12 (4)

Chennai Metro Rail Ltd. Vs. Transtonnelstroy Afcons (JV) & Anr. – Supreme Court

Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:
(i) The court however underlined that in the next category where the person became ineligible to be appointed as arbitrator, there was no need for a challenge to be laid before the arbitrator. In such circumstances outlined in Section 12(5), the party aggrieved could directly approach the court under Section 14(1)(a).
(ii) The grounds of ineligibility which would apply at the appointment stage, would also continue during the proceedings by virtue of Section 12(2). In other words, if during the continuance of the proceedings, the arbitrator becomes subject to any eligibility condition outlying in the Fifth Schedule, the application for his removal on the grounds of justifiable doubts about his impartiality and independence, can be made.
(iii) Parliament’s conscious effort in amending the Act, because of the inclusion of the fifth schedule, as a disclosure requirement, as an eligibility condition [Section 12 (1)] and a continuing eligibility condition, for functioning [Section 12 (2)] and later, through Section 12 (5), the absolute ineligibility conditions that render the appointment, and participation illegal, going to the root of the jurisdiction, divesting the authority of the tribunal, thus terminating the mandate of the arbitrator, as a consequence of the existence of any condition enumerated in the seventh schedule, are to clear the air of any ambiguities. The only manner of escaping the wrath, so to say of Section 12 (5) is the waiver- in writing by the party likely to be aggrieved.

Chennai Metro Rail Ltd. Vs. Transtonnelstroy Afcons (JV) & Anr. – Supreme Court Read Post »

The de jure or de facto termination of mandate of an arbitrator under section 14 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 must not only be assessed in light of the proviso to section 12(5) but also with reference to the express agreement entered into between the parties subsequent to the dispute having arisen between the parties – McLeod Russel India Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Aditya Birla Finance Ltd. & Ors. – Calcutta High Court

Hon’ble High Court held that the proviso to section 12(5) which allows the parties to a dispute to waive the applicability of section 12(5) by an express agreement in writing would hence take from and be confined to section 12(5). In other words, the express agreement of the parties to get around the disqualification under the categories mentioned in section 12(5) can only be in relation to the Seventh Schedule. This is clear from the words “… waive the applicability of this sub-section …” in the proviso (underlined for emphasis). The de jure or de facto termination of mandate of an arbitrator under section 14 must not only be assessed in light of the proviso to section 12(5) but also with reference to the express agreement entered into between the parties subsequent to the dispute having arisen between the parties.
The proviso to section 12(5) must be read in sync with the momentum of the 1996 Act. The proviso to section 12(5) is not a speed-breaker in the momentum to be achieved through arbitration but an accelerator to the process so that parties may resolve any lingering ineligibility issues and put such matters at rest once and for all. The proviso is not to be treated as an escape-route to a disgruntled party who is dissatisfied with a decision of an arbitrator and decides to do a volte-face after participating in the proceedings for a considerable length of time.

The de jure or de facto termination of mandate of an arbitrator under section 14 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 must not only be assessed in light of the proviso to section 12(5) but also with reference to the express agreement entered into between the parties subsequent to the dispute having arisen between the parties – McLeod Russel India Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Aditya Birla Finance Ltd. & Ors. – Calcutta High Court Read Post »

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