors outweigh those of owners and equity holders, with owners and equity holders being ranked after all other claims in the order of priority for distribution. Often this results in owners and equity holders not receiving a distribution (see part two, chap. V, para. 76). In the enterprise group context, the shareholders of some group members with many assets and few liabilities may receive a return, while the creditors of other group members with fewer assets and more liabilities may not. If the general approach of ranking shareholders behind unsecured creditors were to be extended in substantive consolidation to all consolidated members of the group, all creditors of those group members could be paid before the shareholders of any of those group members received a distribution.

(ii) Secured creditors

121. The position of secured creditors in insolvency proceedings is discussed throughout the *Guide* (see annex I for relevant references) and the approach adopted that, as a general principle, the effectiveness and priority of a valid security interest should be recognized and the economic value of the encumbered assets should be preserved in insolvency proceedings. That approach will also apply to the treatment of secured creditors in the enterprise group context. It is also recognized that an insolvency law may nevertheless affect the rights of secured creditors in order to implement business and economic policies, subject to appropriate safeguards (see part two, chap. II, para. 59).

122. Questions arising with respect to substantive consolidation might include: whether a security interest over some or all of the assets of one

group member could extend to include assets of another group member where a substantive consolidation order was made or whether that security interest should be limited to the defined pool of assets upon which the secured creditor had originally relied; whether secured creditors with insufficient security could make a claim against the pooled assets as unsecured creditors; and whether internal secured creditors (i.e., creditors that are at the same time group members) should be treated differently from external secured creditors. Security interests over the whole of a debtor's estate would generally crystallize on the commencement of insolvency proceedings, and the issue of that interest expanding to cover the pooled assets of all consolidated group members should not arise. To allow any secured creditor's security interest to be extended or expanded as the result of an order for substantive consolidation would improve that creditor's position at the expense of other creditors and amount to an unjust benefit or windfall, which is generally undesirable. The same point could be made with respect to employee claims.

123. One solution with respect to the treatment of external secured creditors might be to exclude them from the process of substantive consolidation. Individual secured creditors that relied upon the separate identity of group members, such as where they relied upon an intra-group guarantee, might require special consideration. The guarantee could not be enforced where the relevant group members were subject to an order for substantive consolidation and their individual identities disappeared. That might result in the secured creditor being treated as an unsecured creditor, unless the law permitted them to be treated as having some priority over other creditors in the substantive consolidation. Where encumbered assets are required for reorganization, a different solution might be possible, such as allowing the court to adjust the consolidation order to make specific provision for such assets or requiring the consent of the affected secured creditor. A secured creditor could surrender its security interest following substantive consolidation, and the debt would become payable by all of the consolidated entities.

124. The interests of internal secured creditors might also need to be considered. Under some laws, those internal security interests might be extinguished, leaving the creditors with an unsecured claim, or those claims might be modified or subordinated.

(iii) Priority creditors

125. Similar questions arise with respect to the treatment of priority creditors. Practically, they might benefit or lose from the pooling of

the group's assets in the same way as other unsecured creditors. Where priorities, such as those for employee benefits or tax, are based on the single-entity principle, the treatment of those priorities across the group may need to be considered, especially where they interact with each other. For example, employees of a group member that has many assets and few liabilities will potentially compete with those of a group member in the opposite situation, with few assets and many liabilities, if there is substantive consolidation. While priority creditors generally might obtain a better result at the expense of unsecured creditors without priority, the different groups of those priority creditors might have to adjust any expectations they may have as a result of their priority position with respect to the assets of a single entity. Where there is intermingling of assets so that it is not possible to determine who owns what assets, it may be very difficult to quantify the priorities and determine how much might be available to settle each priority claim. Accordingly, although it is desirable that the priorities established under the insolvency law with respect to each individual debtor be recognized where that debtor is subject to substantive consolidation, it might not always be possible to give them full effect.

(e) Notification of creditors

126. An application for substantive consolidation may be subject to the same requirements for giving notice as an application for commencement of proceedings (see part two, chap. I, paras. 64-71 and recommendations 19 (a) and 22-25). When made at the same time as the application for commencement of proceedings, only an application for substantive consolidation by creditors would require notice to be given to the relevant debtors, consistent with recommendation 19. An application by group members made at the same time as the application for commencement would not require creditors to be notified under recommendations 22 and 23, which do not mandate notification of an application for commencement of insolvency proceedings to the creditors of the entity concerned.

127. The potential impact of substantive consolidation on creditor rights suggests that affected creditors should have the right to be notified of any order for consolidation made at the time of commencement and have the right to appeal, consistent with recommendation 138. One issue to be considered in that situation is whether a single objection would be sufficient to prevent substantive consolidation from occurring. It may be possible, for example, to provide objecting creditors who will be significantly disadvantaged by the consolidation relative to other creditors with a greater level of return than other unsecured creditors, thus departing from the strict policy

of equal distribution. It may also be possible to exclude specific groups of creditors with certain types of contracts, for example, limited recourse project financing arrangements entered into with clearly identified group members at arm's-length commercial terms.

128. Where the application is made by creditors after insolvency proceedings have commenced, it might be desirable for notice of the application to be given to insolvency representatives of the entities to be consolidated. Notice should be given in an effective and timely manner in the form determined by domestic law.

(f) Effect of an order for substantive consolidation

129. The insolvency law should establish the effects of an order for substantive consolidation. These might include: treatment of the assets and liabilities of the consolidated group members as if they were part of a single insolvency estate; the extinguishment of intra-group claims; treatment of claims against the individual group members to be consolidated as if they were claims against the consolidated estate; and recognition of priorities established against the individual group members as priorities against the consolidated estate (to the extent possible, given the difficulty noted above). Intra-group claims would generally disappear on substantive consolidation on the basis that the claim and the obligation to pay belong to or are owed by the same insolvency estate, and therefore effectively cancel each other out.

(i) Avoidance of transactions involving group members subject to substantive consolidation

130. Where group members are substantively consolidated, there will be a practical difficulty in seeking to avoid transactions between the consolidated group members, since the assets to be recovered and the estate for which they would be recovered will be treated as part of the same consolidated estate. However, transactions between a consolidated group member and other members of the group or an external party would be subject to avoidance under the usual avoidance rules, including any rules concerning calculation of the suspect period where substantive consolidation is ordered. Where those transactions can be avoided and assets or value recovered, that recovery will be for the benefit of the consolidated estate.

(ii) Calculation of the suspect period

131. Where substantive consolidation is ordered after the commencement of insolvency proceedings or where group members are added to a

substantive consolidation at different times, the choice of the date from which the suspect period for the purposes of avoidance (see part two, chap. II, paras. 188-191 and recommendation 89) would be calculated may need to be considered to provide certainty for lenders and other third parties. The issue may become more important as the period of time between an application for or commencement of individual insolvency proceedings and the order for substantive consolidation increases. Choosing the date of the order for substantive consolidation for calculation of the suspect period for avoidance purposes may create problems with respect to transactions entered into between the date of application for or commencement of insolvency proceedings for individual group members and the date of the substantive consolidation. One approach might be to calculate that date in accordance with recommendation 89. That approach might result in a different date for each group member subject to the substantive consolidation order, which might in practice be cumbersome to implement. Another approach might be to establish a common date by reference to the earliest date on which an application for commencement was made or insolvency proceedings with respect to those group members to be consolidated commenced. In either case, it is desirable that the date be specified in the insolvency law to ensure transparency and predictability.

(iii) Reorganization

132. With respect to the impact of substantive consolidation on reorganization, the liquidation value for the purposes of recommendation 152 (*b*) would be the liquidation value of the consolidated estate, not the liquidation value of the individual members before substantive consolidation. An order for substantive consolidation might also combine the creditors for the purpose of voting on any reorganization plan for the consolidated group members. Where creditor meetings are required to be held subsequent to an order for substantive consolidation made following commencement of proceedings, all creditors of the consolidated group members would be eligible to attend.

(iv) Treatment of guarantees

133. Guarantees involving group members might be affected in several ways by an order for substantive consolidation. A guarantee may have been provided by one group member to another group member. Both may be subject to the order for substantive consolidation, or the guarantor may not be subject to that order. In the first situation, the guarantee and any associated claims would be extinguished as an intra-group claim. The second situation might be addressed by provisions in the insolvency law on related person transactions (see part two, chap. V, para. 48). A guarantee might also

have been provided by an external guarantor to a group member that is subject to the substantive consolidation. Unless specifically addressed in the insolvency law, this situation would be subject to treatment under domestic law, which might restrict the guarantor's claim where it had made a payment under the guarantee. A guarantee might also have been provided to an external lender by one group member to secure finance provided to another group member, where both group members become subject to substantive consolidation. As noted above, where enforcement of the guarantee relies upon the separate identity of the group members, the external lender is likely to be treated as an unsecured creditor unless the insolvency law permits them to be treated as retaining some priority over other creditors of the consolidated group members.

(g) Modification of an order for substantive consolidation

134. Although modification of an order for substantive consolidation might not always be possible or desirable, given the substantive effect of that order, there may be cases where circumstantial changes or the availability of new information indicate the desirability of modifying the original order. Any such modification should be subject to the condition that any vested rights or interests arising pursuant to the initial order should not be unjustly affected by the order for modification. Those rights or interests, whether arising by decision of the court or the insolvency representative, may relate to sales of assets and provision of finance to group members.

(h) Exclusions from an order for substantive consolidation

135. Some laws make provision for what may be termed an order for partial or limited substantive consolidation, that is, an order for substantive consolidation that excludes certain assets or claims.

136. Generally, these exclusions will be rare, given the assumption in favour of substantive consolidation where the requirement for intermingling or a fraudulent scheme is met. However, there may be circumstances where exclusion may be justified. Those circumstances might include when the ownership of certain specific assets could readily be identified or part of the business activities of the consolidated group members could be separated because it was not involved in the fraudulent scheme; when including certain assets in an order for substantive consolidation might exacerbate the consequences of a fraudulent scheme; or when the assets were burdensome, such as assets carrying an environmental liability or assets that would be difficult or costly to administer (see part two, chap. II, para. 88). Claims associated with excluded assets would go with the asset. Substantive

consolidation might also be limited, for example, to unsecured creditors, thereby excluding external secured creditors, who might be free to enforce their security interests (unless those security interests depend upon the separate identity of the group members to be consolidated). Another approach excludes certain assets from substantive consolidation if otherwise creditors would be unfairly prejudiced, although this ground is unlikely to be relevant in cases of intermingling or fraud.

(i) *Competent court*

137. The issues discussed above with respect to both joint applications and procedural coordination would apply also with respect to the court competent to order substantive consolidation (see paras. 17-19 above and recommendation 209).

Recommendations 219-231

Purpose of legislative provisions

The purpose of provisions on substantive consolidation is:

(a) To provide legislative authority for substantive consolidation, while respecting the basic principle of the separate legal identity of each enterprise group member;

(b) To specify the very limited circumstances in which the remedy of substantive consolidation may be available in order to ensure transparency and predictability; and

(c) To specify the effect of an order for substantive consolidation, including the treatment of security interests.

Contents of legislative provisions

The principle of separate legal identity (para. 105)

219. The insolvency law should respect the separate legal identity of each enterprise group member. Exceptions to that general principle should be limited to the grounds set forth in recommendation 220.

Circumstances in which substantive consolidation may be available (paras. 106, 112-114)

220. The insolvency law may specify that, at the request of a person permitted to make an application under recommendation 223, the court may order substantive consolidation with respect to two or more enterprise group members only in the following limited circumstances:

Recommendations 219-231 (continued)

(a) Where the court is satisfied that the assets or liabilities of the enterprise group members are intermingled to such an extent that the ownership of assets and responsibility for liabilities cannot be identified without disproportionate expense or delay; or

(b) Where the court is satisfied that the enterprise group members are engaged in a fraudulent scheme or activity with no legitimate business purpose and that substantive consolidation is essential to rectify that scheme or activity.

Exclusions from substantive consolidation (paras. 135-136)

221. Where the insolvency law provides for substantive consolidation in accordance with recommendation 220, the insolvency law should permit the court to exclude specified assets and claims from an order for substantive consolidation and specify the circumstances in which those exclusions might be ordered.

*Application for substantive consolidation**—Timing of application (paras. 117-118)*

222. The insolvency law should specify that an application for substantive consolidation may be made at the same time as an application for commencement of insolvency proceedings with respect to enterprise group members or at any subsequent time.³⁸

—Persons permitted to apply (paras. 115-116)

223. The insolvency law should specify the persons permitted to make an application for substantive consolidation, which may include an enterprise group member and a creditor or the insolvency representative of any such enterprise group member.

Effect of an order for substantive consolidation (129-133)

224. The insolvency law should specify that an order for substantive consolidation has the following effects:³⁹

(a) The assets and liabilities of the substantively consolidated group members are treated as if they were part of a single insolvency estate;

³⁸The possibility of ordering substantive consolidation at an advanced stage of the insolvency proceedings is discussed in paras. 117-118 above.

³⁹The effect on security interests is addressed in recommendation 225 and paragraphs 121-124 above.

(b) Claims and debts between group members included in the order are extinguished; and

(c) Claims against group members included in the order are treated as if they were claims against the single insolvency estate.

Treatment of security interests in substantive consolidation (paras. 121-124)

225. The insolvency law should specify that the rights and priorities of a creditor holding a security interest over an asset of an enterprise group member subject to an order for substantive consolidation should, as far as possible, be respected in substantive consolidation, unless:

(a) The secured indebtedness is owed solely between enterprise group members and is extinguished by an order for substantive consolidation;

(b) It is determined that the security interest was obtained by fraud in which the creditor participated; or

(c) The transaction granting the security interest is subject to avoidance in accordance with recommendations 87, 88 or 217.

Recognition of priorities in substantive consolidation (para. 125)

226. The insolvency law should specify that the priorities established under insolvency law and applicable with respect to an individual enterprise group member prior to an order for substantive consolidation should, as far as possible, be recognized in substantive consolidation.

Meetings of creditors (para. 132)

227. The insolvency law should specify that, to the extent that a meeting of creditors is required by the law to be held subsequent to an order for substantive consolidation, creditors of all consolidated group members are eligible to attend.

Calculation of the suspect period in substantive consolidation (paras. 130-131)

228. (1) The insolvency law should specify the date from which the suspect period with respect to avoidance of transactions of the type referred to in recommendation 87 should be calculated when substantive consolidation is ordered with respect to two or more enterprise group members.

Recommendations 219-231 (continued)

(2) The specified date from which the suspect period is calculated retrospectively in accordance with recommendation 89 may be:

(a) A different date for each enterprise group member included in the substantive consolidation, being either the date of application for or commencement of insolvency proceedings with respect to each such group member; or

(b) A common date for all enterprise group members included in the substantive consolidation, being either (i) the earliest of the dates of application for, or commencement of, insolvency proceedings with respect to those group members; or (ii) the date on which all applications for commencement were made or all proceedings commenced.

Modification of an order for substantive consolidation (para. 134)

229. The insolvency law should specify that an order for substantive consolidation may be modified, provided that any actions or decisions already taken pursuant to the order are not affected by the modification.⁴⁰

Competent court (para. 137)

230. For the purposes of recommendation 13, the words “commencement and conduct of insolvency proceedings, including matters arising in the course of those proceedings” include an application or order for substantive consolidation, including modification of that order.⁴¹

Notice of substantive consolidation (paras. 126-128)

231. The insolvency law should establish requirements for giving notice with respect to applications and orders for substantive consolidation and for modification of substantive consolidation, including the scope and extent of the order; the parties to whom notice should be given; the party responsible for giving notice; and the content of the notice.

⁴⁰It is not intended that use of the term “modification” would include termination of an order for substantive consolidation.

⁴¹The criteria that might be relevant to determining which court is the competent court as discussed in para. 18 above

E. Participants

1. Appointment of an insolvency representative

138. The appointment and role of the insolvency representative are discussed in part two, chapter III, paragraphs. 36 to 74. The issues discussed, together with recommendations 115-125, would generally apply in the enterprise group context.

(a) Coordination of proceedings

139. When multiple proceedings commence with respect to group members, an order for procedural coordination may or may not be made, but in either case, coordination of those proceedings could be facilitated if the insolvency law were to include specific provisions promoting coordination, along the lines of articles 25 and 26 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, and indicating how it might be achieved, along the lines of article 27 of the Model Law. That approach could be adopted with respect to coordination between the different courts involved in administering insolvency proceedings for different group members and between the different insolvency representatives appointed in those proceedings, including those appointed on an interim basis.⁴² The obligations of an insolvency representative, as set forth in recommendations 111, 116-117 and 120, might be extended in the group context to include various aspects of coordination, including: sharing and disclosure of information; approval or implementation of agreements with respect to division of the exercise of powers and allocation of responsibilities between insolvency representatives; and cooperation on the use and disposal of assets, the proposal and negotiation of coordinated reorganization plans (unless preparation of a single group plan is possible, as discussed below), the use of avoidance powers, the obtaining of post-commencement finance, and the submission and admission of claims and distributions to creditors. The insolvency law could also address the timely resolution of disputes between the different insolvency representatives appointed.

140. Where a number of insolvency representatives are appointed to the different proceedings concerning group members, the insolvency law may permit one of them to take a leading role in coordinating those proceedings. That representative could be, for example, the representative of the parent if it is subject to the insolvency proceedings. While such a leading role

⁴²The glossary explains that “insolvency representative” includes a representative appointed on an interim basis (*UNCITRAL Legislative Guide* (see footnote 3 above), see Introduction, sect. B).

might reflect the economic reality or structure of the enterprise group, equality under the law of all insolvency representatives should be preserved. Coordination under the leadership of one insolvency representative may also be achieved on a voluntary basis, to the extent possible under applicable law. Notwithstanding such arrangements for cooperation and coordination, all insolvency representatives would remain responsible for meeting their obligations under the law of the jurisdiction in which they were appointed; such arrangements cannot be used to diminish or remove those obligations.

141. In certain jurisdictions, courts, rather than insolvency representatives, may have the principal authority to coordinate insolvency proceedings. When the insolvency law so provides, and different courts are involved in administering proceedings for different group members, it is desirable that the provisions concerning coordination of proceedings apply also to the courts and that they have powers along the lines of article 27 of the UNCITRAL Model Law.

(b) Appointment of a single or the same insolvency representative

142. Coordination of multiple proceedings might also be facilitated by the appointment of a single or the same insolvency representative to administer the different group members subject to insolvency. In practice, it might be possible to appoint one insolvency representative to administer multiple proceedings, or it might be necessary to appoint the same insolvency representative to each of the proceedings to be coordinated, depending upon procedural requirements and the number of courts involved. Although the administration of each of the group members would remain separate (as in the case of procedural coordination), such an appointment could help to ensure coordination of the administration of the various group members, reduce related costs and delays and facilitate the gathering of information on the group as a whole. With respect to the latter point, care might need to be exercised in how that information is treated, ensuring in particular that confidentiality requirements with respect to separate group members are observed. While there are some jurisdictions where such an appointment in the group context has become a practice, many insolvency laws do not address the question of appointing a single insolvency representative. Such an appointment has also been achieved to a limited extent in some cross-border insolvency cases, where insolvency representatives from the same international firm have been appointed in the different jurisdictions.⁴³

⁴³See *UNCITRAL Practice Guide* (see footnote 2 above), chap. III, para. 10 (j), which refers to cases involving the Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region of China, and both the British Virgin Islands and Bermuda.

143. In deciding whether it is appropriate to appoint a single or the same insolvency representative, the nature of the group, including the level of integration of the members and its business structure, needs to be considered. In addition, it is highly desirable that any person to be appointed in that capacity have the relevant experience and knowledge, as noted in part two, chapter III, paragraph 39, and that that knowledge and experience be carefully scrutinized before the appointment is made to ensure that it is appropriate to the group members concerned. It is desirable that a single or the same insolvency representative be appointed to administer two or more group members only where it will be in the interests of the insolvency proceedings to do so.

144. Where a single or the same insolvency representative is appointed to administer several members of a group with complex financial and business relationships and different groups of creditors, there is the potential for loss of neutrality and independence. Conflicts of interest may arise, for example, with respect to cross-guarantees, intra-group claims and debts, post-commencement finance, lodging and verification of claims or wrongdoing by one group member with respect to another group member. The obligation to disclose potential or existing conflicts of interest contained in recommendations 116 and 117 would be relevant to the group context. As a safeguard against possible conflicts, the insolvency representative could be required to provide an undertaking or be subject to a practice rule or statutory obligation to seek direction from the court. Additionally, the insolvency law could provide for the appointment of one or more further insolvency representatives to administer the relevant group members in the event of a conflict of interest. That appointment might relate to the specific area of conflict, with the appointment being limited to its resolution, or it might be a more general appointment for the duration of the proceedings.

(c) Debtor in possession

145. When the insolvency law permits the debtor to remain in possession of the business and no insolvency representative is appointed, special consideration may be required to determine how multiple proceedings should be coordinated and the extent to which the obligations applicable to the insolvency representative, including any additional obligations referred to above, will apply to the debtor in possession (see part two, chap. III, paras. 16-18). To the extent that the debtor in possession performs the functions of an insolvency representative, consideration might also be given to how provisions of an insolvency law permitting the appointment of a single or the same insolvency representative or one of several insolvency representatives to take a lead role in coordinating proceedings might apply to the debtor-in-possession context.

Recommendations 232-236

Purpose of legislative provisions

The purpose of provisions on the appointment of insolvency representatives in an enterprise group context is:

(a) To permit the appointment of a single or the same insolvency representative to facilitate coordination of insolvency proceedings commenced with respect to two or more enterprise group members; and

(b) To encourage cooperation where two or more insolvency representatives are appointed, with a view to avoiding duplication of effort; facilitating the gathering of information on the financial and business affairs of the enterprise group as a whole; and reducing costs.

Contents of legislative provisions

Appointment of a single or the same insolvency representative (paras. 142-144)

232. The insolvency law should specify that, where it is determined to be in the best interests of the administration of the insolvency proceedings with respect to two or more enterprise group members, a single or the same insolvency representative may be appointed to administer those proceedings.⁴⁴

Conflict of interest (para. 144 and part two, chap. III, paras. 42-43)

233. The insolvency law should specify measures to address any conflict of interest that might arise when a single or the same insolvency representative is appointed to administer insolvency proceedings with respect to two or more enterprise group members. Such measures may include the appointment of one or more additional insolvency representatives.

Cooperation between two or more insolvency representatives (paras. 139-140)

234. The insolvency law may specify that when different insolvency representatives are appointed to administer insolvency proceedings with respect to two or more enterprise group members, those insolvency representatives should cooperate with each other to the maximum extent possible.⁴⁵

⁴⁴Although recommendation 118 addresses selection and appointment of the insolvency representative, it does not recommend appointment by any particular authority, but leaves it up to the insolvency law. The same approach would apply in the enterprise group context; (see *UNCITRAL Legislative Guide* (see footnote 3 above), part two, chap. III, paras. 44-47).

⁴⁵In addition to the provisions of the insolvency law with respect to cooperation and coordination, the court generally may indicate measures to be taken to that end in the course of administration of the proceedings.

Cooperation between two or more insolvency representatives in procedural coordination (paras. 139-140)

235. The insolvency law should specify that, when more than one insolvency representative is appointed to administer insolvency proceedings that are subject to procedural coordination, those insolvency representatives should cooperate with each other to the maximum extent possible.

Cooperation to the maximum extent possible between insolvency representatives (paras. 139-140)

236. The insolvency law should specify that the cooperation to the maximum extent possible between insolvency representatives be implemented by any appropriate means, including:

(a) Sharing and disclosure of information concerning the enterprise group members subject to insolvency proceedings, provided appropriate arrangements are made to protect confidential information;

(b) Approval or implementation of agreements with respect to allocation of responsibilities between insolvency representatives, including one insolvency representative taking a coordinating role;

(c) Coordination of the administration and supervision of the affairs of the group members subject to insolvency proceedings, including day-to-day operations where the business is to be continued; post-commencement finance; safeguarding of assets; use and disposition of assets; exercise of avoidance powers; communication with creditors and meetings of creditors; submission and admission of claims, including intra-group claims; and distributions to creditors; and

(d) Coordination with respect to the proposal and negotiation of reorganization plans.

F. Reorganization of two or more enterprise group members

146. Recommendations 139-159 address issues specific to the preparation, proposal, content, approval and implementation of a reorganization plan. In general, those recommendations will be applicable in the context of an enterprise group.

1. Coordinated reorganization plans

147. When reorganization proceedings commence with respect to two or more enterprise group members, irrespective of whether or not those

proceedings are to be procedurally coordinated, one issue not addressed elsewhere in the *Guide* is whether it will be possible to reorganize the debtors through a single reorganization plan covering several members or through coordinated, substantially similar plans for each member. Such plans have the potential to ensure a coordinated approach to the resolution of the group's financial difficulties, delivering savings across the group's insolvency proceedings, and maximizing value for creditors. Although several insolvency laws permit the negotiation of a single reorganization plan, under some laws this approach is possible only where the proceedings are procedurally coordinated or substantively consolidated, while under other laws it would generally be possible only where the proceedings could be coordinated on a voluntary basis.

148. In practice, the concept of a single reorganization plan or coordinated plans would require the same or a similar reorganization plan to be prepared and approved in each of the proceedings concerning group members covered by the plan. Approval of such a plan would be considered on a member-by-member basis, with the creditors of each group member voting in accordance with the voting requirements applicable to a plan for a single debtor; it would not be desirable to consider approval on a group basis and allow the majority of creditors of the majority of members to compel the approval of a plan for all members. The process for preparation of the plan and solicitation of approval should take into account the need for all group members to approve the plan, and it would accordingly need to address the benefits to be derived from such approval and the information required to obtain that approval. Those issues would be covered by recommendations 143 and 144,⁴⁶ concerning the content of the plan and the accompanying disclosure statement. Additional details that could relevantly be disclosed in the group context might include details with respect to group operations, the linkages between group members, the position in the group of each member covered by the plan and the functioning of the group as such.

149. Such a reorganization plan or plans would need to take into account the different interests of the different groups of creditors, including the possibility that providing varying rates of return for the creditors of different group members might be desirable in certain circumstances. Achieving an appropriate balance between the rights of different groups of creditors with respect to the approval of the plan, including appropriate majorities, both among the creditors of a single group member and between creditors of different group members, is also desirable. Classification of claims and classes of creditors also needs to be considered, as does the voting of creditors and approval of a plan, particularly when group members are creditors

⁴⁶See also *UNCITRAL Legislative Guide* (see footnote 3 above), part two, chap. IV, paras. 17-25.

of each other and would be considered “related persons” (see para. 150 below). The calculation of applicable majorities in the group context may require consideration of how creditors with the same claim against different group members should be counted for voting purposes, particularly where the claims may have different priorities. Some consideration may also need to be given to whether rejection by the creditors of one of several group members might prevent approval of the plan across the group and the consequences of that rejection. One approach might be based upon provisions applicable to the approval of a reorganization plan for a single debtor. Another approach might be to devise different majority requirements that are specifically designed to facilitate approval in the group context. Safeguards analogous to those in recommendation 152 could also be included, with an additional requirement that the plans should be fair as between the creditors of different group members.

150. In the group context, a related person includes a person who is or has been in a position of control of the debtor or a parent, subsidiary or affiliate of the debtor (see main glossary, para. 12 (*jj*)). Voting by related persons on the approval of the plan is discussed in part two, chapter IV, paragraph 48, and it is noted that although some insolvency laws restrict the ability of related persons to vote in various ways, most insolvency laws do not specifically address the issue. It should be noted that where the insolvency law includes such restrictions, they might cause difficulty in some groups when a particular member has only creditors that are classified as related persons or a very limited number of creditors that are not related persons.

151. An insolvency law might also include provisions addressing the consequences of failure to approve such a reorganization plan or plans as addressed by recommendation 158. One law, for example, provides that the consequence of failure to approve a plan is the liquidation of all insolvent group members. Where solvent members participated in the plan by consent, special provisions may be required to prevent undue advantages or disadvantages arising from such a liquidation.

2. Inclusion of a solvent group member in a reorganization plan

152. Paragraphs 11 to 15 above discuss the possibility of including a solvent group member in an application for commencement of proceedings. It is noted that an apparently solvent member may, on further investigation, satisfy the commencement standard of imminent insolvency and thus be covered, for commencement purposes, by recommendation 15. That situation may not be uncommon in an enterprise group in which the insolvency of some members leads almost inevitably to the insolvency of others. Where

imminent insolvency is not an issue, however, a solvent group member generally could not participate in a reorganization plan for other members of the same group subject to insolvency proceedings under the insolvency law. There may, however, be circumstances in which different levels of participation by a solvent member in a reorganization plan might be both appropriate and feasible, on a voluntary basis. Such participation by solvent group members is, in fact, not unusual in practice. The solvent group member could thus aid the reorganization of other enterprise group members and would be contractually bound by the plan once it were approved and, where required, confirmed. The decision of a solvent group member to participate in a reorganization plan would be an ordinary business decision of that member, and the consent of creditors would not be necessary unless required by applicable company law. With respect to any disclosure statement accompanying a plan that included a solvent group member, caution would need to be exercised in disclosing information relating to that solvent group member and its business affairs.

Recommendations 237-238

Purpose of legislative provisions

The purpose of provisions relating to reorganization plans in an enterprise group context is:

(a) To facilitate the coordinated reorganization of the businesses of enterprise group members subject to the insolvency law, thereby preserving employment and, in appropriate cases, protecting investment; and

(b) To facilitate the negotiation and proposal of coordinated reorganization plans in insolvency proceedings with respect to two or more enterprise group members.

Contents of legislative provisions

Coordinated reorganization plans (paras. 147-151)

237. The insolvency law should permit coordinated reorganization plans to be proposed in insolvency proceedings with respect to two or more enterprise group members.

Including a solvent group member in a reorganization plan for an insolvent group member (para. 152)

238. The insolvency law should specify that an enterprise group member that is not subject to insolvency proceedings may voluntarily participate in a reorganization plan proposed for one or more enterprise group members subject to insolvency proceedings.

III. Addressing the insolvency of enterprise groups: international issues

A. Introduction

1. The introduction to the *UNCITRAL Practice Guide*⁴⁷ notes that although the number of cross-border insolvency cases has increased significantly since the 1990s, the adoption of legal regimes, either domestic or international, equipped to address cases of a cross-border nature has not kept pace. The lack of such regimes has often resulted in inadequate and uncoordinated approaches that are unpredictable in their application and have not only hampered the rescue of financially troubled businesses and the fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies, but also impeded the protection and maximization of the value of the assets of the insolvent debtor. Moreover, the disparities in and, in some cases, conflicts between national laws have created unnecessary obstacles to the achievement of the basic economic and social goals of insolvency proceedings. There has often been a lack of transparency, with no clear rules on recognition of the rights and priorities of existing creditors, the treatment of foreign creditors and the law that will be applicable to cross-border issues. While many of these inadequacies are also apparent in domestic insolvency regimes, their impact is potentially much greater in cross-border cases, particularly where reorganization is the goal.

2. In addition to the inadequacy of existing laws, the lack of predictability as to their application in practice, and the associated costs and delays, has added a further layer of uncertainty that can affect capital flows and cross-border investment. The acceptance of different types of proceedings, understanding of key concepts and treatment accorded to parties with an interest in insolvency proceedings differ. Reorganization or rescue procedures, for example, are more prevalent in some countries than others. The involvement of, and treatment accorded to, secured creditors in insolvency proceedings varies widely. Different countries also recognize different types of proceedings with different effects. An example in the context of reorganization proceedings is the cases in which the law of one State envisages a debtor

⁴⁷See *UNCITRAL Practice Guide* (see footnote 2 above).

in possession continuing to exercise management functions, while under the law of another State in which contemporaneous insolvency proceedings are being conducted with respect to the same debtor, existing management will be displaced or the debtor's business liquidated. Many national insolvency laws have claimed, for their own insolvency proceedings, application of the principle of universality, with the objective of a unified proceeding where court orders would be effective with respect to assets located abroad. At the same time, those laws do not accord recognition to universality claimed by foreign insolvency proceedings. In addition to differences between key concepts and treatment of participants, some of the effects of insolvency proceedings, such as the application of a stay or suspension of actions against the debtor or its assets, regarded as a key element of many laws, cannot be applied effectively across borders.

3. In the international context, the models that have been created to address cross-border insolvency issues have always stopped short of dealing satisfactorily with enterprise groups. When the House of Lords of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland considered whether the United Kingdom should subscribe to the European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, the relevant committee commented on the failure of the Convention to deal with groups of companies—the most common form of business model. When the Convention became European Council (EC) Regulation No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, it still did not address the issue. When the text of what became the UNCITRAL Model Law was debated, groups were regarded as “a stage too far”.

4. Many cases illustrate the key problem with respect to enterprise groups in the international context. Where business is conducted through group members in a number of different States in an integrated manner, for example in communications groups such as KPNQwest⁴⁸ or Nortel Networks Corporation,⁴⁹ manufacturing groups such as Federal Mogul Global Inc.⁵⁰ or financial services companies such as Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.,⁵¹ widespread failure is likely to result in the commencement of a number,

⁴⁸KPNQwest was a telecommunications group that owned and operated a fibre-optic cable network connecting a number of countries in Europe and those countries to the United States. The main cables were in rings: for the ring around Europe, the French part of the ring was owned by a French subsidiary; the German part by a German subsidiary, and so on. When the Dutch parent failed, many of the subsidiaries were obliged to file for the protection of the court in the jurisdictions in which they were incorporated. No one was able to coordinate the proceedings and it was effectively broken up.

⁴⁹Referred to in the *UNCITRAL Practice Guide* (see footnote 2 above), annex 1, case No. 28: Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Toronto, Case No. 09-CL-7950 (14 January 2009), and the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, Case No. 09-10138 (15 January 2009).

⁵⁰Referred to in the *UNCITRAL Practice Guide* (see footnote 2 above), annex 1, case No. 10: United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, Case No. 01-10578, and the High Court of England and Wales, Chancery Division in London (2001).

⁵¹Referred to in the *UNCITRAL Practice Guide* (see footnote 2 above), annex 1, case No. 16: United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, Case No. 08-13555 (17 June 2009).

sometimes a very large number, of separate insolvency proceedings in different jurisdictions with respect to each of the insolvent group members. Unless those proceedings can be coordinated, it is unlikely that the group can be reorganized as a whole, and it may have to be broken up into its constituent parts. The interrelationships between group members that determine the manner in which the group is structured and operates while solvent are generally severed on insolvency. There is often a clear tension between the traditional separate legal entity approach to corporate regulation and its implications for insolvency and the facilitation of insolvency proceedings concerning a group or part of a group in a cross-border situation in a manner that would enable the goal of maximizing value for the benefit of all creditors to be achieved. The history of cross-border insolvency since the Maxwell case in 1991⁵² underscores the problems encountered in managing numbers of parallel proceedings, and the need for the creative solutions that have been developed and adopted. Some of these solutions are discussed in the *UNCITRAL Practice Guide*,⁵³ but the development of a legislative regime to address the cross-border insolvency of enterprise groups remains a challenge to be met.

5. There has been considerable discussion in recent times as to what might form the basis of a legal regime to address the cross-border insolvency of enterprise groups. Some suggestions have included adapting the concept of “centre of main interests” as it applies to an individual debtor to the situation of an enterprise group, enabling all proceedings with respect to group members to be commenced in, and administered from, a single centre through one court and subject to a single governing law. Another suggestion has been to identify a coordination centre for the group, which might be determined by reference to the location of the parent of the group or to permit group members to apply for insolvency in the State in which proceedings have commenced with respect to the insolvent parent of the group.⁵⁴

6. These proposals raise significant and difficult issues. Some relate to the very nature of multinational enterprise groups and how they operate—how to define what constitutes an enterprise group for insolvency purposes and identify the factors that might be appropriate to determining where the group centre is located, assuming that there is only one centre for each

⁵²*Maxwell Communication Corporation plc*: referred to in the *UNCITRAL Practice Guide* (see footnote 2 above), annex 1, case No. 24: United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, Case No. 91 B 15741 (15 January 1992), and the High Court of England and Wales, Chancery Division, Companies Court, Case No. 0014001 of 1991 (31 December 1991).

⁵³See *UNCITRAL Practice Guide* (see footnote 2 above), chaps. II and III.

⁵⁴These issues are discussed in some detail in the working papers of UNCITRAL Working Group V (Insolvency Law) (see A/CN.9/WG.V/WP/90/Add.1, paras. 5-6; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.85/Add.1, paras. 3-12; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.82/Add.4, paras. 3-15; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.76/Add.2, paras. 2-17; A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.74/Add.2, paras. 6-12). Available from http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/5Insolvency.html.

group—as well as to questions of jurisdiction over the constituent members of the group, eligibility to commence insolvency proceedings and applicable law. Others relate to the challenge of reaching broad international agreement on these issues in order to achieve a consistently, widely applied and, possibly, binding solution that will deliver certainty and predictability to the cross-border insolvency of enterprise groups.

B. Promoting cross-border cooperation in enterprise group insolvencies

1. Introduction

7. The first step in finding a solution to the problem of how to facilitate the global treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency might be to ensure that existing principles for cross-border cooperation apply to enterprise group insolvencies. Cooperation between courts and insolvency representatives in insolvency proceedings involving multinational enterprise groups may help to facilitate commercial predictability and increase certainty for trade and commerce, as well as fair and efficient administration of proceedings that protects the interests of the parties, maximizes the value of the assets of group members to preserve employment and minimizes costs. Although there are enterprise groups in which separate insolvency proceedings may be a feasible option because there is a low degree of integration in the group and group members are relatively independent of each other, for many groups cooperation may be the only way to reduce the risk of piecemeal insolvency proceedings that have the potential to destroy going-concern value and lead to asset ring-fencing, as well as asset shifting or forum shopping by debtors.

8. A widespread limitation on cooperation between courts and insolvency representatives from different jurisdictions in cases of cross-border insolvency derives from the lack of a legislative framework, or from uncertainty regarding the scope of any existing legislative authorization, for pursuing cooperation with foreign courts and insolvency representatives. The UNCITRAL Model Law provides that legislative framework, addressing issues of access to foreign courts and recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings, and authorizing cross-border cooperation and communication between courts, between courts and insolvency representatives and between insolvency representatives.⁵⁵

⁵⁵UNCITRAL *Practice Guide* (see footnote 2 above), chap. I, sect. B, paras. 9-16 provides a short introduction to the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency; chap. II of the *Practice Guide* discusses possible forms of cooperation under the Model Law.

9. However, since the provisions of the Model Law focus on individual debtors, albeit with assets in different States, they have limited application to enterprise groups with multiple debtors in different States. A key difference in enterprise group insolvencies is that the court in one jurisdiction is not necessarily dealing with the same debtor as the court in another jurisdiction (although there may be a common debtor in the case of individual group members that have assets in different States, a situation within the scope of the Model Law). The link between parallel proceedings is not a common debtor, but rather that the debtors are all members of the same enterprise group. Unless the existence (and possibly the extent) of that group is or can be recognized under national law, each proceeding will appear to be unconnected to each other proceeding and cooperation will appear to be unwarranted on the basis that it might interfere with the independence of local courts or be deemed unnecessary because each proceeding is, essentially, a national proceeding. While it may be possible in some instances to treat each group member entirely separately, for many enterprise groups the best result for the different members may be achieved through a more widely based and potentially global solution that reflects the manner in which the group conducted its business before the onset of insolvency and addresses either distinct business units or the enterprise group as a whole, particularly where the business is closely integrated.

10. For these reasons, it is desirable that an insolvency law recognize the existence of enterprise groups and the need, with respect to cross-border cooperation, for courts to cooperate with other courts and with insolvency representatives, not just with respect to insolvency proceedings concerning the same debtor, but also with respect to different members of an enterprise group.

2. *Access to courts and recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings*

11. The current rules and practices on cross-border assistance and cooperation in insolvency matters are rather diverse, including those rules relating to access to the courts and the recognition of foreign proceedings. In many States, some form of recognition of the foreign proceeding is a prerequisite to further assistance and cooperation. To achieve that recognition, those seeking assistance and cooperation, whether the insolvency representative or creditors, generally require standing to make an application to the foreign court. That application might relate to assistance with respect to a stay of proceedings, examination of witnesses and other matters included in articles 20 and 21 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. The work undertaken in preparation of the Model Law highlighted the widespread absence of domestic laws

addressing these issues and the different approaches taken in the laws that had been enacted. To achieve a uniform approach, the Model Law provides the legislative framework for access to courts and recognition of foreign proceedings,⁵⁶ establishing appropriate conditions to ensure expedited and direct access (articles 9-14), the criteria for determining whether foreign proceedings are proceedings that qualify for recognition and the effects of recognition (articles 15-24). Although the Model Law has limited application in the enterprise group context, it is desirable that the access to courts and recognition of foreign proceedings it provides with respect to individual debtors also be provided with respect to insolvency proceedings involving members of the same enterprise group.

12. It should be noted that cooperation between a court and a foreign court or foreign representatives⁵⁷ as envisaged under the UNCITRAL Model Law does not require a formal decision to recognize the foreign proceeding, encouraging cooperation from the earliest stages of the proceedings.⁵⁸

13. In States where access and recognition are not required to facilitate cooperation, further legislation may not be required. However, the existence of such provisions may not be sufficient, as available mechanisms may be cumbersome, costly and time-consuming. Only where access and recognition are readily available in a timely manner is it likely that effective cooperation with respect to the administration of proceedings concerning multinational groups can be achieved.

⁵⁶“Foreign proceeding” is defined in article 2 (a) of the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (see footnote 1 above) to mean “a collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign State, including an interim proceeding, pursuant to a law relating to insolvency in which proceeding the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a foreign court, for the purpose of reorganization or liquidation”.

⁵⁷“Foreign representative” is defined in article 2 (d) of the Model Law (see footnote 1 above) to mean “a person or body, including one appointed on an interim basis, authorized in a foreign proceeding to administer the reorganization or the liquidation of the debtor’s assets or affairs or to act as a representative of the foreign proceeding”.

⁵⁸*Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.05.V.10), annex III, part two), para. 177.

Recommendation 239

Purpose of legislative provisions

The purpose of provisions on access to courts and recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings with respect to enterprise group members is to ensure that access and recognition are available under applicable law.

Contents of legislative provisions

Access to courts and recognition of foreign proceedings

239. The insolvency law should provide, in the context of insolvency proceedings with respect to enterprise group members:

- (a) Access to the courts for foreign representatives and creditors; and
- (b) Recognition of the foreign proceedings, if necessary under applicable law.

C. Forms of cooperation involving courts

14. Cooperation in cross-border insolvencies may take different forms and may include, as suggested in article 27 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, communication between the courts, between the courts and insolvency representatives and between the insolvency representatives, as well as the use of cross-border insolvency agreements,⁵⁹ coordination of hearings and coordination of the supervision and administration of the debtor's affairs. In the context of a single debtor, authorization for cooperation is provided by articles 25 and 26 of the Model Law. Article 25 authorizes the court to cooperate to the maximum extent possible with foreign courts, while article 26 authorizes an insolvency representative, in the exercise of its functions and subject to the supervision of the court, to cooperate to the maximum extent possible with foreign courts and representatives. The issue of cooperation is also addressed, within the European Union, by EC Regulation No. 1346/2000. Recital 20 notes that in the context of main⁶⁰ and secondary⁶¹

⁵⁹“Cross-border insolvency agreement” is defined in the *UNCITRAL Practice Guide* (see footnote 2 above) (see glossary (see Introduction, sect. B), para. 13 (i)) as “an oral or written agreement intended to facilitate the coordination of cross-border insolvency proceedings and cooperation between courts, between courts and insolvency representatives and between insolvency representatives, sometimes also involving other parties in interest”. The *UNCITRAL Practice Guide* compiles practice with respect to the use and negotiation of these agreements, including a discussion of the issues typically addressed.

⁶⁰“Main proceeding” is defined in the UNCITRAL Model Law to mean “a foreign proceeding taking place in the State where the debtor has the centre of its main interests” (see footnote 1 above).

⁶¹Referred to in the UNCITRAL Model Law as “non-main proceedings” and defined as “a foreign proceeding, other than a foreign main proceeding, taking place in a State where the debtor has an establishment within the meaning of subparagraph (f) of this article” (see footnote 1 above).

proceedings the liquidators must cooperate closely, in particular by exchanging a sufficient amount of information. The liquidator in the main proceedings should have the ability to intervene in the secondary proceedings and to propose a reorganization plan or apply for suspension of the realization of assets in those proceedings. Article 31 of the EC Regulation establishes a duty of liquidators in main and secondary proceedings to communicate information, particularly information that may be relevant to the other proceedings and relates to progress made with respect to the submission and verification of claims and measures aimed at terminating the proceedings. Neither the UNCITRAL Model Law nor the EC Regulation addresses the need for cooperation with respect to enterprise groups, where those obligations need to be more broadly applicable and the distinction between main and non-main proceedings is not relevant, except as it applies to multiple proceedings concerning an individual group member.

1. *Communication by courts*

(a) *General considerations*

15. Both the *Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law*⁶² and the *UNCITRAL Practice Guide*⁶³ point to the desirability of enabling courts in cross-border insolvency proceedings to communicate directly with foreign courts and insolvency representatives in order to avoid the use of the traditional, time-consuming procedures, such as letters rogatory or other diplomatic or consular channels and communications via higher courts. This ability is critical when the courts consider that they should act with urgency to avoid potential conflicts or preserve value or the issues to be considered are time-sensitive. That ability to communicate should include the ability to initiate communication, by requesting information or assistance from foreign courts and insolvency representatives, as well as the ability to receive and process such requests from abroad. It is desirable, as noted in paragraph 12 above with respect to cooperation more generally, that communication not be dependent upon the formal recognition of foreign proceedings, thus enabling communication to take place before, or irrespective of whether, an application for recognition is made.

16. The different approaches taken to communication between the courts and parties serve to illustrate some of the problems that might be encountered when seeking to promote cross-border cooperation. In addition to the

⁶²*Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law* (see footnote 58 above), paras. 178-179.

⁶³*UNCITRAL Practice Guide* (see footnote 2 above), chap. II, paras. 4-10, and chap. III, paras. 146-181.

question of whether there is specific authorization for communication between courts, there is very often hesitance or reluctance on the part of courts of different jurisdictions to communicate directly with each other. That hesitance or reluctance may be based upon ethical considerations, legal culture, language or lack of familiarity with foreign laws and their implementation. It may also relate to concerns about the implications of communication for judicial independence and impartial decision-making. Some States have a relatively liberal approach to communication between judges, while in other States judges may not communicate directly with parties or insolvency representatives, or, indeed, with other judges, as such communication may give rise to constitutional issues. In some States, ex parte communications with the judge are considered normal and necessary, while in other States such communications would not be acceptable. Within States, judges and legal practitioners may have quite different views about the propriety of contacts between judges without the knowledge or participation of the legal representatives for the parties. Some judges, for example, accept that there is no difficulty with private contact among judges, while some legal practitioners would strongly disagree with that practice. Courts typically focus on the matters before them and, as noted above, may be reluctant to provide assistance to related proceedings in other States, particularly when the proceedings for which they are responsible do not appear to involve an international element in the form of a foreign debtor, foreign creditors or foreign operations.

17. A further issue of relevance to facilitating cooperation between insolvency proceedings affecting group members might be the ability or willingness of courts to take a global view of the business of the debtor and note what is occurring in insolvency proceedings in other jurisdictions concerning the same debtor or other members of the same group. This may be of particular importance where what occurs in those other jurisdictions is likely to have a domestic impact (e.g. with respect to local employees and other social policy issues). While it would not change the powers the courts have under domestic law, knowledge of or about the foreign proceedings might nevertheless affect the court's approach to local proceedings and its willingness to coordinate them with the foreign proceedings. The challenge, however, is for the court to obtain the information about an enterprise group's global operations and concurrent insolvency proceedings that would be necessary to facilitate coordination, especially where that involves gaining access to information and records that are part of insolvency proceedings in other jurisdictions concerning different debtors, albeit members of the same enterprise group. The first aspect is thus gaining access to relevant information. The second is making it available to the court in local proceedings. One approach might be to permit appropriate documentary evidence to be provided or a foreign practitioner or insolvency representative of related group members to appear in the local

court. Notwithstanding the practical difficulties, it is desirable that a court be able to take note of foreign proceedings that might affect local proceedings concerning the same enterprise group, particularly where a global solution for the group is being sought.

18. Establishing communication in cross-border cases involving enterprise groups may facilitate cross-border proceedings in many ways. For instance, it may help parties to better understand the implications or application of foreign law, particularly the differences or overlaps that may otherwise lead to litigation; advance the resolution of issues through a negotiated result acceptable to all; and provoke more reliable responses from parties, avoiding the inherent bias and adversarial distortion that may be apparent where parties represent their own particular concerns in their own jurisdictions. It may also serve international interests by creating better understanding that will encourage international business and preserving value that would otherwise be lost through fragmented judicial action. Some of the potential benefits may be hard to identify at the outset, but may become apparent once the parties have communicated. Cross-border communication may reveal, for example, some fact or procedure that will substantially inform the best resolution of the case and may, in the longer term, serve as an impetus to law reform.

19. Communication between judges or other interested parties should follow proper procedures in order to ensure that the communication is transparent, effective and credible. At a general level, it might be appropriate to consider whether communication should be treated as a matter of course or as a last resort; whether a judge may advocate that a particular course of action be taken; and, with respect to the conditions that might apply to communication, such as those mentioned below, whether they should apply in all cases or whether there might be exceptions. While courts should be given broad discretion in carrying out their communications with foreign counterparts, they should not be required to engage in communications they consider inappropriate in the circumstances of a particular case. A further issue relates to the subject matter of the communication, and in particular whether communication could address only matters of procedure or also matters of substance. Some judges take the view that they could discuss case management issues, issues of timing, use of cross-border agreements and the identification of the courts that might resolve particular issues, but not substantive issues that touch upon the merits of the case.

(b) Means of communication

20. Information may be communicated in several ways, such as by exchange of documents (e.g. copies of formal orders, judgements, opinions,

reasons for decisions, transcripts of proceedings, affidavits and other evidence) or orally. The means of communication may be post, fax or e-mail or other electronic means, or telephone or videoconference, depending upon what is available and affordable in the States involved in the communication and what is appropriate or required in each case. Copies of written communications may also be provided to the parties in accordance with applicable notice provisions. Communication may be effected directly between judges or between or through court officials (or a court-appointed intermediary— see below, para. 37) or insolvency representatives, subject to local rules. The development of new communications technologies supports various aspects of cooperation and coordination, with the potential to reduce delays and, as appropriate, facilitate face-to-face contact. As global litigation multiplies, these methods of direct communication are increasingly being used. Videoconferences, for example, have been used in a number of cases in preference to telephone conferences, because they provide reasonable control of the process and facilitate disciplined organization of the communication as the participants can hear and see each other, an aspect that is central to court proceedings generally. However, since these technologies are not available to all courts, it is desirable that the focus be upon how the communication might be facilitated to suit the needs of the particular case, rather than upon the use of any particular technology.

(c) *Establishing rules or procedures for court-to-court communication*

21. In any particular case it will be desirable to determine, as appropriate to the relevant jurisdictions involved and in accordance with applicable law, procedures to govern court-to-court communication in order to balance the interests of the different parties and ensure that no one is prejudiced in any material way. The procedures might address: the parties to be notified of the proposed communication (e.g. all parties in interest and their legal representatives); the persons permitted to participate in the communication and any limitations that will apply; the questions to be considered; whether the parties share the same intentions or understanding with respect to communication; organization and timing of the communication; recording of the communication; any safeguards that will apply to protect the substantive and procedural rights of the parties; the language of the communication and any consequent need for translation of written documents or interpretation of oral communications (and who should bear the administrative costs); acceptable methods of communication; handling of objections to the proposed communication; and questions of confidentiality and transparency.

22. Courts may adopt guidelines, such as the Court-to-Court Guidelines,⁶⁴ to address some of these issues. Such guidelines typically are intended to promote transparent communication between courts, permitting courts of different jurisdictions to communicate with one another, without changing the applicable domestic rules or procedures or affecting or curtailing the substantive rights of any party in proceedings before the courts.

(i) Time, place and manner of communication

23. Generally, it is desirable that communications proceed at a time and place and in a manner mutually determined between the courts, the insolvency representatives and other parties in interest, as applicable. Such arrangements need not necessarily be made by the judges directly, but might involve relevant court officials.

(ii) Notice of proposed communication

24. In insolvency proceedings involving multinational enterprise groups, a balance needs to be struck between facilitating the communication in a practical and convenient manner and protecting the integrity of the communication by ensuring an open and transparent process. Various parties may be affected by communications between courts, and it may often be difficult, if not impractical, to ascertain the identity of all of those parties, including, for example, the creditors. Moreover, the jurisdictions involved may operate under different rules regarding the provision of notice, affecting issues of timing and the identity of recipients (i.e. not all parties in interest may be entitled to notice of certain issues). A key question will therefore concern the parties to be notified of any proposed communication in accordance with applicable law and the extent to which the requirements of the different laws can be coordinated. The absence of clear rules on how this issue should be approached has the potential to cause delay and erosion of value, especially when the communication is required to resolve or avoid conflicts or to address the coordination of particular issues, such as sale of assets or submission and verification of claims.

25. Provision of notice generally might be assisted by cooperation between the various courts to develop a list of parties requiring notification, which may include parties that are entitled to notice of any court business related

⁶⁴*Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communications in Cross-Border Cases*, published by the American Law Institute (16 May 2000) and adopted by the International Insolvency Institute (10 June 2001). Available from www.ali.org/doc/Guidelines.pdf.

to the insolvency proceedings, including communication.⁶⁵ Coordination of the provision of notice may be managed through an electronic system or a website, which could facilitate tracking of the changing identity of those persons entitled to notice in many insolvency proceedings, resulting from, for example, assignment or trading of claims; minimizing the costs associated with provision of notice; and taking account of the differences in the laws applicable to the provision of notice. It would also, however, have to take into consideration possible language, access and confidentiality issues.

(iii) Right to participate

26. To ensure the credibility of the communication and the parties directly involved in it, as well as fairness and transparency, it is desirable that communications proceed in a manner that is open to participation by relevant parties, rather than *ex parte*.

27. As noted above, however, there is a need to balance those requirements against the practicalities of organizing and conducting the communication. This may require participants to be limited to parties in interest. Although different standards may govern the issue of who may be considered a party in interest⁶⁶ in the particular circumstances of the case or the communication in question, it might generally be assumed that key parties in interest would include the debtor (where it is a debtor in possession) or the insolvency representative and relevant legal representative. While the general principle might be that those particular parties in interest are entitled to participate, it may be desirable for the courts to have the right to determine, as required, who should participate in a specific case in order to ensure that the process is manageable and effective.

(iv) Recording of the communication as part of the record of the proceedings

28. To further ensure the transparency of court-to-court communication, the insolvency law may permit any communication to be recorded and a transcript prepared. The transcript may be made part of the record of the proceedings and, as such, generally would be available at least to those participating in the communication and their legal representatives or, more widely, in accordance with the rules applicable to the availability of such court records.

⁶⁵See *Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communications*, guideline 12.

⁶⁶“Party in interest” is explained in the main glossary, paragraph 12 (*dd*) (*UNCITRAL Legislative Guide* (see footnote 3 above), see Introduction, sect. B).

(v) *Confidentiality*

29. In general, communications between courts involved in parallel insolvency proceedings related to members of a multinational group should be as transparent as possible to ensure fairness to the parties involved and avoid creating incentives for the parties to hedge against the possibility of an adverse outcome. It is desirable that information not be treated as confidential simply because the communication occurs in a cross-border context.

30. However, much of the information relating to the debtors and their affairs that needs to be considered and shared in insolvency proceedings involving multinational enterprise groups may be commercially sensitive, confidential or subject to obligations owed to third persons (such as trade secrets, research and development information, and customer information). Such information may be especially sensitive in the case of a debtor in reorganization proceedings where its continued ability to operate in the market and the protection of value may require confidentiality. Accordingly, the use of such information may need to be carefully considered and disclosure appropriately restricted to prevent third parties from taking unfair advantage of it.

31. The jurisdictions involved in insolvency proceedings relating to multinational enterprise group members may have different substantive rules regarding confidentiality and the release of information to parties. Those differences would need to be taken into account when considering cross-border communications and how they will be conducted and recorded, permitting the courts to reach agreement on the protections necessary to comply with applicable law.

32. Confidentiality of information may also be addressed in a cross-border insolvency agreement,⁶⁷ which can establish requirements for access to that information, including the use of confidentiality agreements.

(vi) *Costs of communication*

33. The issue of the costs of the communication may be a consideration, especially where many parties are affected and a means of communication is used that entails, in some States, relatively high costs, such as video-conferencing. Moreover, the use of multiple languages may complicate

⁶⁷See *UNCITRAL Practice Guide* (see footnote 2 above), chap. III, paras. 168-171; see also *UNCITRAL Legislative Guide* (see footnote 3 above), part two, chap. III, paras. 28, 52 and 115 and recommendation 111 on obligations of confidentiality in insolvency proceedings.

communication, with cost implications where translation of documents and interpretation of oral communication are required. It will be important to determine how the costs are to be borne by, or apportioned among, the relevant insolvency proceedings. If reimbursement of the costs of certain parties is involved, it should be clear how, and the currency in which, that will occur.

(vii) *Effect of communication*

34. Where a court communicates with a foreign court in the context of cross-border insolvency proceedings, the insolvency law should make it clear that the mere fact of communication having taken place would not imply a substantive effect on the authority or powers of the court, the matters before it, its orders or the rights and claims of parties participating in the communication. Such a proviso reassures the parties that the communication between the authorities involved in the insolvency proceedings will not jeopardize their rights or affect the authority and independence of the court before which they are appearing. It is also likely to reduce the likelihood of objections to planned communication and furnish the courts and their representatives with greater flexibility in their cooperation with each other. Further, it may ensure that courts and their representatives do not operate beyond the limits of their authority in engaging in communication with their counterparts in different jurisdictions. Notwithstanding such a proviso, it should be possible for the courts to explicitly reach agreement on a range of matters, including approval of a cross-border insolvency agreement.

2. *Coordination of the debtor's assets and affairs*

35. The conduct of cross-border insolvency proceedings concerning enterprise groups will often require assets of the different insolvency estates to continue to be used, realized or disposed of in the course of the proceedings. Coordination of such use, realization and disposal will help to avoid disputes and ensure that the benefit of all parties in interest is the key focus, particularly in reorganization. For example, one member of an enterprise group may serve as the exclusive supplier of another group member or have exclusive control over a key resource used by another member, so that insolvency proceedings with respect to one of those members might have profound consequences on the continuing operation of the entire group. Coordinating the debtor's assets and affairs may involve both the courts and the insolvency representatives. Some matters may require specific approval by the courts, while others may be addressed by agreement between the insolvency representatives.

36. Some of the issues to be considered in facilitating this coordination may include: the location of the various assets and identification of the jurisdiction to which they are subject; determination of the law governing the assets and the parties responsible for determining how they can be used or disposed of (e.g. the insolvency representative, the courts or in some cases the debtor), including the approvals required; the extent to which responsibility for those assets can be shared among or allocated to different parties in different States; how information concerning the affairs of different debtors in different jurisdictions can be obtained and shared to ensure coordination and cooperation; and the sequence in which proceedings should evolve. Coordination may be relevant to investigating the debtor's assets, considering possible avoidance proceedings and restricting the debtor's ability to move assets to locations beyond the reach of the court or insolvency representative. It may also require the courts to identify the optimal forum for addressing a particular issue, such as sale or disposal of a certain asset, and to defer to that forum to the extent permitted by law.⁶⁸

3. *Appointment of a court representative*⁶⁹

37. A court may appoint a representative to facilitate the coordination of insolvency proceedings concerning enterprise group members taking place in different jurisdictions. The person may have a variety of possible functions as directed by the courts, but should not be regarded as an additional insolvency representative or as a substitute for an existing insolvency representative. The representative's potential functions might include: acting as a go-between for the courts and the insolvency representatives involved, especially where issues of language are raised; developing a cross-border insolvency agreement in consultation with the relevant parties; promoting consensual resolution of issues between the parties; facilitating the flow of information between the different proceedings; and ensuring that notice with respect to certain business before the courts is given to all parties in interest (e.g. other members of the enterprise group, creditors and foreign courts or insolvency representatives). The appointing court may consider the qualifications required to perform the functions to be undertaken, as well as issues of conflict, and will typically outline the terms under which appointees are authorized to act and the extent of their powers. A representative may be appointed for a specific purpose, such as the negotiation of a cross-border insolvency agreement, or, more generally to carry out a range of the functions noted above. The person may be required to report to the court or courts involved in the proceedings on a regular basis, as well as to the parties.

⁶⁸Allocation of responsibility for certain actions between the different courts and the issue of deferral is discussed in the *UNCITRAL Practice Guide* (see footnote 2 above), chap. II, paras. 18-20; chap. III, paras. 59-74.

⁶⁹See *UNCITRAL Practice Guide* (see footnote 2 above), chap. II, paras. 2-3.

4. Coordination of hearings

38. Hearings that might variously be described as joint, simultaneous or coordinated (“coordinated hearings”)⁷⁰ can significantly promote the efficiency of parallel insolvency proceedings involving members of a multinational enterprise group by bringing relevant parties in interest together at the same time to share information and discuss and resolve outstanding issues or potential conflicts, thus avoiding protracted negotiations and resulting time delays. What needs to be emphasized with respect to such hearings, however, is that each court should reach its own decision independently and without influence from any other court. While such hearings may be relatively convenient to organize in a domestic setting to ensure coordination of proceedings with respect to different group members, they can be logistically very complicated to organize in an international setting, involving as they may different languages, time zones, laws, procedures and judicial traditions. They may result in a deadlock if, for example, the competencies of the authorities engaged in the hearing are not precisely agreed or established.

39. Although they are potentially difficult to organize, such hearings have been used between some States that share a common language, legal tradition and similar time zones and have led to the successful resolution of difficult issues to the benefit of all parties concerned.⁷¹ Such hearings might be more widely used in the future, with appropriate procedures and safeguards to assist careful planning and avoid complications. The rules of procedure might address, for example, use of pre-hearing conferences; conduct of the hearings, including the language to be used and need for interpretation; requirements for the provision of notice; methods of communication to be used so that the courts can simultaneously hear each other; conditions applicable to the right to appear and be heard; documents that may be submitted; the courts to which participants may make submissions; the manner of submission of documents to the court and their availability to other courts; questions of confidentiality; limitations on the jurisdiction of each court with respect to the parties appearing before it;⁷² and the rendering of decisions.

⁷⁰These types of hearings are discussed in the *UNCITRAL Practice Guide* (see footnote 2 above), chap. III, paras. 154-159.

⁷¹See for example, the cases of *Quebecor World Inc.*, Montreal Superior Court, Commercial Division, (Canada) No. 500-11-032338-085 and the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, No. 08-10152 (2008) and *Solv-Ex Canada Limited and Solv-Ex Corporation*, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, Case No. 9701-10022 (28 January 1998), and the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico, Case No. 11-97-14362-MA (28 January 1998); further details of these cases are provided in the *UNCITRAL Practice Guide* (see footnote 2 above), annex I, cases Nos. 36 and 40.

⁷²See for example, UNCITRAL Model Law (see footnote 1 above), article 10.

40. Some guidelines and agreements dealing with these types of hearings provide that in order to best plan for orderly administration, the courts, their appointees or the insolvency representatives should communicate with their foreign counterparts in advance of the hearing to establish guidelines related to all procedural, administrative and preliminary matters. Once a hearing has been concluded, the relevant authorities may further communicate to assess the content of the hearing, discuss next steps (including additional hearings), develop or modify guidelines for future hearings, consider whether issuing joint orders would be feasible or warranted and determine how certain procedural issues that were raised in the hearing should be resolved.⁷³

Recommendations 240-245

Purpose of legislative provisions

The purpose of legislative provisions on cooperation involving courts in the context of multinational enterprise groups is:

(a) To authorize and facilitate cooperation between the courts seized of insolvency proceedings relating to different members of an enterprise group in different States;

(b) To authorize and facilitate cooperation between the courts and the insolvency representatives appointed to administer those different proceedings; and

(c) To facilitate and promote the use of various forms of cooperation to coordinate insolvency proceedings with respect to different enterprise group members in different States and establish the conditions and safeguards that should apply to those forms of cooperation to protect the substantive and procedural rights of parties and the authority and independence of the courts.

Contents of legislative provisions⁷⁴

Cooperation between the court and foreign courts or foreign representatives⁷⁵
(paras. 14 and 37)

240. The insolvency law should permit the court that is competent with respect to insolvency proceedings concerning an enterprise group member to cooperate to the maximum extent possible with foreign courts or foreign

⁷³See also *UNCITRAL Practice Guide* (see footnote 2 above), chap. II, para. 15 and chap. III, paras. 154-159; *Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communications* (see footnote 64 above), guideline 9 (e).

⁷⁴These recommendations on cooperation are intended to be permissive, not directive and are consistent with the corresponding articles of the UNCITRAL Model Law (see footnote 1 above), articles 25, para. 1 and article 26, para. 1.

⁷⁵See footnote 57 for the definition of “foreign representative”.

representatives, either directly or through the insolvency representative or other person appointed to act at the direction of the court, to facilitate the coordination of those proceedings and insolvency proceedings commenced in other States with respect to members of the same enterprise group.

Cooperation to the maximum extent possible involving courts (para. 14)

241. The insolvency law should specify that cooperation to the maximum extent possible between the court and foreign courts or foreign representatives be implemented by any appropriate means, including, for example:

(a) Communication of information by any means considered appropriate by the court, including provision to the foreign court or the foreign representative of copies of documents issued by the court or that have been or are to be filed with the court concerning the enterprise group members subject to insolvency proceedings or participation in communications with the foreign court or foreign representative;

(b) Coordination of the administration and supervision of the affairs of the enterprise group members subject to insolvency proceedings;

(c) Appointment of a person or body to act at the direction of the court; and

(d) Approval or implementation of agreements concerning coordination of insolvency proceedings in accordance with recommendation 254.

Direct communication between the court and foreign courts or foreign representatives⁷⁶ (paras. 15-20)

242. The insolvency law should permit the court that is competent with respect to insolvency proceedings concerning an enterprise group member to communicate directly with, or to request information or assistance directly from, foreign courts or foreign representatives concerning those proceedings and insolvency proceedings commenced in other States with respect to members of the same enterprise group to facilitate coordination of those proceedings.

⁷⁶See UNCITRAL Model Law (see footnote 1 above), article 25, para. 2 and article 26, para. 2.

Recommendations 240-245 (continued)*Conditions applicable to cross-border communication involving courts (paras. 21-33)*

243. The insolvency law should specify that communication between the courts and between courts and foreign representatives should be subject to the following conditions:

(a) The time, place and manner of communication should be determined between the courts or between the courts and foreign representatives;

(b) Notice of any proposed communication should be provided to parties in interest in accordance with applicable law;

(c) An insolvency representative should be entitled to participate in person in a communication. A party in interest may participate in a communication in accordance with applicable law and when determined by the court to be appropriate;

(d) The communication may be recorded and a written transcript prepared as directed by the courts. That transcript may be treated as an official transcript of the communication and filed as part of the record of the proceedings;

(e) Communications should be treated as confidential only in exceptional cases to the extent considered appropriate by the courts and in accordance with applicable law; and

(f) Communication should respect the mandatory rules of the jurisdictions involved in the communication, as well as the substantive and procedural rights of parties in interest, in particular the confidentiality of information.

Effect of communication (para. 34)

244. The insolvency law should specify that communication involving the courts shall not imply:

(a) A compromise or waiver by the court of any powers, responsibilities or authority;

(b) A substantive determination of any matter before the court;

(c) A waiver by any of the parties of any of their substantive or procedural rights; or

(d) A diminution of the effect of any of the orders made by the court.

Coordination of hearings (paras. 38-40)

245. The insolvency law may permit the court to conduct a hearing in coordination with a foreign court. Where hearings are coordinated, they may be subject to certain conditions to safeguard the substantive and procedural rights of parties and the jurisdiction of each court. Those conditions might address the rules applicable to the conduct of the hearing; the requirements for the provision of notice; the method of communication to be used; the conditions applicable to the right to appear and be heard; the manner of submission of documents to the court and their availability to a foreign court; and limitation of the jurisdiction of each court to the parties appearing before it.⁷⁷ Notwithstanding the coordination of hearings, each court remains responsible for reaching its own decision on the matters before it.

D. Forms of cooperation involving insolvency representatives

1. Promoting cooperation

41. As noted in part two, chapter III, starting in paragraph 35, the insolvency representative plays a central role in the effective and efficient implementation of the insolvency law, with day-to-day responsibility for administration of the insolvency estate of the debtor. Thus, the insolvency representatives will play a key role in ensuring the successful coordination of multiple proceedings concerning enterprise group members by working with each other and with the courts concerned. In order to fulfil that role, the insolvency representative, like the court, will need to have appropriate authorization to undertake the necessary tasks of, for example, sharing information, coordinating day-to-day administration and supervision of the debtor's affairs and negotiating cross-border insolvency agreements.

42. As noted above, such arrangements for cooperation and coordination cannot diminish or remove insolvency representatives obligations under the law governing their appointment.

⁷⁷See also UNCITRAL Model Law (see footnote 1 above), article 10.

Recommendations 246-250

Purpose of legislative provisions

The purpose of legislative provisions on cooperation between insolvency representatives and between insolvency representatives and foreign courts in the context of multinational enterprise groups is:

(a) To authorize and facilitate cooperation between insolvency representatives appointed to administer insolvency proceedings relating to different members of an enterprise group in different States and between those representatives and foreign courts; and

(b) To facilitate and promote the use of various forms of cooperation between those insolvency representatives and between them and foreign courts and establish the conditions and safeguards that should apply to those forms of cooperation to protect the substantive and procedural rights of parties in interest.

Contents of legislative provisions

Cooperation between the insolvency representative and foreign courts

246. The insolvency law should permit the insolvency representative appointed to administer insolvency proceedings with respect to an enterprise group member, in the exercise of its functions and subject to the supervision of the court, to cooperate to the maximum extent possible with foreign courts to facilitate coordination of those proceedings and insolvency proceedings commenced in other States with respect to members of the same enterprise group.

Cooperation between insolvency representatives

247. The insolvency law should permit the insolvency representative appointed to administer insolvency proceedings with respect to an enterprise group member, in the exercise of its functions and subject to the supervision of the court, to cooperate to the maximum extent possible with foreign representatives⁷⁸ appointed to administer insolvency proceedings commenced in other States with respect to members of the same enterprise group to facilitate coordination of those proceedings.

Direct communication between the insolvency representative and foreign courts

248. The insolvency law should permit an insolvency representative appointed to administer insolvency proceedings with respect to an enterprise group

⁷⁸See footnote 57 for the definition of a foreign representative, which would include an insolvency representative appointed on an interim basis.

member, in the exercise of its functions and subject to the supervision of the court, to communicate directly with or to request information or assistance directly from foreign courts concerning those proceedings and insolvency proceedings commenced in other States with respect to members of the same enterprise group to facilitate coordination of those proceedings.

Direct communication between insolvency representatives

249. The insolvency law should permit an insolvency representative appointed to administer insolvency proceedings with respect to an enterprise group member, in the exercise of its functions and subject to the supervision of the court, to communicate directly with foreign representatives appointed to administer insolvency proceedings commenced in other States with respect to members of the same enterprise group concerning those proceedings to facilitate coordination of those proceedings.

Cooperation to the maximum extent possible between insolvency representatives

250. The insolvency law should specify that cooperation to the maximum extent possible between insolvency representatives be implemented by any appropriate means, including:

(a) Sharing and disclosure of information concerning the enterprise group members subject to insolvency proceedings, provided appropriate arrangements are made to protect confidential information;

(b) Use of cross-border insolvency agreements⁷⁹ in accordance with recommendation 253;

(c) Allocation of responsibilities between insolvency representatives, including one insolvency representative taking a coordinating role;

(d) Coordination of the administration and supervision of the affairs of the enterprise group members subject to insolvency proceedings, including day-to-day operations where the business is to be continued; post-commencement finance; safeguarding of assets; use and disposition of assets; exercise of avoidance powers; communication with creditors and meetings of creditors; submission and admission of claims, including intra-group claims; and distributions to creditors; and

(e) Coordination with respect to the proposal and negotiation of reorganization plans.

⁷⁹The *UNCITRAL Practice Guide* (see footnote 2 above) compiles practice with respect to the use and negotiation of these agreements, including a discussion of the issues typically addressed.

2. *Appointment of a single or the same insolvency representative*

43. The issue of promoting coordination may also be approached via the appointment of the insolvency representative, by considering, for example, the appointment of the same or a single insolvency representative in multiple insolvency proceedings affecting members of the same group in different States, where that person (whether natural or legal) meets applicable local requirements (see chap. II, paras. 139-145 above with respect to domestic proceedings). In addition to the benefits that such an appointment might bring to multiple domestic proceedings, in the international context it has the potential to greatly facilitate cooperation between the different proceedings and the reorganization of the group as a whole.

44. As noted above with respect to the domestic context, in deciding whether it would be appropriate to appoint a single or the same insolvency representative, the nature of the group, including the level of integration of its members and its business structure, would need to be considered. In addition, it is highly desirable that any person to be appointed in that capacity have the appropriate experience and knowledge (see part two, chap. III, paras. 36-47, especially para. 39) of international insolvency matters and that that knowledge and experience be carefully scrutinized before the appointment is made to ensure that it is appropriate to the particular group members concerned and the business they conduct. It is also desirable that a single or the same insolvency representative be appointed to administer two or more group members only where it will be in the interests of the insolvency proceedings to do so.

45. Where such persons could be appointed, they would be subject to the local law of the States in which they were appointed, in particular as regards qualifications, licensing (where applicable), powers and duties and supervision by the court. Accordingly, the insolvency representative would be subject to the same requirements as a local insolvency representative appointed in one of those States.

46. The appointment could be of a natural person qualified to act in different States or a legal person, where that legal person employed or had as its members appropriately qualified persons who could serve as insolvency representatives in a number of different States. Although the availability of those qualified persons might generally be limited, there may be regions where such an appointment is more common or the globalization of trade and services makes it increasingly feasible.⁸⁰

⁸⁰See *UNCITRAL Practice Guide* (see footnote 2 above), chap. III, para. 10 (*j*), which refers to cases involving Hong Kong, China, and the British Virgin Islands and Bermuda.

47. Where such an approach is adopted, provisions to avoid potential conflicts of interest may need to be considered. Such a conflict of interest might arise when the group members represented by a single insolvency representative had different interests in a particular issue, for example, post-commencement finance or the verification and admission of claims, especially intra-group claims, or when the obligations of the insolvency representative under different insolvency laws were directly in conflict. Those cases might be addressed in the same manner as indicated above with respect to the appointment of a single or the same insolvency representative in the domestic context (chap. II, para. 144 above and recommendation 233).

Recommendations 251-252

Purpose of legislative provisions

The purpose of legislative provisions on appointment of the insolvency representative in the context of multinational enterprise groups is, in the interests of promoting efficient and effective administration of insolvency proceedings with respect to members of the same enterprise group in different States,

(a) To authorize, where the court determines it to be in the best interests of the relevant insolvency proceedings, the appointment of a single or the same insolvency representative to administer multiple proceedings; and

(b) To address any conflicts of interest that might arise where a single or the same insolvency representative is appointed.

Contents of legislative provisions

Appointment of a single or the same insolvency representative (paras. 43-46)

251. The insolvency law should permit the court, in appropriate cases, to coordinate with foreign courts with respect to the appointment of a single or the same insolvency representative to administer insolvency proceedings concerning members of the same enterprise group in different States, provided that the insolvency representative is qualified to be appointed in each of the relevant States. To the extent required by applicable law, the insolvency representative would be subject to the supervision of each of the appointing courts.

Conflict of interest (para. 47)

252. The insolvency law should specify measures to address any conflict of interest that might arise when a single or the same insolvency representative is appointed to administer insolvency proceedings with respect to two or more enterprise group members in different States. Such measures may include the appointment of one or more additional insolvency representatives.

E. Use of cross-border insolvency agreements

48. The insolvency community, faced with the daily necessity of dealing with insolvency cases and attempting to coordinate the administration of cross-border insolvencies in the absence of widespread adoption of facilitating national or international laws, has developed cross-border insolvency agreements, which are discussed in detail in the *UNCITRAL Practice Guide*. They are designed to address issues arising in cross-border cases, facilitating their resolution through cooperation among the courts, the debtor and other parties in interest across jurisdictional lines, to work efficiently and to increase realizations for creditors in potentially competing jurisdictions. Their use can effectively reduce the cost of litigation and enable parties to focus on the conduct of the insolvency proceedings, rather than upon resolving conflict-of-laws and other such disputes. Moreover, in addition to clarifying parties' expectations, such agreements can assist in the preservation of the debtor's assets and the maximization of value. In the practice to date, such agreements have typically been approved by the courts, but they might also be approved by creditors or creditor committees or operate as contractual arrangements between the signatories.⁸¹

49. Cross-border insolvency agreements are generally entered into for the purpose of facilitating international cooperation and the coordination of multiple insolvency proceedings in different States. Typically, they are designed to assist in the management of those proceedings and are intended to reflect the harmonization of procedural rather than substantive issues between the jurisdictions involved (although in limited circumstances, substantive issues may also be addressed). They vary in form (written versus oral) and scope (generic to specific) and may be entered into by different parties. Simple generic agreements may emphasize the need for close cooperation between the parties, without addressing specific issues, while more detailed, specific agreements establish a framework of principles to govern multiple insolvency proceedings.

50. Those agreements can be regarded as contracts between the signatories or, in case of approval by the court, may obtain the legal status of a court order. Agreements may cover one or more matters, and nothing prevents parties from concluding several agreements as proceedings progress to address different issues that arise. It is not uncommon, for example, to have agreements addressing general communication and cooperation at the start of insolvency proceedings, followed later by specific agreements on claims procedures. The conclusion of a cross-border insolvency agreement is thus

⁸¹*UNCITRAL Practice Guide* (see footnote 2 above), chap. III, paras. 31-33.

not limited to a certain time period, such as before the commencement of proceedings. While it is certainly preferable at an early stage of the proceedings in order to address expectations and provide clarity, an agreement may be concluded at a later stage, when particular issues arise that indicate a need for cooperation. Existing agreements may also be modified, subject to any requirements of the agreement regarding modification.

51. As noted above, cross-border insolvency agreements may include only general principles on how cooperation and coordination should be handled, or also address specific issues, depending upon the needs of the particular case and the issues to be resolved. Issues typically addressed include some or all of the following:

(a) Allocation of responsibility for various aspects of the conduct and administration of the proceedings between the different courts involved and between insolvency representatives, including limitations on authority to act without the approval of the other courts or insolvency representatives;

(b) Availability and coordination of relief;

(c) Coordination of recovery of assets for the benefit of creditors generally, in case claims for assets of a group member subject to insolvency proceedings in a different State are raised;

(d) Submission and treatment of claims;

(e) Use and disposal of assets;

(f) Methods of communication, including language, frequency and means;

(g) Provision of notice;

(h) Coordination and harmonization of reorganization plans;

(i) Issues related specifically to the agreement, including amendment and termination, interpretation, effectiveness and dispute resolution;

(j) Administration of proceedings, in particular with respect to stays of proceedings or agreement between the parties not to take certain legal actions;

(k) Choice of applicable law with respect to overlapping issues;

(l) Allocation of responsibilities between the parties to the agreement;

(m) Costs and fees; and

(n) Safeguards.

52. The safeguards included typically relate to ensuring that nothing in the agreement derogates from the court's independence and authority, public

policy and applicable law, particularly with respect to any obligations undertaken by the insolvency representative or parties, including the debtor.

53. Such agreements are increasingly common, especially in certain States, and have been successfully employed in different situations, such as concurrent reorganization and liquidation proceedings in different States; main and non-main proceedings as defined by the UNCITRAL Model Law;⁸² and concurrent insolvency and non-insolvency proceedings in different States. It should be noted, however, that while the insolvency law of certain States may permit courts to approve cross-border agreements regarding the same debtor (for example, through provisions analogous to article 27 of the Model Law), that authorization may not necessarily extend to the use of such agreements in the group context. What might be required to facilitate the global resolution of a group's financial difficulties (be it global reorganization or a combination of different procedures) is an agreement to coordinate multiple proceedings with respect to different debtors in different States, albeit members of the same group. Many laws may lack the provisions necessary to enable a court to approve or recognize an agreement relating not only to debtors subject to its jurisdiction, but also to debtors that are not, even if they are members of the same enterprise group.

54. It is desirable, therefore, that in order to enhance cross-border cooperation, an insolvency law should authorize the relevant parties—insolvency representatives and other parties in interest—to conclude cross-border insolvency agreements concerning different group members in different States and permit the courts to approve or implement them, taking into consideration the group context. It should be noted that different States may have different form requirements that will have to be observed in order for the agreements to be effective in the relevant jurisdictions.

Recommendations 253-254

Purpose of legislative provisions

The purpose of legislative provisions with respect to cross-border insolvency agreements is to ensure that the insolvency law:

(a) Permits the use of such agreements to facilitate cooperation with respect to insolvency proceedings in different States concerning members of the same enterprise group; and

(b) Authorizes the approval of such agreements by the court, as appropriate.

⁸²See footnotes 60 and 61 for the definition of these terms.

Contents of legislative provisions

Authority to enter into cross-border insolvency agreements (paras. 48, 50, 53-54)

253. The insolvency law should permit the insolvency representative and other parties in interest to enter into a cross-border insolvency agreement involving two or more members of an enterprise group in different States to facilitate coordination of insolvency proceedings with respect to those group members.

Approval or implementation of cross-border insolvency agreements (paras. 53-54)

254. The insolvency law should permit the court to approve or implement a cross-border insolvency agreement involving two or more members of an enterprise group in different States to facilitate coordination of the insolvency proceedings with respect to those enterprise group members.

Annex IV

Decision of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on part three and General Assembly resolution 65/24

A. Decision of the Commission

At its 918th meeting, on 1 July 2010, the Commission adopted the following decision:

The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,

Recognizing that effective insolvency regimes are increasingly seen as a means of encouraging economic development and investment, as well as fostering entrepreneurial activity and preserving employment,

Noting that because the business of corporations is increasingly conducted, both domestically and internationally, through enterprise groups, the formation of enterprise groups is a feature of the increasingly globalized world economy and thus significant to international trade and commerce,

Recognizing that where the business of an enterprise group fails, it is important not only to know how the group will be treated in insolvency proceedings, but also to ensure that that treatment facilitates, rather than hinders, the fast and efficient conduct of the insolvency proceedings,

Being aware that very few States recognize an enterprise group as a legal entity, except in limited ways for specific purposes and that very few, if any, have a comprehensive regime for the treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency,

Noting that while the *UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law*^a provides a sound basis for the unification of insolvency law and forms key elements of a modern commercial law framework, it does not address the insolvency of enterprise groups,

^aUnited Nations publication, Sales No. E.05.V.10.

Recalling the mandate given to Working Group V (Insolvency Law) to complement the *UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law* with provisions concerning the treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency,

Appreciating the support for and the participation of international intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations active in the field of insolvency law reform in the development of an additional part of the *UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law* addressing the treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency,

Expressing its appreciation to Working Group V (Insolvency Law) for its work in developing part three of the *UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law* on the treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency,

1. *Adopts* part three of the *UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law*, consisting of the text in documents A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.92 and Add.1, the revisions agreed by the Working Group at its thirty-eighth session (as set forth in documents A/CN.9/691 and A/CN.9/708), and the amendments adopted by the Commission at the current session, and authorizes the Secretariat to edit and finalize the text of part three of the *UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law* in the light of the deliberations of the Commission;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit the text of part three of the *UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law* to Governments and other interested bodies;

3. *Recommends* that all States utilize the *UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law* to assess the economic efficiency of their insolvency law regimes and give favourable consideration to the *Guide* when revising or adopting legislation relevant to insolvency, and invites States that have used the *Guide* to advise the Commission accordingly;

4. *Recommends also* that all States continue to consider implementation of the *UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency*;^b

5. *Recommends* that the *UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation* continue to be given due consideration by judges, insolvency practitioners and other stakeholders involved in cross-border insolvency proceedings.

B. General Assembly resolution 65/24

2. On 6 December 2010, the General Assembly adopted the following resolution:

^bUnited Nations publication, Sales No. E.99.V.3.

Part three of the **UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on
Insolvency Law**

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2205 (XXI) of 17 December 1966, by which it established the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law with the purpose of furthering the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of international trade in the interests of all peoples, in particular those of developing countries,

Recalling also its resolution 59/40 of 2 December 2004 recommending the use of the *UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law*,^c

Recognizing that effective insolvency regimes are increasingly seen as a means of encouraging economic development and investment, as well as fostering entrepreneurial activity and preserving employment,

Noting that because the business of corporations is increasingly conducted, both domestically and internationally, through enterprise groups, the formation of enterprise groups is a feature of the increasingly globalized world economy and thus significant to international trade and commerce,

Recognizing that where the business of an enterprise group fails, it is important not only to know how the group will be treated in insolvency proceedings, but also to ensure that that treatment facilitates, rather than hinders, the fast and efficient conduct of the insolvency proceedings,

Being aware that very few States recognize an enterprise group as a legal entity, except in limited ways for specific purposes, and that very few, if any, have a comprehensive regime for the treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency,

Noting that the *UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law*, while providing a sound basis for the unification of insolvency law and forming key elements of a modern commercial law framework, does not address the insolvency of enterprise groups,

Appreciating the support for and the participation of international intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations active in the field of insolvency law reform in the development of an additional part of the *UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law* addressing the treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency,

^cUnited Nations publication, Sales No. E.05.V.10.

1. *Expresses its appreciation* to the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law for developing and adopting part three of the *UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law* on the treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency;^d

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit the text of part three of the *UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law* to Governments and other interested bodies;

3. *Recommends* that all States utilize the *UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law* to assess the economic efficiency of their insolvency law regimes and give favourable consideration to the *Guide* when revising or adopting legislation relevant to insolvency, and invites States that have used the *Guide* to advise the Commission accordingly;

4. *Also recommends* that all States continue to consider implementation of the *UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency*;^e

5. *Further recommends* that the *UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation* continue to be given due consideration by judges, insolvency practitioners and other stakeholders involved in cross-border insolvency proceedings.

^dSee *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 17 (A/65/17)*, chap. V.

^eUnited Nations publication, Sales No. E.99.V.3.

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